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## CONTENTS

DOSAAB: Central Committee Discussions (SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, various dates).....	1
Subject Commissions Military-Patriotic Propaganda Efforts Production Facilities Propaganda and the Organization	
DOSAAB: Civil Defense Official Discusses Propaganda Efforts (V. Grekov; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 16 Nov 80).....	13
DOSAAB: Economists Needed on Auditing Commissions (S. Kozhevnikov; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 16 Nov 80).....	17
Military Regulations: Regulations for Draftees (SOVETSKIY VOIN, May, June 80).....	21
Educational Opportunities Replies to Readers' Questions	
Command Training: Psychological Factors Discussed (Vadim Alekseyevich Ponomarev, et al, Interview; SOVETSKIY VOIN, Oct 80).....	25
Officer Describes Work With Supreme High Command in WW II (P. Plyachenko; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Jun 80).....	32
Tank Unit Fuel Conservation Efforts (S. Margin, V. Shurpin; ZNAMENOSETS, Jan 80).....	52
Tank Exercise in Carpathian Mountains Described (M. Severenchuk; ZNAMENOSETS, Feb 80).....	55

Tank Exercise in Mountains Described (N. Yezhov; ZNAMENOSETS, Apr 80).....	58
Role of Sergeant in Formulating Battlefield Strategy Described (N. Yershov; ZNAMENOSETS, May 80).....	62
Ground Forces: Training and Related Activities (ZNAMENOSETS, May, Jun 80).....	65
Artillery Observation Exercise Artillery Exercise Described Artillery Night Exercise	
Belorussian Military District Conference (ZNAMENOSETS, Jun 80).....	77
Participants Tactical Problems, by P. Pecherskiy Platoon Training, by G. Klimenkov Raising Level of Training, by L. Stankevich Antichemical Training, by A. Kolychev Tank Training Simulators, by V. Fedorov Tank Driving, by V. Bereznitskiy Antiaircraft Defense, by N. Davydov Tank-Antitank Missiles, by P. Vavilov Physical Training Night Exercise, by N. Gil' Tank Weaponry, by A. Protsenko Concluding Remarks, by M. Zaytsev	
Trainees Learn To Combat Armored Vehicles (N. Bogatov; ZNAMENOSETS, Sep 80).....	106



## DOSAAF: CENTRAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS

### Subject Commissions

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] A study of the activities of subject commissions in certain DOSAAF training organizations shows that they play an important role in increasing the effectiveness of the educational and training process and the quality of training received by specialists for the armed forces. In accordance with management documents, the following commissions have been created at vehicle and technical schools: one for vehicle operation and vehicle equipment and a second for traffic regulations and principles of safe driving. There are two commissions operating in joint technical schools in each type of training.

Indeed, subject commissions of both types work in close contact and cooperation in joint technical schools which train drivers for vehicles and wheeled armored personnel carriers. For example, the commission for regulations and safe driving principles and the commission for driving at the Khar'kov Joint Technical School render continuous assistance to the teachers and masters of both cycles.

As a rule, the staffs of the commissions at DOSAAF schools include the best trained teachers and the masters with the most practical experience. They arrange their work according to previously formulated plans which have been discussed and approved at meetings of the teachers councils. Subject commissions deal with such questions as the study and introduction into the training process of the methods recommendations of the Central Committee of the USSR Voluntary Society for Cooperation With the Armed Forces and technical and programmed methods of instruction. They also are occupied with the formulation of methods studies, the rendering of assistance to young teachers and the cultivation in future soldiers of high moral and psychological qualities and a loyalty to the glorious fighting traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Subject commissions in DOSAAF schools were created about two years ago. This is not a long period of time. However, it can be said without exaggeration that their activities are one of the reserves for improvement in the effectiveness of the educational process. For example, the quality of methods studies has been improved considerably. Previously, each of the studies had been submitted by an instructor for immediate discussion at a teachers council meeting. Now, however, it is looked into carefully beforehand and analyzed by the commission. Only after this work is done is it presented to the teachers council for approval.

At the Khar'kov Joint Technical School, 25 methods studies were analyzed and submitted to the teachers council for discussion by the subject commissions. This educational organization renders active and effective assistance to beginning instructors and masters, summarizes and disseminates the foremost experience in training and educating students and extensively employs a form of tutorship among the them.

Let us take another important issue with which the commissions constantly deal-- the organization of attendance and discussions in open classes. For example, the instructors and masters at the Borisoglebak Joint Technical School (Voronezhskaya Oblast) attended 36 classes during the course of a year. In their critiques, they devoted particular attention to the clarity of the presentation and the method used to explain the material, the use of technical aids for instruction and the methods employed to question the students. The masters of professional vehicle driving instruction are under the special tutelage of the subject commissions. It is no secret that many of them are considerably less prepared than the instructors with respect to teaching methods. The results of tests conducted by workers of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF confirm this. For example, out of four masters tested at the Pushkinogorsk vehicle school (Pskovskaya Oblast), only one received a mark of "good." Two received an "unsatisfactory," and one even got a mark of "unsatisfactory." Approximately the same indicators were found at the Velikolukskiy Joint Technical School, where 16 percent of the masters showed poor results in driving a vehicle on a test track within marked lanes.

It is for this very reason that primary significance is attached to improving the mastery of teaching methods within this category of student instructors at progressive educational organizations. At the Taganrog Vehicle School, a subject commission for drivers training (chairman A. Lubashev) provides for continuous control over the quality of exercises conducted on the test track and on city routes.

As experience shows, the subject commissions in many schools work persistently and purposefully at developing recommendations for improving the material base, organizing efficient operations and introducing technical aids for instruction. For example, at the Odessa Vehicle School No 1, under the guidance of commission chairman A. Krymov, an automatically run vehicle-equipment and vehicle-operation class was created. This innovation has now secured a place in other related educational organizations as well.

In addition, the subject commission at the Novocherkassk Joint Technical School (chairman A. Zinovkin) has analyzed the students' poor mastery of the electrical equipment section of the program, "Determining and Eliminating Faults," and has recommended that master of professional training G. Konoplev prepare an electrified "ZIL-130 electrical equipment" circuit. This is to be connected to the instruments of a display vehicle in order to introduce faults. The circuit has since been constructed and is being employed in the LPZ [expansion not provided] class. The introduction of this circuit into the training process has made it possible to eliminate some blanks in the future soldiers' learning.

Much experience in perfecting the material base has been accumulated by the Mozyr' Vehicle School. Owing to the active work of the subject commission headed by V. Artyushenko, the number of efficiency proposals submitted has grown here recently almost tenfold. The skilful organization of the activity of similar commissions

at the Borisogleb Joint Technical School has made it possible to introduce 32 proposals from innovators in the last academic year alone. This had positive aesthetic and technical results in the equipping of classrooms and the test track.

Now, before the beginning of the academic year, school administrators and the teachers councils are carefully analyzing the experience accumulated during the work of the subject commissions and are seeking alternate methods of improving their activity. Indeed there are alternate methods. For example, in his article, "Two Pressing Problems," published in SOVETSKIY PATRIOT on 13 April of this year, deputy chief of the Tula Joint Technical School A. Vladimirskiy wrote that it is now time to develop criteria for summing up the work of the commissions.

The statement of the question is well-timed. The work of the subject commissions must be appraised according to the number and the quality of the methods studies approved, the efficiency proposals introduced, the technical aids for instruction developed, the visual aids produced, etc. On the basis of these indicators, it is necessary to show a preference for one commission or another.

It is also an opportune time to raise a question in the article with regard to apportioning space for a shop where the efficiency experts and the inventors can build test beds, models, simulators and visual aids. This problem must be resolved on-site. It is felt that it is possible to find in each school such a place and to install there some simple equipment: a lathe and a drilling machine, work benches and vises.

It cannot be forgotten that the teachers council must regularly monitor the activity of the subject commissions. In accordance with circumstances, the commission chairmen are obliged to present not less than two reports per year at teachers council meetings on the work that has been accomplished. In the majority of educational organizations checked, however, these reports are not carried out in practice.

Even certain leading collectives have yet to understand the importance of the effective operation of subject commissions. For example, in the Omsk Pilot Vehicle School, the commissions did not have the work plans. This fact indicates that some managers have not made total use of all the forms and methods of improving the educational process and raising the quality of instruction of future soldiers.

This is a waste. An analysis of the work of subject commissions testifies to the fact that, when their work is skilfully organized, subject commissions have a great impact and render invaluable assistance to school administrators and teachers councils in improving the educational process.

#### Military-Patriotic Propaganda Efforts

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 28 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] In light of the requirements stated in the CPSU Central Committee resolution of 26 April 1980, the office of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee discussed the work of the Central Committee's permanent commission on questions of military-patriotic propaganda and measures for its further improvement. A report was presented by commission chairman N. Tsar'kov.



At a session of the office of the presidium, it was noted that the members of the commission and its active members, guided by the requirements of our party for further improvement in ideological and political educational work among the population, had carried out conclusive work in summarizing their positive experience and in drawing up recommendations for improving the effectiveness and the quality of the military-patriotic education received by members of the defense Society. In recent times, the commission examined questions regarding the introduction of a comprehensive approach to the military-patriotic education of workers and youth in the Gomel' DOSAAF organization. It also looked into the operational experience of the L'vov oblast DOSAAF committee in the area of perfecting forms and methods of joint work with trade unions, the Komsomol, the "Znaniye" society and other public organizations for the military-patriotic education of workers and youth. In addition, the commission considered the question of the participation of the Smolensk oblast organization in the effort to prepare for the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

The commission devoted particular attention to monitoring the fulfillment of the decisions at the Eighth All-Union Congress of the defense Society and the subsequent plenums of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The commission received practice in annual planning. As a rule, provisions are made in the plans for conducting two sessions and for studying questions of military-patriotic work in DOSAAF organizations when the commission members depart for the provinces. According to the results of tests, the members of the commission present their materials along with an analysis of the state of affairs in DOSAAF collectives and proposals for improving propaganda work.

The permanent commission summarizes advanced know-how and recommends to DOSAAF organizations ways to put it into practice more actively.

According to these recommendations, the committees and organizations of DOSAAF plan measures for the further improvement of military-patriotic work and master the practice of finding comprehensive solutions to educational problems. They also carry out measures necessary for the further development of the educational process in DOSAAF schools and clubs, for increasing the level of sporting skill and for improving educational work among sportsmen.

In addition, during one of the sessions the office of the presidium noted that the permanent commission is not employing all possible means to increase its influence on organizations of the defense Society and to improve the quality and effectiveness of military and patriotic education. The commission, it was also noted, rarely comes up with organizational questions for the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee in regard to these problems.

The office of the presidium made recommendations to the permanent commission of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee on questions of military-patriotic propaganda. This commission is guided by the requirements of the 25th party congress and the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Educational Work," as well as by the decisions of the Eighth All-Union DOSAAF Congress. The office recommended that the permanent commission continue its efforts to further improve the forms and methods of its work in improving

the effectiveness and the quality of the military-patriotic education of workers and youth and that it make an intensive analysis of the state of this work in DOSAAF organizations.

The office called upon all those permanent commissions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee which are carrying out the decisions of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the noteworthy meeting of the 26th party congress to attain a further improvement in the level of mass-organized, military-patriotic, educational and sport work. The office also required that these commissions perfect the material and technical base of DOSAAF organizations and the production activities of enterprises in the defense Society. In addition, they are to submit for discussion the urgent problems of Society activity; to develop concrete recommendations for improving the work of DOSAAF organizations; to present organizational questions to the office of the presidium, to administrations of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and to press organs of the defense Society; and to more actively involve members of the commission in the preparation of materials for plenums and plenum sessions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

During the discussion of the work of the permanent commission for questions of military-patriotic propaganda, the following individuals spoke at the offices of the presidium: first deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Col Gen A. Odintsov; deputy chairmen of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Lt Gen V. Mosyaykin, Lt Gen A. Shilin, Maj Gen V. Zemlyannikov and other members of the office of the presidium. In their speeches they emphasized the importance of the research done by permanent commissions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and local status committees within the organizations of the defense Society. They also emphasized the significance of summarizing and disseminating advanced know-how and of presenting the problem issues to DOSAAF committees. They also noted the necessity of rendering all possible cooperation in the work of the permanent commissions.

#### Production Facilities

Moscow SOVETSKIY PARTIOT in Russian 4 Jun 80 p 3

[Text] The All-Union Conference of Directors of USSR DOSAAF Production Enterprises was held in Kaunas. The results of work done in the last year and the tasks for 1980 and the 11th Five-Year Plan were examined. Papers and reports were presented by the chief of administration of USSR DOSAAF production enterprises A. Ilyushchenko, chief engineer of the administration V. Kendzya, deputy chief of the financial and planning administration A. Shiyanov, deputy chief of administration and department chief B. Myagkov and department chiefs O. Lemtyuzhnikov, M. Spivak, et al.

Deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Maj Gen Engr V. Zemlyannikov, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee Maj Gen R. Zhal'nerauskas and secretary of the Kaunas gorkom of the Lithuanian Communist Party I. Skripnikov took part in the work of the conference.

The conference devoted principal attention to questions associated with carrying out the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Effect of the Economic Mechanism On Increasing the Efficiency of Production and the Quality of Work," the decisions of the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks of the last



and concluding year of the 10th Five-Year Plan. It was noted that, on the whole, production collectives coped with their programs during the past year. Particularly good results were obtained by the Shakhtinskiy Aircraft Repair Plant and the Kropotkin Plant of DOSAAF, the "Sputnik" production association of the Latvian DOSAAF Central Committee, the Kiev Experimental Test Plant and the Vilnius and Shal'chinskii combines of the Lithuanian DOSAAF Central Committee.

At the same time, it was pointed out with great concern at the conference that, according to selected indicators, some enterprises had not reached the planned level. In particular, the Simferopol' Sport Modeling Shops, the Chernigovskaya Vehicle Repair Shop and the Donetsk production combine did not satisfy the plan with regard to the realization of production. These same enterprises, along with the Khmel'nitskiy production combine of DOSAAF, did not achieve the necessary degree of growth in labor production.

At some enterprises, the funds available for salaries were exceeded. The plan for the production of goods on the product list is not being strictly adhered to everywhere. Everything has not gone right in realizing production levels. The Leningrad "Patriot" production association did not satisfy the multiple purchase orders of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee with regard to the delivery of goods to 34 committees. At the same time, products were shipped to 34 committees without multiple purchase orders. Such practices introduce disorganization and interrupt the smooth flow of work.

What are the reasons for these shortcomings? How can they be eliminated? The conference organizers concentrated the attention of the enterprise managers on the basic problems upon whose solutions success depends: on the accurate planning of all aspects of production, on the struggle for consistency in observing conditions of material economy, on financial and labor reserves, on the technical development of enterprises, on the mastery of progressive technology, the development and production of new articles and the persistent efforts to increase product quality.

The conference did not simply take up the various omissions--emphasis was placed on their analysis and on training managers in order to familiarize them with progressive production methods. In the report of A. Ilyushchenko, for example, typical planning shortcomings were examined. One of them was the fact that the plans drawn up are not always intensive enough. This dampens the spirit of the collectives and disposes them to easy success. For 1979 the Dnepropetrovsk DOSAAF combine planned a production volume 4.9 percent lower than that reached in 1978. The planned indicator for production volume at the Odessa DOSAAF combine, too, was 5.3 percent lower than the 1978 level. The plan was exceeded. However, who needs such, to put it mildly, overfulfillment?

Alarm was also caused by the fact that here and there sufficient attention is not being devoted to planning technical development and to introducing scientific labor organization. For example, when drafting their technical, industrial and financial plans, the Moscow city and oblast DOSAAF committees completely omitted measures for scientific labor organization. It sometimes happens that everything is included in the plan but practically nothing gets done.

A large part of the conference's work was taken up with researching measures to observe economical operating conditions. Collectives of the "Sputnik" and "Patriot" production associations and of the Kiev Plant No 9 have achieved good results in this effort. In the struggle for economy and conservation, however, far from everything is being done. There are many reserves that require that attention be devoted to all aspects of production before they can be used. All questions must be solved in a comprehensive manner and the planned tasks must be unconditionally fulfilled with respect to all indicators. Only an efficient coordination of all the issues in a single plan and a persistent effort to carry out this plan can lead to success.

In this connection, it is difficult to overstate the role of socialist competition, which in the current year--the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War--has acquired enormous scope in the enterprises. Among the labor collectives, the Shakhtinsk aircraft maintenance personnel and the workers of "Sputnik" and the production association of the Armenian DOSAAF Central Committee are forging ahead.

More than 5,000 persons are participating in the movement for a communist attitude toward labor. Tutorship is developing. The practice of formulating personal plans for each year and the five-year plan has spread. Competition is being conducted between workers in the leading professions. Included among the right-flankers are: marker V. Markelov ("Patriot"); milling machine operator R. Stolyarov (Kiev Experimental Testing Plant); brigade foreman A. Shitov (Moscow DOSAAF oblast party committee); fitter V. Nesterov (Moscow DOSAAF Aircraft Repair Plant); fitter P. Levshin (Shakhtinsk DOSAAF Aircraft Repair Plant) et. al. Competition has been organized among enterprises and associations.

Competition is vital, creative work. It is necessary to seek out further methods of increasing the labor activity of the masses and of involving them in the struggle to carry out the plans of the concluding year of the five-year plan ahead of schedule. What else is sometimes lacking in socialist competition at a number of enterprises? Sometimes people undertake contracts without referring to the achievements of leaders not only in their own sector, but in the industry as a whole. Indeed, one cannot compete without seeing what is going on at other enterprises. Henceforth, it will be necessary to organize in a most serious manner information about the achievements of workers and the foremost methods of operation. The organizers of the competition are obliged to study progressive experience and learn everything new going on in shops, sections, brigades and in the working place. Unfortunately, as was noted at the conference, such practices are not observed everywhere. Serious reproach is merited by managers and public organizations at those enterprises where results of competition are formally tallied but not everything is done to objectively evaluate the achievements of the workers.

With great attention the participants in the conference concerned themselves with issues regarding the prospects for developmental work in the 11th Five-Year Plan, with establishing a metrological service at enterprises and with the selection and training of personnel. With the participation of managers from the planning sections (after the general sessions, the conference participants worked in groups), practical classes were conducted on subjects associated with the requirements of the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers,

"On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Effect of the Economic Mechanism On Increasing the Efficiency of Production and the Quality of Work."

The enterprise managers were familiarized with the organization of production at an experimental sport-aviation plant of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

#### Propaganda and the Organization

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] The hallowed ground of Volgograd... It was no accident that this city became the site of the All-Union Seminar Of Deputy Chairmen of DOSAAF Central Committees of Union Republics and Kray and Oblast Committees of the Society in the Russian Federation. Indeed, during the war years, this hero-city became a symbol of the determination and courage of Soviet soldiers and rear-services workers. Here in the unsubdued fortress, the soldiers fought to the death while workers forged cannon for victory under enemy fire.

Today, dozens of majestic monuments to the valor of those defenders of the Motherland stand on the streets and squares of Volgograd. The most remarkable of these is the city itself--risen from the ashes, in the literal sense of the word.

Volgograd is not only our historic past but our present as well. The continuation of its exploits is in the labor valor of the Volga natives. The continuation of its glory is in the patriotic acts of the Volgograd citizenry who have an enormous concern for the education of its youth in the glorious traditions of their countrymen.

The secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Obkom I. A. Litvinov spoke to the seminar participants about these traditions and the labor achievements of the Volga natives in peaceful construction. In his speech, he also told how party administration is being accomplished in the oblast by defense collectives. He cited examples of the painstaking organizational efforts being carried out by DOSAAF committees in a number of rayons and city oblasts.

At the seminar, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Lt Gen V. V. Mosyaykin delivered a report on the present status and future development of organizational and military-patriotic work for the noteworthy meeting of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Our seminar, he emphasized in his report, is taking place at a remarkable time, when all Soviet people are living and working in an atmosphere of great political and labor development, brought about by preparations for the upcoming 26th CPSU Congress.

The defense Society is seeking all that is new and is striving for a new upsurge in its work. Today its ranks include more than 94 million people. The network of primary organizations has expanded considerably and numbers more than 340,000. There has been an increase in the number of defense collectives in which military-patriotic and mass-defense work is being actively conducted. The leading positions



are occupied by the DOSAAF organizations of Armenia, Belorussia, Georgia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Tatarskaya ASSR and Bryanskaya, Volgogradskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Kemerovskaya and other oblasts.

The Minskaya Oblast DOSAAF organization can serve as an example of organizational and military-patriotic activity. Here at an enlarged session of the Society's obkom presidium, practical measures were developed for the noteworthy meeting of the 26th CPSU Congress. The heightened socialist obligations in honor of this remarkable event were examined. It is important that these new lofty advances which have been planned are based upon the initiative of the local organizations. They were met with the broad support and approval of the party organs.

In the oblast DOSAAF organizations, extensive efforts were developed for popularizing materials from the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and from Lenin's behests for the defense of the socialist Fatherland, as well as for explaining the practical measures taken by the CPSU and the Soviet government to reinforce the economic and defensive strength of the country. Diverse procedures and methods of military-patriotic activity are employed for this.

The concrete tasks of the Society's organizations in connection with preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress were determined at sessions of the presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. Here the corresponding resolutions were adopted and detailed plans of the basic measures were drawn up.

The most important tasks of the committees for the near future were dealt with in detail at the seminar. It was emphasized in particular how important it is to analyze the way in which preparations for the Congress are being planned and how all these plans are being carried out. It is important that this be done so that all the DOSAAF organizations can discuss their associated specific tasks, carry them out successfully and involve a broad segment of the active public in these efforts.

At conferences and seminars with various categories of staff members and active party members, it is necessary to direct attention to those organizations which are lagging behind and to render them practical on-site assistance.

It is necessary to elevate to a higher qualitative level the work being done in the military-patriotic education of the workers. Speaking of efforts to prepare for the noteworthy 26th CPSU Congress, chief attention must be directed to the necessity of further increasing the activity and readiness of the primary organizations. At the same time, it is important to depend extensively upon the experience accumulated by the leading collectives.

Unfortunately, it was noted at the seminar that the level of organizational work being done to increase the role of the primary organizations does not everywhere satisfy growing contemporary demands. In a number of republics, krays and oblasts there are still labor collectives where the primary defense organizations encompass only an insignificant portion of the working force. Poor work is being done in increasing the ranks of organizations in the DOSAAF obkoms of the Komi, Kalmytskaya and Tuvinskaya ASSR's and in Vladimirskaya, Kamchatskaya and Kirovskaya Oblasts.

One of the important conditions for success is the degree of planning and the system of governing the primary organizations employed by the committees named above, as

well as the education of active party members. In a number of krais and oblasts the implementation of planned tasks is achieved only through the efforts of the leading collectives, while many organizations spend much time dragging along.

In order to increase the organizations' readiness it is necessary to make thorough use of the reporting campaign conducted in October-December of this year in the primary collectives. It should energetically contribute to the growth of the political and labor activities of members of the Society. In addition, it is necessary to employ the experience obtained from organizational and mass political work during the course of previous reports and elections and to see that statutes of the USSR DOSAAF Charter are strictly adhered to.

A further improvement in the working style of committees and managers and the realization of high-quality control over the execution of decisions adopted merit constant attention. In his speech to a meeting of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that the party is devoting extremely great attention to this issue.

Henceforth, there must be an improvement in the work of Society committees in the areas of selection, placement and education of staff and active party members. It is also necessary to achieve strict observation of the Leninist principles of labor and to thoroughly study their political, business and moral qualities. There must be a constant concern for the fact that there are people in management who combine in themselves party spirit with competency, discipline with initiative and a creative approach to matters.

During the seminar, its participants exchanged work experience in improving the methods and procedures of military-patriotic education. Occasionally the committees lack readiness, concreteness and the ability to move ahead. Measures are sometimes implemented which are out of touch with the tasks determined by DOSAAF organizations and do not render a great emotional impact.

While preparing for the 26th CPSU Congress, it is necessary to adopt all measures to increase the level and effectiveness of military-patriotic work. Utilizing its entire arsenal of methods and procedures, it is necessary to indicate graphically and persuasively the guiding role of the Communist Party and the principles and conclusions contained in the works of V. I. Lenin, CPSU documents and the speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on questions of strengthening our country's defenses.

Socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress has been called upon to play an important role in mobilizing members of the defense Society to carry out their worthwhile tasks. It is necessary to strive persistently in order that this competition be truly on a mass scale and that it contribute to introducing advanced know-how.

The chief of the administration for organized mass work and military-patriotic propaganda of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, A. Mamayev, dedicated his speech to an analysis of the current state of affairs and to measures for the further improvement of military-patriotic work in DOSAAF organizations in light of the de-



cisions of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Educational Work." He emphasized that, in connection with the preparations for and the conducting of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, patriotic activity in many defense collectives has picked up noticeably and that its scale has grown.

An indispensable condition for success in finding a comprehensive solution to the problems of military-patriotic education is constant and reliable communication between DOSAAF committees and other organizations and mass media.

The arsenal of procedures for educating youth in the heroic traditions of our people has been augmented in recent years by such brilliant systems of measures as "Memorial Shift" and "Revolutionary Glory Week." Many other interesting affairs are being conducted everywhere.

There are, however, still many shortcomings in work for the military-patriotic education of the workers. Here and there detailed plans have been drawn up and seminars and conferences with the administrative staffs of DOSAAF committees and educational organizations have been conducted. These plans, however, are being realized very slowly. For example, at the Kaluzhskaya Oblast DOSAAF organization, the plans that have been made are being realized with insufficient effectiveness.

A number of Society committees are not devoting attention to the organization of systematically operating lecture propaganda. The subject matter of lectures, reports and talks is sometimes monotonous and is confined to military-historical problems.

The participants in the seminar exchanged work experience. There is much that is instructive in the Ryazanskaya Oblast DOSAAF organizations. As deputy chairman of the Society obkom A. Sozinov related, here a broad circle of interested organizations is everywhere formulating a single comprehensive plan of measures for the year. The plan is being thoroughly examined in the CPSU obkom. An extensive network of non-staff departments has been created in the oblast for mass-organizational work, for military-patriotic propaganda and for lecture groups.

Permanent monitoring of the quality of verbal propaganda has been imposed upon the Kuybishevskaya Oblast DOSAAF organization. At sessions of the presidiums of oblast, city and rayon committees, regular discussions are held on the state of the lecture effort, the thematic trend of speeches and questions of training the propaganda staff. A significant place in the lecture activities is set aside for the propaganda of military accomplishments. The lecturers frequently travel to distant areas of the oblast and speak before rural workers. This fact was related by deputy chairman of the Kuybishev Obkom D. Shurshin.

There was much to be learned from the speeches of the deputy chairmen of the DOSAAF Central Committees: from the Armenian SSR--B. Pogosov; from the Moldavian SSR--G. Sulyak; from the Azerbaijan SSR--R. Gadzhiyev; from the Uzbek SSR--M. Shmelev; from the Ukrainian SSR--O. Gulyayev; from the Leningrad DOSAAF Committee and Oblast--A. Averin; from the Rostov Obkom--S. Mukhtarov, et al.

Such questions as the improvement of committee work on propaganda and the dissemination of the DOSAAF lottery were also discussed. A. Rachkov and P. Somov, officials in charge of the DOSAAF Central Committee administration for conducting the lotteries, spoke before the participants of the seminar.

The seminar participants were familiarized with the operational experience of the leading organizations of the Volgograd DOSAAF.

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**DOSAAB: CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PROPAGANDA EFFORTS**

**Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 80 p 2**

[Article by Col Gen V. Grekov, deputy chief of civil defense of the USSR for political affairs: "In Close Cooperation"]

[Text] The Communist Party and Soviet Government are steadfastly and consistently pursuing a peace-loving, Leninist foreign policy and striving persistently for a halt in the arms race and normalization of the international situation. "Our country," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev declared in a speech at the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "is entering the 1980's having attained great economic and scientific-technical potential and highly skilled and qualified cadres. We are looking to the future with confidence."

In striving for peace our party closely follows the aggressive plots and schemes of the enemies of socialism and demonstrates a continuous concern for increasing the defensive capability of the Soviet state.

Our civil defense has been charged with the vital task of protecting the country's population and economy against modern-day weapons. Accomplishment of these tasks depends to a great extent on how our people perform under adverse conditions and their readiness and ability to take decisive action.

It is for precisely this reason that civil defense propaganda is oriented above all toward the development in the Soviet people of high moral-political and psychological qualities and solid confidence in the invincibility of our Armed Forces' combat strength and the effectiveness of measures to protect the population and economic facilities.

Under the direction of party and soviet organs, and in close cooperation with DOSAAF and other social organizations, civil defense staffs are conducting vigorous propaganda among the population. This cooperation has become ever more fruitful and effective from one year to the next. CD and DOSAAF personnel and activists are achieving consistently greater effectiveness and higher ideological levels in propaganda measures in the spirit of the requirements imposed by the 25th party congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "Further Improving Ideological and Political Education Work."

Creative collaboration between many CD staffs and DOSAAF organizations has been established on a well-organized basis in Gor'kovskaya Oblast. Take Gor'kiy's Orbita plant (S. Ignat'yev, CD chief of staff; O. Yel'kin, DOSAAF committee chairman), for example. Through their common efforts the facility has equipped a training center for civil defense instruction and initial military training for their young men. CD and DOSAAF corners have been set up in shops and sections. DOSAAF members assist the CD staff with explanatory work during instruction and training exercises, while civil defense activists do not allow themselves to remain uninvolved in activities organized by the DOSAAF committee. Together these two organizations plan topical evening programs and put on civil defense days, weeks and months. The final results of their activities are summed up in the course of these events, which also see reviews, inspections and competitions among nonmilitary formations. Civil defense specialists trained in DOSAAF schools demonstrate their skills. Lectures, reports and discussions are held on military and patriotic topics and visual agitational material designed.

Harmonious joint labors have contributed to making the Orbita plant one of the oblast's best facilities in civil defense, while its DOSAAF organization has remained in first place in the rayon for more than a year.

CD propaganda is more successfully conducted where civil defense speakers' groups and sections are active in Znaniye Society organizations. They include many Armed Forces veterans and defense society activists. I would like to take note of the fruitful propaganda work being accomplished by DOSAAF committees in Moscow city, the Baltic republics and a number of oblasts in the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia.

A competitive review was recently held in Nikolayevskaya Oblast, UkSSR, to determine the Znaniye Society's best city and rayon civil defense propaganda section. It helped put substantial new life into CD propaganda in the oblast's cities and villages, improve its quality and enhance its effectiveness.

Sverdlovskaya Oblast is focusing serious attention on CD propaganda and improving the manner in which it is conducted. This work is always to be found within the field of view of the party and soviet organs, the Komsomol, DOSAAF organizations and the Znaniye Society. An oblast seminar for leaders of civil defense speakers' sections (groups) has been successfully held here. Seminar participants, who included DOSAAF activists, discussed the tasks involved in improving CD propaganda in light of requirements imposed by the CPSU Central Committee decree of 26 April 1979.

The oblast has generalized and disseminated experience accumulated during integrated CD exercises. Summary reviews on the occasions of lectures are oriented toward helping propagandists. The photographic exhibition "Civil Defense Is Everybody's Business" has made the round of the oblast's cities and rayons. The oblasts' series of television and radio broadcasts entitled "For the Population on Civil Defense" is stirring a lively interest among the people in Sverdlovsk Oblast. All this is helping to increase the effectiveness of civil defense propaganda.

But the work of CD speakers' sections and groups unfortunately does not always receive the required attention, and CD staffs and DOSAAF committees do not always combine their efforts. Until recently, for example, there had been no real practical



cooperation in the work of the CD staffs and DOSAAF committees of Kaluzhskaya Oblast. This has a negative impact not only upon the activities of speakers' sections and groups, but on the organization of civil defense propaganda in the oblast as a whole and of military-patriotic education among working people as well.

Any propagandist or agitator finds that his success is in direct contact with the people. Drawing upon concrete instances and phenomena occurring in the life of a collective, the propagandist in the course of free and unrestrained conversation stimulates among his listeners an exchange of views and stirs in each of them a deeper awareness of his place in the accomplishment of the civil defense task. As a rule, a discussion yields its best result when conducted by CD chiefs who are at the same time shop or department supervisors in one economic facility or another.

I will take as an example S. Katal'nikov, director of Novosil'skiy Sovkhoz in Orlovskaya Oblast. Since he has a good idea of what his people live on, what it is that interests them, he orients his listeners in his presentations not only toward the course of events in international and domestic life, but also focuses their attention upon accomplishment of educational, indoctrinational, production and defense tasks.

Experience indicates that propaganda measures are more effective when they take into consideration the interests of the various categories of the population, particularly of our youth.

It is in precisely this creative manner that Angarsk's Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations approach their CD propaganda tasks. The young people's evening programs "And Now Then, Lads!", "And Now Then, Young Ladies!" and "Test Yourself" have become parts of their practice. The program here also includes such interest-catching forms of propaganda as competitions, quiz games and reviews. An imaginative, innovative approach is stirring a lively interest among the youth in these evening programs, lectures and CD training and exercises.

In speaking of a creative approach to propaganda, I would like to emphasize how important it is to shed full light on the humanity of our civil defense, which has been called to serve the noble cause of protecting people, of insuring the safety and security of the Soviet people.

The people's possession of elementary medical and first aid skills is acquiring particular importance under modern-day conditions. Ideas that only authorized official medical personnel should give this aid, still current among some sections of the population, must be overcome. Effective and purposefully oriented dissemination of medical information makes an important contribution to the accomplishment of this task.

Another important task for our propagandists lies in convincingly explaining to the Soviet people that socialist humanism is not an abstract idea, but rather an integral feature of our Soviet way of life. It manifests itself in, among other things, a constant readiness to give necessary assistance to people who need it. A spirit of genuine humanism pervades the Constitution of the USSR, as well as the articles of the USSR law. These govern the basic powers of kray and oblast councils of



people's deputies of autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs concerning the cooperation of soviet organs in the task of increasing the country's defensive capability and direction of the kray- and oblast-level civil defense effort.

Inspired by the decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet people are striving selflessly for a successful conclusion to the 10th Five-Year Plan and a worthy salute to the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The duty of CD and defense society personnel and activists lies in achieving, while preparing for this union-wide communist forum, further increases in practical cooperation and improvement in the quality and effectiveness of civil defense propaganda.

8963

CSO: 1801

## DOSAAF: ECONOMISTS NEEDED ON AUDITING COMMISSIONS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by S. Kozhevnikov, chairman of Tambov DOSAAF Obkom: "They Have Begun To Provide More Concrete Direction, Continuous Attention To Auditing Commissions"]

[Text] At its meeting a year ago, the bureau of the presidium of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR heard a report from our DOSAAF Obkom on our supervision of our auditing commissions' work in light of the decisions of the society's eighth all-union congress. We were justifiably criticized at that time for slackness in our supervision of auditing commission work. Among our routine concerns, this area had slipped out of our field of view.

We had most decisively to change our attitude toward the auditing and review function. We began by once more undertaking a thorough analysis of the state of affairs. What had been the causes of our neglect? The basic difficulty lay in the fact that oblast committee personnel (and, following our example, those at the raykom and gorkom levels as well) viewed this vital matter as something of only secondary importance. We had to change the manner in which we performed our organizational work: to study local situations more thoroughly, become better acquainted with this category of defense society activists and, finally, provide proper instruction and training.

The tasks facing society auditors, the requirements imposed upon them, grow more complex from one year to the next. Most Tambovskaya Oblast city and rayon organizations now rest on a solid economic foundation. Their income is constantly increasing, the range of their cost-accounting-based activities continually expanding. It is enough to say that only four rayons of the oblast now have no DOSAAF technical sports clubs. Greater amounts of resources are being allocated for mass-scale defense, military-patriotic, training and sports activities.

The success with which our auditing commissions accomplish their work and, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of the audits themselves are subject to two conditions: first, skillful selection of commission members and chairmen and, second, continuous, skilled, well-qualified direction provided to these commissions. It was to these matters that we turned our attention in the first instance. Last year's election and reporting campaign brought with it a need to recommend

replacement of one-third of our rayon auditing commission chairmen. These were generally people who displayed little initiative or enthusiasm in discharging their society responsibilities. With the help of local party organs we were able to insure the election of comrades who set about their work with energy and enthusiasm.

The overwhelming majority of rayon and city auditing commission chairmen are now communists, two-thirds of them economists and finance personnel. Accounting and bookkeeping specialists have been chosen deputy chairmen of those commissions whose chairmen are unfamiliar with the basics of finance. The composition of primary-organization auditing commissions has been stabilized and strengthened as well.

Improving and enhancing the effectiveness of local auditing and review work now lies at the center of the oblast committee's attention. The status of auditing work at the rayon and city levels is being reviewed more closely and detailed records kept of the activities of our rayon commissions. When visiting city and rayon committees, oblast committee personnel would formerly not concern themselves with the auditing commissions at all. They would express an interest in them at best, as they say, only in passing. But during the last 6 months our comrades have gone out 6 times for precisely this purpose. In looking into the work of the Rasekazovski Rayon auditing commission, for example, obkom instructor M. Chistov discovered that it was failing to exercise maximum thorough routine oversight of the rayon committee's financial and economic activities.

I would like to emphasize that our personnel do not limit themselves merely to recording deficiencies and oversights; they also provide assistance in remedying these shortcomings and in organizing the work of society auditors as called for in the decisions of the Eighth All-Union Congress of DOSAAF.

It has become the practice for reports from rayon auditing commission chairmen to be heard at meetings of the obkom presidium. We also hear from raykom and gorkom chairmen on their supervision of the work of the auditing commissions of their primary organizations. The day before, of course, we make thorough and painstaking study of the actual state of affairs in their particular locality. In the course of only the past few months the obkom presidium has heard from the chairmen of the Mordovski and Znamenski Rayon auditing commissions and the chairman of the Kotovski Gorkom of DOSAAF.

Discussion of the work of the Mordovski Rayon auditing commission, headed by A. Satalkin, proceeded in characteristic fashion. Its chairman is an experienced financial specialist and was a participant in the Great Patriotic War. He has chaired the commission for 12 years now. But this commission had recently let its work slip drastically. The discussion at the session of the presidium was, of course, principled and thorough. It demanded of the chairman closer supervision of the rayon committee's financial and economic activities.

To his honor, A. Satalkin took this criticism in a party-spirited way and within only a brief period of time had remedied the deficiencies in the commission's work. Responsibilities were reassigned among its members. Their auditing work is now of better quality and is being performed more frequently and more thoroughly. Conclusions drawn concerning the status of the raykom's financial and economic activities and suggestions for eliminating deficiencies which are identified have now become more concrete. The oblast committee recently presented A. Satalkin with an award after taking special note of his conscientious work.

Systematic training for chairmen plays an important role in our overall system of supervising the work of our auditing commissions. We devote our most intensive efforts to training and holding seminars for them, one of the basic ways of increasing the knowledge of this component of the DOSAAF public aktiv and of enriching its experience. During the year that has elapsed since the decree of the bureau of the presidium of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR, we have planned and held four seminars, taking into account the deficiencies formerly existing in our training of auditing commission chairmen.

At each of these instruction sessions the best chairmen share the practical experience accumulated in the course of their work. Unfortunately, however, we have not yet arrived at the point at which we can hold practical training locally, directly with a rayon or city committee, and based on the example of one of our best auditing commissions. We do have them to be emulated. Special note has quite recently been taken of the good work and initiative of auditing commission chairmen D. Doroshin (Pervomayskiy Rayon), P. Pirozhkov (Kirsanov city) and N. Romanenkov (Michurinskiy Rayon).

The oblast auditing commission, headed by V. Il'in, deserves a good word. Its members render the oblast committee effective assistance in its work with rayon and city auditing commissions. They render this assistance first of all through their participation in organizing and conducting training.

The measures which have been taken have borne fruit. As audit results have shown, the first 10 months of this year have seen us eliminate all instances of waste, deficiency and misappropriation of funds and physical assets.

Our achievement, in a word, has been no small one. But can we really say we have done everything we can to improve our auditing and review work? There is no doubt that deficiencies still exist. In a number of instances the oblast committee is still failing to subject the rayon and city auditing commissions to sufficiently thorough analysis or to provide them with adequate direction. Hence the quality of the inspections does not always measure up to the requirements contained in instructions governing audits of financial and economic activities within the DOSAAF system.

The status of auditing and review work at the primary-organization level continues to disturb us as well. There is no question that a number of rayon and city committees have begun to focus greater attention on this aspect of their work. The Kirsanov city and Michurinskiy Rayon committees, for example, regularly hear primary-organization auditing-commission chairmen at their presidium meetings. Scheduled sessions of training are also organized for them here.

At the same time, many committees are still approaching this vital matter as they always have. Take the Kotovsk city DOSAAF committee, for example. There has in fact been some improvement in the make-up of the auditing commissions here; however, only one-fourth of the primary-organization committees in Kotovsk had been audited by the end of the first half of the year. There has been no analysis to determine the accuracy of the records of receipts and expenditures of membership dues (especially of the 30 percent remaining with the organizations) nor any inquiry into the

status of the records of society members. The gorkom's presidium has not adopted the practice of hearing reports from auditing-commission chairmen at its meetings nor does it review audit documents. This is without mentioning that the gorkom is taking no effective steps to eliminate its deficiencies.

A thorough, broad-ranging discussion of this matter at a meeting of the obkom presidium proved an instructive lesson not only for gorkom chairman A. Tvel'nev, but for several other gorkom and raykom chairmen as well.

At a meeting of our DOSAAF oblast committee presidium at the end of September, we reviewed the progress so far achieved in implementing the decree of the bureau of the presidium of the Central Committee of the DOSAAF USSR. We self-critically evaluated the results of our work during the past year and oriented our committees toward a determined effort to eliminate deficiencies in their reviewing and auditing work. Any further success we achieve in our mass-defense effort will depend on this to a great extent.

8963

CSO: 1801



## MILITARY REGULATIONS: REGULATIONS FOR DRAFTEES

### Educational Opportunities

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 9, May 80 p 41

[Article: "The Soldier and the Law"]

[Text] Reader Yu. Yurkin as well as others have asked us to tell about the educational privileges granted draftees and active-duty military personnel.

Here is our answer to this question.

The USSR law, "The Universal Military Obligation," permits draftees expressing a desire to study in military educational institutions to be admitted to these educational institutions upon their attaining the age of 17. They are to submit their applications to their military commissariat before 30 April of the year in which they are to enroll. Youth admitted to military educational institutions are to be considered as being on actual military duty.

Draftees permitted to take entrance examinations for admittance to military educational institutions are to be given time off to register and take their examinations with retention of their position and average earnings at their place of employment for the time required to take the examinations. Citizens actually enrolling in military educational institutions who are then for some reason dismissed have the right to return to their former place of employment to the position they formerly held if no more than three months have elapsed since the day of their enrollment in the institutions, not counting the time required to return to their permanent place of residence. This provision also applies to individuals in the category of civilian youth enrolled in military educational institutions but who have not passed competitive entrance examinations.

The law grants deferments to day (full-time) students of higher educational institutions. Deferments are also granted to students of secondary general-educational schools as well as of secondary specialized educational institutions, including evening and correspondence schools, until completion of their work in these schools, but not beyond the age of 20, if prior to their enrollment in the secondary specialized educational institutions they had no secondary education. Deferments are also granted to students of secondary specialized educational institutions studying in a reserve officers training program.

Upon being discharged into the reserves, individuals drafted into active military service during their course of study in educational institutions retain the right to be enrolled to continue their studies in the same educational institution and in the same course in which they were studying prior to their call-up for military service.

Individuals formerly studying in higher educational institutions who have had their work interrupted by their call-up for service in the Armed Forces of the USSR are, as a rule, reinstated for continuation of their studies in the first and all subsequent courses during all odd-numbered semesters. In this connection, those studying with leave from work may be reinstated in either the same or a similar institution of higher education for daytime, evening or correspondence coursework as desired, while those previously studying in higher educational institutions offering correspondence or evening courses (branches, departments, divisions) may be reinstated in only the same or a similar evening or correspondence institution of higher education.

Upon enrolling in a higher educational institution on the basis of the results of competitive examinations, military personnel discharged into the reserves with at least two years' active duty time are to enjoy preference equal to that accorded secondary-school graduates with at least two years' practical work experience.

First-enlistment soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers have the right to enroll in military educational institutions of all services of the Armed Forces of the USSR and of all arms and services until the age of 21 regardless of their military specialty or time in service. Applications to enroll for study are to be submitted through channels before 23 February of the year they plan to enroll.

Candidates selected from among both first-term and extended enlisted personnel for entrance into military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR undergo 30 days of special instructional sessions in their military districts, groups of forces and fleets in May and June in preparation for their entrance examinations.

In enrolling in higher military educational institutions, active-duty military personnel and civilian youth awarded a gold (or silver) medal upon completion of their secondary school work, or who upon graduation from a secondary specialized educational institution received a diploma with distinction, take only one examination (oral or written) from among the required entrance examinations. If they pass the examination in this discipline with an "outstanding" rating, they are exempted from having to take any further entrance examinations, while if they receive ratings of "good" or "satisfactory," they take examinations in all other disciplines included in the battery of entrance examinations.

In enrolling in secondary military educational institutions, graduates of secondary general-educational schools awarded the certificate of commendation "For Achievement in the Study of Individual Subjects" are exempted from having to take an entrance examination in the discipline, for the successful study of which they were awarded their certificate if this discipline is among those included in the battery of entrance examinations.

Individuals completing secondary school with a gold (or silver) medal, or a secondary specialized educational institution with a diploma with distinction are admitted to secondary military training schools without entrance examinations.

If they receive positive evaluations on their entrance examinations, active-duty military personnel who have been rated "outstanding" in combat and political training at least one year and who have a statement to this effect in their unit orders are admitted for study in military educational institutions without competitive examination.

The most deserving soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers discharged into the reserves after completing their required active duty service may upon request be provided by their command with certificates for admission to preparatory divisions of civilian institutions of higher education. Those completing their work in these preparatory divisions and successfully passing their final examinations may enroll in higher educational institutions without having to take any entrance examinations.

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#### Replies to Readers' Questions

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 12, Jun 80 pp 30-31

[Replies to readers' questions]

[Text] We reply below to questions from our readers.

QUESTION: Under what conditions are draft deferments granted?

ANSWER: According to the law, "The Universal Military Obligation," deferments of call-up for active military duty are granted for continuing education, in consideration of a special family situation or for reasons of health.

Draft deferments to continue education are granted:

- to daytime students (in residence) at institutions of higher education;
- students of secondary general-educational schools and secondary specialized educational institutions, including evening and correspondence schools, until completion of their course of study in these schools, but not beyond the age of 20, if prior to their enrollment in secondary specialized educational institutions they have had no secondary education;
- and to students of secondary specialized educational institutions studying in a reserve officers training program.

Draftees granted deferment to continue their education, but who are then for one reason or another not called to active duty with the Armed Forces of the USSR at the designated time, remain liable to call-up for active military duty until the age of 27. A draftee may be granted a deferment for family reasons if he is supporting as dependents:

- a disabled father or mother if either of the latter have no other individuals able to work who are legally obligated to support them, regardless of whether they are living with their parents or alone;
- two or more children or an invalid wife in the first or second category;
- an able-bodied mother living alone with two or more children not yet 8 years of age who does not have other able-bodied children legally obligated to support her regardless of whether they are living with their mother or alone;
- one or more brothers or sisters, younger or older than 16, but who are invalids of the first or second category, if there are no other individuals capable of supporting them, and also in the absence of any possibility of placing these brothers or sisters in children's homes, boarding schools or special treatment facilities.

Young men are granted draft deferments for reasons of health who have been declared temporarily unfit for military service because of ill health.

Deferments from call-up for active military duty are granted by decision of the rayon (city) draft commission.

QUESTION: How is military service organized?

REPLY: The law provides that male citizens who will be 18 years of age by the day of their call-up will be subject to drafting into active military service. Those desiring to study in military educational institutions may be admitted to these educational institutions upon attaining the age of 17. Individuals admitted to military educational institutions are to be considered on active military duty. Citizens are called up to active military service two times a year (May-June and November-December).

Simultaneously with their entrance upon active military duty, all military personnel are given the military rank of private or seaman. Upon being assigned corresponding positions, the ranks of private first class and senior seaman are awarded those discharging their service obligations in model fashion, who have earned "good" and "outstanding" ratings in training and who have demonstrated exemplary military discipline.

The military ranks junior sergeant (petty officer 2d class), sergeant (petty officer 1st class) and senior sergeant (chief petty officer) are conferred following examinations in a specific program and assignment to corresponding posts. Soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers with higher education who have completed their preparations and passed the required examinations are awarded officer rank upon being discharged into the reserves.

QUESTION: May a military service member be discharged into the reserves ahead of schedule?

REPLY: A member of the armed forces may be discharged into the reserves ahead of schedule because of ill health if a military medical commission declares him unfit for reasons of health for further military service, or for family reasons if during the period of his military service a member's family situation has changed to one in which he would have been eligible for deferment.

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8963

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## COMMAND TRAINING: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 19, Oct 80 pp 6-8

[Round table interview with Lt Gen Avn Vadim Alekseyevich Ponomarev, member of military council and chief of district political administration; Professor Nikolay Fedorovich Fedenko, doctor of psychological sciences; Lt Col Ivan Petrovich Sachavskiy, commander of outstanding-rated SAM unit (chast') and master of military skills and Sergeant Aleksandr Nikolayevich Chikin, squad leader, operator 1st class and candidate member of the CPSU by Maj A. Vasilets: "The Psychology of Efficiency"; date and place not given]

[Text] Many years of friendship and fruitful collaboration bind the military pedagogy and psychology faculty of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin with personnel of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District. The scientists conduct extensive research among the troops of the district and on the basis of this research give unit and subunit (podrazdeleniye) commanders and political officers no small number of valuable recommendations for improving educational work with their rank-and-file troops and NCOs. The practical experience accumulated within the district in turn enriches academy scientists.

Our editor's regular round table discussion is devoted on this occasion to the question of efficiency. Participating in the discussion are Vadim Alekseyevich Ponomarev, military council member and chief of the district political administration; Professor Nikolay Fedorovich Fedenko, Doctor of Psychological Sciences; Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Petrovich Sachavskiy, commander of an outstanding-rated SAM unit and master of military skills; Sergeant Aleksandr Nikolayevich Chikin, squad leader, operator 1st class and candidate member of the CPSU and our special correspondent.

CORRESPONDENT: I would like to begin our discussion with an analysis of a phenomenon characteristic of our Soviet people alone. I am thinking of the *ram*. The Great Patriotic War provided dozens of examples and demonstrations of bravery and self-sacrifice unknown to the world. The *ram* was encountered in the air, at sea and on the ground. Clashing head-on with the enemy on the battlefield, a soldier

frequently executes his orders at the cost of his own life. The ram went back to the years of the civil war, on the battlefields of which it was employed by those fighting for the new Soviet Government.

Nikolay Fedorovich, let's talk some about the essential nature and the real cause for the appearance of this phenomenon as well as about its origins.

FEDENKO, N.P.: Soviet science has long since explained this phenomenon. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin held that the key factor in the young Soviet Republic's victory over its numerous enemies was the heroism of its Red Army men, their self-sacrifice, their demonstrations of never before heard of endurance in battle. This was rooted in profound ideological conviction, the clear understanding of the aims and tasks of armed struggle and the Soviet people's boundless love for their motherland and loyalty to the ideals of communism. The development of such moral qualities as discipline and efficiency, in the most profound sense of these terms, is also based on this solid foundation. That is, when a man cannot but discharge his military duty at any price, even by sacrificing himself.

PONOMAREV: You won't find a single army that can function without discipline. But there are different kinds of discipline. Soviet military discipline is a fundamentally new, higher type of discipline. It is one thing for a man to do something under the lash, but quite another when he performs any task assigned him quite consciously. Nobody ordered Viktor Talalikhin, for example, to go for a ram, that is, to almost certain death. But with careful consideration, consciously, and without coercion, he and he alone decided to take that deadly dangerous risk, for the sole purpose of blocking the enemy's advance on the capital. So he did execute his orders. There is no doubt about that. I want to emphasize that it is in this conscious attitude of the Soviet fighting man toward his sacred obligation--not to spare his life in defending the socialist fatherland--that makes up the strength of our discipline.

I had occasion in June of this year to participate in a conference of senior armed forces commanders and political officers. We focused particular attention on further improvement of our troop training and education program and on increasing both the efficiency and responsibility of commanders at all levels for tightening discipline. General of the Army Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, chief of the main political administration of the Soviet Armed Forces emphasized in his report that enhancing the educational role of the Armed Forces presumes the implementation both at the center and within the local commands of an entire program of measures. These are measures well conceived and planned, measures that should help make possible continued steady tightening of organization and improvement in conscious discipline among our troops.

I.P. SACHAVSKIY: Discipline is a quality every individual must have, from the private to the marshal. But all military service personnel first get to know what it means during their years as rank-and-file soldiers. They then nurture this quality within themselves, developing it and improving it. But the "first encounter" with discipline is far from being a simple matter for all of them. And, as is frequently the case, how much time must pass before a young man, beyond any shadow of a doubt, grasps with his heart and mind the fact that he simply must subordinate himself to his commanders and adhere to strict regulation procedures. He will understand and then willingly submit to the authority of the army order.

A.N. CHIKIN: You have put that very accurately, comrade lieutenant colonel. I am judging here on the basis of my own experience and the experience of my friends. It has to be admitted that some come to the army simply to "put in" their time. They in fact end up doing so-so service. The overwhelming majority of them are motivated to perform their duty in an honorable manner and to become diligent students in the army's wise school of life. It is easier, of course, for people like this to accustom themselves to the requirements of military discipline. I, for example, went to boarding school and so was accustomed to independence from childhood. We had just the kind of military instructor people ought to have, a front-line veteran! He told us a lot about the army and about the heroes and the cowards.

It was then that I learned that only those who are exacting with themselves in even the most trifling matters, those who thoroughly understand what the word "must" entails, these are the only people who will be capable of performing the great military deed. I had a comrade-in-arms named Strokov. He was always at daggers drawn with any orders from the squad leader. "Polish my boots til they shine? What for? They'll get dirty out on the street anyway!" "Change my undercollar or make my bed just so--all these petty details, all this nagging and carping..." The tone in which the orders, commands and instructions were issued--severe, demanding and domineering--was at first offensive not only to people like Strokov, but to me as well.

CORRESPONDENT: And then when did you get over feeling of being offended?

A.N. CHIKIN: Following an incident that occurred one time in the course of a tactical training exercise involving some field firing, an incident in which I very nearly ended up in a critical situation myself, almost placing my comrades in the same circumstances as well. It was then that I was struck by the realization that where there's firing going on, in the army, that is, the most important thing is to learn to subordinate yourself to authority and to become imbued with a consciousness of necessity and a desire to discharge your commanders' orders and instructions with precision and in accordance with the requirements imposed by your military oath. When I grasped this truth, the service became easier. While I did possess a sense of my own importance, I had somehow overlooked that of my performance of my military duties. I was generally learning to think on a larger scale.

CORRESPONDENT: You probably began to look upon the exactingness of an NCO through different eyes when you yourself were in a position in which you had to lead people, didn't you?

A.N. CHIKIN: That's essentially true. It's more difficult for an NCO--he has not only to insure that a soldier develops an ingrained understanding of the regulation definition of discipline, but also to teach a subordinate to obey. And this isn't such a simple matter.... I once ordered a young soldier to put a latrine in order, but he became indignant: "Why me? The whole company uses it!" What do you say in a case like this? The soldier had his logic. You could, of course, give him a lecture, or even punish him. Now this may be precisely the whole point! He was young, and had just taken his first steps in his new soldier's boots. I had to discuss patiently with him what military discipline really means and then to teach him to live up to the requirements of the regulations and the oath.

CORRESPONDENT: Nikolay Fedorovich, what should we then consider the most important component of discipline?

N.F. FEDENKO: If we were to put it as concisely, and at the same time as fully as possible, we would have to say efficiency. Its fullest manifestation is a conscious efficiency. But this would be impossible without a deep political consciousness, without a soldier being aware of both his rights and responsibilities and without a capability on his part of realizing them.

I.P. SACHAVSKIY: You're quite correct, Nikolay Fedorovich. Ability is precisely the thing here. Try having a driver, let's say, get his vehicle at precisely the right time to a point designated by his commander if he can't operate the controls properly.... You couldn't execute a command involving the employment of a weapon quickly and accurately if you hadn't mastered that weapon to perfection. Desire alone, be it the most sincere, is obviously not enough here.

CORRESPONDENT: That's quite true. But still, what does efficiency amount to from the point of view of military psychology?

N.F. FEDENKO: I couldn't answer that in a couple of words. It's a complex individual quality, the most critical feature of the military character. We have already spoken here about a conscious attitude toward military duty and a thorough understanding of it. I would add that what we are also talking about in this connection is initiative on the part of the individual soldier, a high level of inner activity, his understanding of the essential nature and role of discipline in his military work. In fact, you won't be able to meet the requirements of modern-day tactical and technical norms. Nor can we fail to mention such components as a highly developed intellect on the part of a defender of the motherland, his technical knowledge and skills, standards of conduct and his mutual relationships with both his superiors and comrades within the combat formation.

All these components of discipline are inseparably linked to a new stage in the development of the military profession. This is a stage in which it's not enough simply to execute orders unquestioningly. What's necessary is that they be executed, with spirit, enthusiasm and desire, with a clear understanding on the part of the individual soldier of the importance of what he is doing even in small things.

V.A. PONOMAREV: To put it even more simply, efficiency is above all a soldier's readiness and ability to discharge his everyday responsibilities in the best possible manner. These would be his commander's orders and his combat mission. Looked at more broadly, efficiency amounts to correct, regulation mutual relationships between seniors and subordinates. In my view, the psychology underlying efficiency presumes a soldier's firm inner disposition not to allow any failure whatsoever in connection with his responsibilities or obligations to the state, to his collective and to himself. We are speaking here about a moral quality such as conscience. It's your severest and most incorruptible judge, from whom, as they say, you can't hide. But a conscience doesn't develop on its own. It is formed under the influence of teachers and the collective. We might say that conscience is the social criterion embedded in the human mind. When this indicator of the level of a person's moral development and training is high, it may with full justification be said that he is an efficient, reliable soldier.



I.P. SACHAVSKIY: All this is absolutely correct. Life confirms this truth. But certain phenomena are to be encountered which do not fit the general rule. Our unit went out to the training ground not long ago. We had made all our preparations beforehand, of course. We had had an examination, in fact.... I was honestly apprehensive about the discipline in one of our subunits. You'd find everything in order there one time, then you'd have another look and..."surprise!" We had never been able to get things properly organized in this collective. But it nevertheless turned out that out on the training range not one soldier of the "unsatisfactory" subunit gave cause for criticism. The battalion received an "outstanding" rating. We were of course delighted at this reincarnation. Well, we thought, everything's going to be all right now. And then what do you suppose happened? After we got back to garrison, we started to see breaches of discipline again. How can you explain all this?

N.F. FEDENKO: Pedagogical practice knows no small number of instances in which a strong but short-lived motive generates a qualitative jump in discipline and efficiency. This applies not only to individuals, but to entire collectives as well. These motives might include, for example, the accomplishment of an important mission preceded by a prolonged period of preparation, the desire for reward, fear of punishment and so on. Such motives are basically positive, of course, but their effective range is limited; the battalion completed its fire exercise--and then everything went back to the way it was before. For such things not to happen requires continuous education and indoctrination.

V.A. PONOMAREV: The key factor here, of course, is the development in the troops of a communist world view, ideological conviction and conscious obedience to commanders and other superiors. Our military regulations, that concentrated experience of many generations, remain the surest path to success! The regulations are a reliable assistant to both the commander and the soldier.

I.P. SACHAVSKIY: We have a golden rule: as the commander orders, so will the subordinate perform. We're not talking simply about the tone in which an order is given. It cannot but be strict and authoritative, of course. But the one giving the order should also have very good knowledge of the conditions required for its execution and the capabilities of his subordinate and be able to describe the task involved clearly and concisely. We have a subunit commander in our regiment named Major Aleksandr Timofeyevich Gorskin. He's something to be admired as he directs the military activities of his men--have a seat and write a methods manual on the art of command from a real live model! Never a superfluous word. No fuss, no muss. Commands most precise and laconic. It's no surprise that the performance of his well-trained, well-conditioned men reminds you of the operation of some perfectly adjusted mechanism. And the results are there for all to see: they destroy all their targets here on the training range with their first missile alone and from the most distant lines.

V.A. PONOMAREV: What you've just been talking about here is referred to in psychology as feedback between commander and subordinates; in practice we call it good teamwork. This is what we are striving to achieve at all echelons of the system of troop command and control, but especially at the point where the issue of battle is directly decided. Back in his day, Marshal Rokossovskiy wrote about the importance of the mutual relationships between commander and subordinates. In his relations

with his own closest assistants he always tried to create a favorable working atmosphere, which excluded any relationships of the "as-you-order" variety and prevented the development of any feeling of constraint when people are afraid to express an opinion different from their superior. It is in this healthy spirit that the party has always trained, and continues to train, our commanders.

CORRESPONDENT: Behind a good commander, of course, his men are as if behind a secure wall. But situations frequently arise in combat in which each individual has to be able to take independent, lightning-fast action.

V.A. PONOMAREV: It is precisely these situations that require from a soldier this conscious efficiency, brought to its highest degree and based upon great skill. A transporter-loader with a missile went out of control on a very bad road in bad weather on the training ground not long ago. It almost went off a cliff: the wheels on the front axle were hanging in mid-air. But Pfc O. Glazov did not jump out of the vehicle, and he didn't scare; he rather applied all his skill and prevented an accident. Oleg Glazov took only moments, but he had been getting ready for them for years. If he had not had a thorough knowledge of his vehicle, developed the skills involved in operating it down to the point where they had become a series of automatic responses, and if he had not developed in himself such qualities as a deep consciousness of his military duty, willpower, decisiveness and boldness, he would hardly have been able to evaluate the situation correctly, make his decision quickly and carry it out with lightning-fast action, all in those same short seconds.

N.F. FEDENKO: I would like once again to single out the role of the personality of the training commander and of his authority among his subordinates. You recall how by simply appearing even among troops running panic-stricken, Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Suvorov, the legendary Russian military commander, was able to reinstalled their fighting spirit and turn them around to face the enemy.

A.N. CHIRYN: But how do you establish this authority?

N.F. FEDENKO: We conducted a sociological study in one of the units. To the question on the questionnaire "For what most of all do you respect your commanders and political personnel?", 300 NCOs and rank-and-file troops responded as follows: for high levels of political and military training, exactingness and fairness and concern for their men and respect for their interests. So draw your own conclusion. A training commander's exactingness and principledness, based upon high levels of personal skill, tact and an attentive attitude toward his men, these things will enable him to achieve good results in training and education and in developing discipline and efficiency.

V.A. PONOMAREV: Well-organized socialist competition should certainly be included among the important factors of increasing combat readiness and tightening military discipline. It is playing a particularly important role now after the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee's adoption of the decree "Socialist Competition for a Worthy Salute to the 26th Congress of the CPSU."

CORRESPONDENT: So, returning to the beginning of our discussion, we can say with certainty that concepts such as heroism and the great military deed are inextricably linked to military discipline and efficiency.

V.A. PONOMAREV: High levels of discipline and efficiency have long since become standards of conduct for Soviet fighting men in their everyday life as well as in combat, that spring from which flows heroism and great military deeds. The great military deed is not a mere flash in the pan, the result of a single moment of spiritual or emotional uplift. A man spends his whole life getting ready for it. It crowns an enormous output of daily efforts, an honest and conscientious attitude toward his service obligations and an awareness of his personal responsibility for the discharge of his constitutional duty. It is entirely understandable that the whole system of training and educating our troops, as well as the organization of their lives and service routines, are based on the effort to insure that the greatest possible number of them will be prepared to perform the great military deed if it comes to being tested in combat. We can say with full justification that life has confirmed the correctness of this system more than once. In a difficult hour for the fatherland, our fighting men and the entire Soviet people showed unprecedented marvels of heroism and self-sacrifice for the sake of its honor and independence.

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## OFFICER DESCRIBES WORK WITH SUPREME HIGH COMMAND IN WW II

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[Two-part article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Col (Ret) P. Plyachenko\*: "Special Missions"]

[Jun 80, pp 44-51 Part 1]

[Text] The cold, snowy month of December 1944 was coming to an end. At this time the headquarters of Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko and Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, representatives of the Headquarters Supreme High Command (HqSHC) who were coordinating military operations of the three Ukrainian fronts, was located in the small Hungarian village of Jaszapati, roughly 80 kilometers east of Budapest. The fiery line of the front, which had rolled through this area at the start of the month, was already drawing close to the capital of Hungary, forming an enormous ring around it on all sides.

At about 1800 of 26 December the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts Mar R. Ya. Malinovskiy and Mar F. I. Tolbukhin reported to HqSHC representative S. K. Timoshenko that the Budapest grouping of fascist troops was fully surrounded. There were 188,000 fascist soldiers and officers within the enormous ring encircling the Hungarian capital and its suburbs.

"That means the circle is closed. Great!" Timoshenko said triumphantly.

"Now we have to force the enemy to surrender correctly," Vorozheykin added.

"That is crucial," Semen Konstantinovich agreed. "But how can it be done? The garrison is strong and fresh, and the Nazis are trying to hold the city at any price."

"That may be true. In that case the fighting will take quite a while. But all the same, I think that we must demand that the enemy turn over Budapest to our forces peacefully and surrender its garrison unconditionally. We must take all possible steps to prevent destruction of the capital of Hungary and to spare its citizens suffering and deprivation."

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\* During the period described P. Plyachenko was special assignments officer for HqSHC representative Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin.



On 29 December truce envoys were sent to the enemy camp. But the Nazis rejected the ultimatum and executed envoy Capt Miklosh Shteynmetz, who was sent by the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and Capt I. A. Ostapenko, envoy of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. It was an act of unheard-of treachery!

There was nothing left for Soviet forces to do but begin an assault on the city in which this vicious enemy had taken its position. From this point the responsibility for devastation of the Hungarian capital lay on the German fascist command. Nonetheless, the Soviet command ordered our artillery and aviation to wipe out the military installations of the Nazis and Szalasists [Hungarian collaborators], while taking all possible steps to prevent the destruction of industrial enterprises, residential areas, scientific centers, and historical monuments. This order was followed precisely.

When the news of the tragic death of the Soviet envoys reached marshals Timoshenko and Vorozheykin, they sat in silence for a long time, barely restraining their rage. The first to speak was Vorozheykin:

"The Nazis must have had some kind of plan when they shot our envoys, but what?"

"It would appear they intend to break out of the circle," Timoshenko said. "They will definitely make an effort to do that. You will see. And the blows will be struck at the same time from within and from the outer front."

The marshal's words were completely borne out later. But in the first days of the blockade of Budapest it was a mystery where and when the blows would fall. And as luck would have it, the weather turned bad. Snow began falling and the entire Danube plain was covered by a dense fog that made it impossible to carry out aerial observations of the encircled enemy. But information was desperately needed. Moscow was calling more and more often to find out the situation in the surrounded capital.

Early in the morning of 31 December the high-frequency phone rang. HqSHC was asking again how the surrounded garrison was behaving, whether they were building up strength to break out of encirclement and where. Marshal of Aviation Vorozheykin took the phone.

"The fascist troops are resisting bitterly. The situation within the ring is unknown at present. To clarify things we are using all available ground and aerial reconnaissance personnel and equipment. We are sending several special reconnaissance groups into Budapest today."

That same day the HqSHC representatives sent their own special reconnaissance group into the surrounded Hungarian capital, and I was ordered to lead it. Sergeants Aleksey Yatsyna, David Vediberidze, and Grigoriy Mikhaylyuk were sent on the mission with me. These soldiers had seen a great deal. During the war they had, as the saying goes, gone through fire and water. They were men that one could rely on in any situation. Komsomol member Aleksey Yatsyna was an impressive, athletically built man, tall, broad-shouldered, with auburn hair and unusually lively blue eyes. He was bold, determined, but cautious, not foolhardy. He was complete master of his

weapon and fired it perfectly. He was the first to be called for difficult assignments.

David Yediberidze, a communist and Georgian, was exceptionally brave and daring. He was well-built with curly black hair, dark eyes, a sharp, prominent nose, and a quick glance. He seemed to have enough energy for three people. He was always lively and sociable, and never became depressed under any conditions. His comrades liked him and went willingly with him on any difficult mission. David was a complete master of both firearms and silent weapons as well as an excellent driver.

Grigoriy Mikhaylyuk was as good as his friends in every way. He was just as skillful with the weapon and behaved fearlessly in battle. His appearance was also striking: taller than average, with dark hair and straightforward, attractive facial features.

In short, I had the men I needed. I felt confident with them.

On the night before the mission we studied the city carefully using a large-scale map and learned about its "underground" streets. After changing into civilian clothes, we traveled at night through sewer passages to come out in the enemy rear on one of the large streets of Pest. We had to move carefully, because death awaited us at every step. We advanced with caution, avoiding a clash with the enemy. We slipped unnoticed into the yard of a high building and stopped to listen. Voices could be heard in the basement. It was absolutely quiet in the apartments. We climbed up the stairway to the top floor, and then into the attic, where we settled down.

Early in the morning of 1 January we began observing the bridges over the Danube and the embankments of the river, which were easily visible from there. Traffic in the city became more intensive with every minute. Columns of enemy vehicles were going from Pest to Buda. After crossing the bridges they immediately turned toward the northern part of the Old Fortress. It was apparent that the Nazis were concentrating in an area northwest of Budapest to break out of encirclement.

We transmitted our first report to headquarters. Soon groups of IL's appeared. The ground-attack planes began bombing the fascist forces who were bunched up on the east bank of the Danube. No sooner had they departed than PYe-2 divebombers appeared. Powerful explosions filled the air.

Our radio was on transmit. We sent the command reports on movements of enemy troops and the actions of our aviation. The planes struck accurately against the groups of Nazi forces, again and again, blocking all the bridges across the Danube. While attacking the enemy they did everything possible not to hit civilian targets in the city.

We spent three days in the attic. During this time we transmitted many reports. The radio was turned on only when necessary. The cold got to us. The wild north wind cut into us and the unusually cold weather for this area chilled us to the bone. The roof of the attic in which we were located provided no protection against the cold. We all became thoroughly chilled and

sick with colds. Something had to be done, so we moved to another building. Reports to the headquarters of the HqSHC representatives were not interrupted.

After completing the assignment we returned to our position. After a few days, however, the same team was sent to Budapest again. This time Marshal of Aviation Vorozheykin gave us the following parting instructions:

"Find out what is going on in this mess. Just this morning I received a report that our fighter planes have blockaded Budapest from the air so well that no fascist transport planes can reach the troops surrounded in the city. At the same time the commanders of our rifle units report that German transport planes are regularly dropping ammunition, medicine, fuel, and food into Buda and that fascist night bombers are ruthlessly bombing the residential quarters of Pest and our troops. Who can I believe? Now as for these 'attacks on friendly forces,' the story is also not exactly clear. You will have to go here," the marshal pointed to one of the sections of the city, "and find out how many attacks our planes made, when, and what losses our infantry suffered. Finally, you must determine the condition of all these sections."

G. A. Vorozheykin pointed on the map of the city to sections where strikes by our aviation and artillery were strictly forbidden. Only infantry was supposed to operate there for the most part. All this was done to prevent the destruction of nonmilitary structures in the Hungarian capital.

When we arrived in Budapest for the second time, bitter fighting was still going on, in both Pest and in Buda. The Nazis were resisting with fanatical stubbornness despite enormous losses. In savage rage they had blown up plants, warehouses, institutions, and residential buildings in Pest and were retreating destroying communications, the water supply system, the sewers, and other facilities. This continued for several days. Finally the enemy began to retreat from Pest. After crossing to Buda, the western part of the city, under cover of night the enemy blew up all the bridges across the Danube. Our hearts were grieved at the sight of the fearsome devastation.

"Barbarians, medieval barbarians!" Sergeant Yatsyna yelled. "We didn't touch anything, but look at what they have done."

In fact, our aviation and ground forces preserved the bridges of Budapest until the last minute, when fascist scum blew them up. The Nazis figured that, after destroying the bridges across the Danube, they could safely hole up in Buda and wait there until the arrival of help, which was already moving in from the west. But they were wrong. The enemy's attempt to break the ring of encirclement failed.

As on the first occasion, we settled in to an attic of a building and carried on observation from there. One morning as we looked toward Buda we were struck by an alarming sight. Enormous red sheets could be clearly seen on the surviving buildings and ruins, and there were so many of them they were hard to count.

"Look, comrades!" Yediberidze shouted. "Is it an uprising? There are red flags on all the buildings. Even on the fortress red banners are fluttering everywhere."

Everybody pressed against the dormer window.

"What does it mean, comrade captain?"

"Look a little closer. Over there on that bridge. There is a red flag hanging there too, with a basket under it."

The sergeants gazed at the bridge.

"Well, what do you think it is?"

"It looks like a parachute."

"Exactly, they are parachutes," I explained to the scouts. "They are made of red silk so they will not be visible in the darkness. We were observing flights by fascist aircraft all night long. Many of them flew over us. But did anybody see one parachute drop?"

"No, we didn't."

"There you are. In other words, camouflage."

During the day no enemy transport planes appeared over Buda. Enemy night bombers did not appear over Pest either. Our fighter and ground-attack planes did not let them through. But at night the air blockade of the city relaxed and the fascist vultures broke through and dropped food and ammunition to the surrounded troops and bombed the city and the positions of our forces. A great deal of materiel was delivered by glider. I reported this to Marshal Vorozheykin. The first mystery had been cleared up. Now we had the second one: were our ground-attack planes striking friendly troops? It took a little longer to find this out.

Our troops needed until 18 January to wipe out the Nazis in the western part of Pest. This mission was performed by units of the 30th Rifle Corps, the 18th Guards Rifle Corps, and the Romanian 7th Army Corps. They were supported by pilots of the 5th Air Army. Representatives from ground-attack aviation units were sent to the command posts of the corps and certain divisions to carry out coordination with the infantry. At the request of the combined arms commanders they called in ground-attack aircraft and directed them to enemy strongpoints or fire points set up in windows and on the roofs of buildings, at street intersections, and in other places. Where there were no unit representatives, the commanders of rifle units guided the planes to the targets. The forward edge or location of friendly troops was marked and target indication carried out with colored flares, tracer bullets, colored smoke grenades, and other means following a predetermined code.

Choosing a convenient moment, we drove to visit subunits of the 30th Rifle Corps who were finishing off Nazis who had taken positions in buildings along one of the streets of Pest. They often called in IL's to strike the fire points.

We drove up to a large grey building and stopped. Fighting was going on in front of . I got out of the vehicle and headed toward a group of soldiers



who had assembled for an attack. We introduced ourselves and lit up cigarettes. We started talking about our airplanes. Sgt T. Rakimatulin, commander of the assault group, informed me that the day before and that morning Il.'s had attacked strongpoints on this street. They put the bombs and shells right on target.

"Does it ever happen that they hit friendly forces?" I asked the sergeant.

"Sometimes they shoot, and sometimes they make divebombs."

"What do you mean, divebombs?"

"Very simple, they come flying up and dive at us, then fly back and do it again. Right at us. We launch rockets as they approach and use flame-throwers to indicate targets, but they still keep diving."

"Have there been killed and wounded?" I asked out of curiosity.

"No, there haven't."

"Do you have permanent signals for communications with our aircraft?"

"Why would we?"

"So they wouldn't shoot at you."

"We do not have any signals. We think them up ourselves."

I had similar talks in other subunits. It became clear that the ground forces and aviation had no mutual recognition signals or agreed upon ways to designate the forward edge, so the soldiers were thinking them up. The ones at fault for this were the headquarters of the rifle and aviation units. The planes were sometimes diving at friendly subunits in order to find out who was there. This was the reason for the complaints about them. And so the second mystery was solved.

I returned to my vehicle. Half-way there Sergeant Yatsyna met me.

"We found a half-dead child in the yard," he said grimly. "Where can we send it?"

We went into the yard. The fascists were already gone. A little five-year old girl lay on Yediberidze's knees, barely breathing.

"She should be warmed up and fed," I told the sergeants.

We climbed up to the third floor and entered a room. A woman, apparently sick, lay on one of the beds. Alongside her a little girl was sleeping. The room was messy, with boards and trash spread around the floor.

We put the other girl on the bed, lit the oven, and shut off the holes in the windows.

"Yediberidze, bring our food in here. Cook some supper and warm up the tea so that everyone can be fed!" I ordered the sergeant. "Mikhaylyuk and I will go looking for the enemy."

In less than an hour the room was warm and clean. Dry firewood that Yatsyna had found somewhere was crackling in the iron stove. On the cooking ring was a pan of kaasha which David Yediberidze had already been able to make from concentrates. Canned goods, condensed milk, sausage, and bread was spread on the table.

Soon a doctor was sitting next to the sick woman and children. The mother proved to have tuberculosis and fainting from hunger. The children were weakened by hunger. The little girl we had found in the yard had a broken leg. We treated them right there.

We left the Hungarian family and found a place in the same building. After taking care of necessities, the next morning we were preparing to return. Before leaving we decided to visit the sick family. The two little girls were already up. The mother was still lying in bed. Leaving food with the family, we set off. We had many more important missions to perform.

My combat friends and I visited this family on Chaki Street three times. The last time we visited was in early April 1944 when the last fascist had been driven from Hungarian soil. The mother, Olga, and both daughters had recovered their health. They greeted us and saw us off with a constant stream of thanks. We will never forget the Hungarian word for thank you.

Early in the cold morning of 19 January our group returned from Budapest to Paks after carrying out the assignment of the HqSHC representative. The small Hungarian city of Paks nestles on the west bank of the Danube roughly 120 kilometers south of the Hungarian capital. The forward echelon of the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian front was located there. There too we found the headquarters of Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, to whom I reported in detail on everything we had seen and heard in Budapest.

"So we were unable to save the bridges from being blown up," the marshal said. "A shame, a real shame. Well, what about the strikes by our airplanes against our own troops? Were you able to find out anything?"

I told him everything I had learned.

"The situation with cooperation and signals will have to be straightened out immediately," Grigoriy Alekseyevich said. He picked up the telephone and began calling the commanders of the air armies.

I then reported in detail on the impoverished condition of the peaceful population of Pest. We had seen enormous lines of people formed around dead horses; the starving people were cutting the horses into small pieces and passing them around. There were many sick people in the residential buildings, and many were dying. Help was urgently needed.

The marshal observed that our command had already taken determined steps. The troops located in Budapest had been ordered to share their food with the peaceful inhabitants and give them medical care. Within a few days food distribution points and dining halls would open in Pest. Hospitals and medical points would start operating. A large amount of medical supplies had already been sent there. The questions of giving emergency aid to the population of Budapest had been carefully decided at a meeting of the military council of the front.

While we were talking a call came from Moscow. The HqSHC wanted information on actions by front aviation against attacking enemy tanks at Budapest and in the region of lakes Balaton and Velence. G. A. Vorozheykin gave a thorough report on everything. After hanging up Grigoriy Alekseyevich set off for front headquarters to see Marshal Tolbukhin. I followed later.

A fairly difficult battle situation had developed by the night of 19 January 1945 in the attack zone of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. During the night before 18 January the enemy had broken through our defense between lakes Velence and Balaton with a surprise strike by major tank and infantry forces. During the day of 19 January the Nazis crossed the Serviz Canal and moved swiftly east, toward the Danube, breaking the front's troop grouping into two parts.

The Soviet command took urgent steps to stop the enemy's third attack on Budapest. Upon returning to headquarters the HqSHC representative called me in and gave me my mission:

"Get ready to take off on another assignment. This time I want reconnaissance and a situation report directly from the field of battle. This is nothing new for you and I hope you can manage it."

"I will try, comrade marshal of aviation."

"Alright, early in the morning I am flying to Jaszapati to see General Goryunov. He and I have to decide the question of cooperation with General Sudets. As the situation is shaping up, the efforts of all the ground-attack aircraft of two air armies must be concentrated immediately in the zone of the 4th Guards Army. The enemy tank grouping racing toward Budapest from the southwest must be destroyed at any cost, and the ground-attack planes can and must play the main part. The full responsibility is theirs. Do you understand?"

"I do."

"Well, if you do, keep on listening. As soon as it is light, go immediately to the 4th Guards Army. In the region north of Erd, which is southwest of Buda, you will meet the chief of an operational group of the 17th Air Army. He has a radio. You will use it. This officer has all the necessary data for radio communications with the headquarters and units of ground-attack aviation of the 17th and 5th air armies. Communicate with me through the radio of the commander of the 5th Air Army."

The morning fog was still dense on the Danube plain when our vehicle left Paks and headed north toward the Hungarian capital. Traveling with me were my

constant friends in combat: Aleksey Yatsyna, Grigory Mikhaylyuk, and David Yediberidze. We raced along the left bank of the Danube, not suspecting the trials that awaited us on the road to Erd.

Dunafoldvar came into view ahead. There was not a soul on the road as we approached. A certain anxiety came over us, a fear that something would happen.

We reached Dunapentele in 30 minutes. Again everything was deserted. The only thing we could see was many caterpillar track prints on the road and its shoulders.

"What can this mean?" I asked the sergeants. "David, stop the vehicle!"

Before I opened the door, Yatsyna shouted loudly, "Tanks! Over there, on the bank, look over there!"

"On the street too," Mikhaylyuk added.

"I see them. They're Germans. Turn back, quickly!" I ordered the driver.

Yediberidze turned the car around in a flash and raced back the way we had come. The tanks, which were in ambush behind small ridges along the road, fired after us. Some shells fell behind us and some off to the side of our "Willys," which was going at top speed. Fragments whistled by us. "The next shell may be ours," I thought, "and that will be it."

"Step on it, David, step on it!" the sergeants yelled.

Yediberidze was literally glued to the wheel and getting everything out of the jeep that he could. The Willys heaved from side to side. We held onto one another firmly so that we would not be thrown out. It seemed this mad race would never end.

Finally, we got out of the enemy's field of vision. The firing stopped. We breathed a sigh of relief.

We had great difficulty getting to the 4th Guards Army where the operational group of the 17th Air Army was located. I was able to find Lt Col T. Smirnov, chief of the group, with his radio and radio operators, in the region north of Erd on that same day. From there the surrounded Nazi forces were just a stone's throw away.

Aerial combat between our fighters and enemy planes broke out over the field of battle again and again. The heavy roar of their engines mixed with the staccato firing of the aircraft cannons and machine guns. One after another the crippled planes fell like fiery torches, increasing their speed and wailing sound until they struck the ground.

After collecting the final data on the number of groups of ground-attack and fighter planes that had arrived at the field of battle and analyzing reports by reconnaissance forces and aviation officers on the situation, I put together a radiogram for Volga (the call sign of Marshal Vorosheykin).



I turned the filled-in paper over to the duty radio operator. He immediately established contact with the radio station of the neighboring air army. Twenty minutes later the operator began writing something down quickly. Then he handed me a sheet of paper and said, "This is for you."

I took the radiogram and read the following: "Kama: Give me hourly reports on the ground and air situation in your region. Volga."

I thought to myself, that is quite an assignment. It is not easy to gather all the information in an hour. But an order is an order. I looked for a solution. I got in contact with the aircraft control officers located with the troops and received information from them on the actions of enemy tanks, which I transmitted to Marshal Vorozheykin.

We heard the roar of an aircraft engine approaching from the Danube; a PO-2 was flying toward us at low altitude. The plane circled and landed on a level field near the grove.

"Is he here by accident?" I asked the chief of the operational group.

"Possibly he is here to see us, but more likely he is going to the headquarters of the 4th Guard Army which is over in that grove. I'll find out right now, we have telephone communication."

While the lieutenant colonel was calling the 4th Guards Army, a vehicle drove up to the radio station. A pilot stepped out. Dressed in a fur-lined flight suit and high boots, he stepped lightly, with an athletic stride, over to the command radio. This was Col-Gen Avn V. A. Sudets, commander of the 17th Air Army. As we later learned, during all these days he had been controlling the combat operations of his aviation units from one primary and two auxiliary control posts. One of them was our post. In difficult and tense situations General Sudets was always in the place where the principal missions of wiping out the enemy tank grouping were being accomplished.

Entering the command radio shack, General Sudets listened to a brief report by the chief of the operational group and then immediately began calling the commander of some aviation unit on the radio. After talking with him he called another, then a third. Then he gave instructions to the headquarters of the air army, informed the front commander of the air situation and the combat operations of the aircraft, and reported these same matters to the HqSHC representative.

With the arrival of General Sudets at our northern auxiliary command and control post air actions in this sector became even more lively. The commander directed not just the aircraft of his own army but all the ground-attack forces which, on order by HqSHC representative Marshal Vorozheykin were operating in the zone of the 3rd Ukrainian Front against the enemy tanks that had broken through to a region 20 kilometers southwest of Buda.

For the remainder of 26 January and from the morning of 27 January 1945 on Soviet aviation dominated the air space of the central regions of Hungary completely. The numerous groups of ground-attack planes operating under cover of fighter planes filled the skies above the field of battle to the

southwest of the Hungarian capital. They poured thousands of antitank aerial bombs plus cannon fire and rocket shells onto the tanks. It is difficult to describe what happened in the air and on the ground. You had to see it to picture it fully.

The enemy forces that were trying to open a corridor to the surrounded grouping melted like snow in the springtime; their will to advance was broken. The enemy stopped the attacks, and by 7 February was retreating to his earlier positions. This was the inglorious end of the third fascist strike against Budapest. On 13 February the capital of Hungary was completely cleared of fascist troops.

On 15 February 1945 the representatives of the HqSHC, Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko and Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, accompanied by Col P. G. Tyukhov, messengers, translators, and a few personal bodyguards set out for the western part of Buda to inspect the Old Fortress. All its underground floors were filled with thousands of wounded German soldiers and officers.

"The wounded must be given care," Marshal Timoshenko said.

We went down into the enormous basement rooms and found one where the command of the surrounded grouping was gathered. There were many generals there. They had hidden underground, pretending to be sick. The marshals decided to stop by the room of the former command. With one of the security officers I was the first to enter the room. We looked around. Lying peacefully on the six large beds were well-fed, clean-shaven military men. On top the blankets of several were overcoats with general's epaulets; the insignia of the SS could be seen on their uniform collars. "This is it, the fascist den," I thought.

Not one of the men on the beds moved, except for the SS officer on the bed nearest to the door who for some reason slipped his hand into his overcoat pocket. I watched his hand carefully and gripped my gun tightly. A small object flashed in the general's hands. With a quick movement he slipped a cartridge into the chamber of a nickel-plated pistol. In one leap I was at the general's bed and knocked the pistol out of his hand with a strong blow from my rifle. The marshals entered the room at this minute. I picked the pistol up off the floor quickly, unloaded it, and reported what had happened.

"Yes, they live by the law of scorpions," one of the men who had entered said, "and fear revenge."

"I wouldn't even have taken away the gun. Let them shoot," another officer said in a bass voice.

"It is obvious that he feels very guilty to try such a thing," Colonel Tyukhov said.

"But why are these SS generals still sleeping quietly here?" I asked.

"Never mind," said Marshal Timoshenko. "Let them stay here for now. Their turn will come. We will find out everything in good time. Each one of them will get what he deserves."

After inspecting the Old Fortress we set off for the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front where the HqSHC representatives conferred for a long time with the command and members of the military council. Among other pressing matters they decided the question of emergency medical care and food for the injured and sick German soldiers and officers located in the basements of the Old Fortress in Buda. When I learned this I thought again of our great people: "There it is, the just heart of the Soviet people, strict and at the same time kind and humane."

A few days later we celebrated the 27th anniversary of the Soviet Army. This holiday was unforgettable for me and for my comrades in battle. On that day the HqSHC representative Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, awarded us combat orders for successful performance of special command assignments. I was given the Order of the Red Banner, while my combat friends sergeants D. P. Yediberidze and A. I. Yatsyna received the Order of the Red Star and G. I. Mikhaylyuk, our courageous scout who died near Budapest, received the Order of the Red Star posthumously.

[Sep 80 pp 36-41 Part II]

[Text] On the morning of 22 March 1945 Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin was in his working office in the small Hungarian city of Balatonalmad. He was summarizing the combat actions of the air forces in the recently completed defensive operation of our troops in the Lake Balaton region.

Now and again the telephone in the HqSHC representative's office would ring. This was new information being reported on the actions of our aviation and enemy aviation in the Hungarian sector where Soviet troops had gone over to the offensive on the morning of 16 March and by this time, having crossed the Vertes and Bakon mountains, were pursuing the Nazis who were retreating toward the Austrian border.

"Well, how did our aviation do on the field of battle in the Lake Balaton region?" Vorozheykin asked.

I placed on his desk detailed information on the actions of the aviation units of the 17th and 5th air armies of generals V. A. Sudets and S. K. Goryunov for the period of 6-20 March. He began to read the text of the hefty document out loud. After reading through to the last page, the marshal said:

"Those pilots are great! They did a fine job. And look at all the new tactics they used.\* All the pilots who fought there deserve the highest awards in our

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\* In the Balaton operation of the ground-attack planes successfully came at the enemy tanks from different directions and altitudes. In bad weather their actions from very low altitude were highly effective. These and other tactics were what Marshal Vorozheykin had in mind when he praised the pilots - Editors.

country. And as for fighter ace Captain Koldunov, I think he should be nominated for a second Hero of the Soviet Union!"

"Comrade marshal, when you also consider the fact that during all these days the pilots had to fly under extremely difficult conditions, it is simply impossible to praise their success too highly. Many crews were performing six to eight missions a day. How could they do it?"

The pilots really did perform miracles. The enemy had concentrated a large amount of antiaircraft artillery there. It seemed that the enemy had gathered all the antiaircraft weapons of Army Group South at Balaton, and enemy aviation provided strong resistance.

"How many enemy aircraft took part, according to the latest figures?" Marshal Vorozheykin asked.

I said that at the start of the battle the Nazis had 775 airplanes in the Balaton region, and at the present time they had about 400.

"In other words, in half a month the enemy lost 375 planes. Excellent!" The marshal stood up, walked away from his desk and paced around the room, concentrating his thoughts on something. Then he walked over to a map hanging on the wall and began carefully looking over the Vienna area.

"For the enemy 375 aircraft today is a very significant figure. Fascist aviation will probably not be able to replenish such losses in our sector. The Nazi command will not take aviation units from other sectors. Our attack is going forward there too. But possibly some planes will be received from the aviation industry. Many German aviation plants are continuing to work at full strength."

I listened to the marshal carefully, but I still did not understand where his thoughts were heading.

"Where are these operating German aviation plants today?"

Grigori Alekseyevich did not answer immediately. Looking at the map, he said slowly that in his opinion they were not so far away. Our command knew that there were 120 aviation industry enterprises operating in Austrian territory, supplying fascist Germany with up to 9,000 aircraft and 17,000 engines a year. Moreover, the largest underground aviation plants were located in the Vienna region. Unquestionably they were the ones who were now replenishing the enemy aviation units operating in this sector.

"Comrade marshal, can't they be bombed?"

"I know. I know what needs to be done," Vorozheykin interrupted me in mid-sentence. "At the present time we are aware of plants in these quadrants here," he said, pointing to the map. All of the quadrants which the marshal indicated were in Lower Austria.

"Presumably, the construction sites for the new V rockets are located in this mountainous region of the Austrian Alps," the marshal said, again turning to



the map. "We are very interested in detailed information on these sites. According to the Yalta agreement with the Allies, the entire war industry of Nazi Germany is subject to elimination. Do you understand?"

"Yes, I do."

"General Goryunov must be given the mission today of putting his reconnaissance aviation right to work searching for underground plants in the Vienna area," Grigoriy Alekseyevich continued. "As far as I know, General Sudeta and his staff are already working on this matter. I think that he already has some information on underground plants located in Lower Austria and south of Vienna. We will solve this problem together, with all available means."

The HqSHC representative paced up and down the room, then stopped and stared at me. I came to the position of attention.

"Comrade marshal! If urgent reconnaissance is necessary to find where the plants are located, I am ready to perform the assignment."

"And you will perform it, but only when the proper time comes. Still, you need to start preparing today! Now get some paper and we will write a report for the HqSHC on the combat operations of aviation in the Balaton defensive operation and the Vienna offensive operation. They are waiting for information there."

The marshal began dictating the text of the report: "Moscow. State Committee for Defense, Comrade Stalin. I report that in the period between 6 and 20 March 1945 the air forces of the 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts..."

On the same day Moscow confirmed receipt of the full text of this document.

The Vienna offensive operation was coming to an end. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were advancing rapidly. Then one day (it was 9 April) Marshal Vorozheykin, who at the time was in the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front, turned to me and said:

"Now your turn has come to go search for the underground plants in the region of the Austrian capital. Our units have already drawn very close to it. So go into action, but be cautious."

"Yes sir, I will be cautious!"

"Carry out careful reconnaissance of the underground aviation plants in the region of the city and check the information on the launch sites of the V rockets in the Austrian Alps. Inform Marshal Tolbukhin, the front commander, on performance of your assignment."

On 10 April 1945 the HqSHC representative's airplane delivered me to Wiener-Neustadt Airport, 60 kilometers south of Vienna. From there I went to the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. It was not too simple to get in to see the commander. He was occupied with urgent matters. Finally, the adjutant invited me into P. I. Tolbukhin's office.

"Why have you come to visit us?" the marshal asked.

I briefly stated the purpose of my arrival and the missions I had been given by the HqSHC representative.

"Good heavens," the commander said in some surprise. "My men are watching and examining these sites carefully and you will get information from them, yet here you have come all this distance..." After a brief pause Tolbukhin continued, "Well, since you have received this mission go ahead and do it. I will help you with it. Report everything you see to me afterward."

"Yes sir," I answered shortly.

A commander's messenger was called in to the office and Tolbukhin instructed him to help me carry out the assignment.

"And now, get to work!" the marshal said, shaking my hand firmly in parting.

In the afternoon of that day, 10 April, in the region south of Baden I switched from my Willys to the vehicle of a certain tank company commander of the Ninth Guards Army, which was advancing in the spurs of the Austrian Alps. It was agreed that the battle route of this company would pass through the quadrant where I was going on special assignment. We would discuss different alternatives of action on the spot.

The command came to take our places in the tanks. I quickly said goodbye to the comrades who were seeing me off, Yatsyna, Yakimenko, and the new jeep driver, whose name I have unfortunately forgotten. They stayed at the head quarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front to wait for me.

"Meet me in Vienna, by the provost's office!" I shouted back to my friends.

"What do you mean, Vienna? The Fritzies are still there," they said in surprise.

"So what, in a few days I am sure we will liberate Vienna!"

The sergeants waved their caps goodbye. My courageous combat friend David Yediberidze was not among them on this occasion. He had been critically wounded during performance of a combat assignment just a few days earlier. An armored personnel carrier delivered him to the hospital with a leg torn off. I lost contact with him for many years; we did not meet again until 1965.

In the part of the Austrian Alps where I had to do the reconnaissance and collect the necessary information heavy fighting against the fascist groups was underway. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance the tank troops moved confidently forward. When the tank I was in reached the assigned quadrant we saw many dead Nazis and disfigured equipment. Signs of heavy bombing were everywhere. The mauled enemy had fled the region, not even managing to completely destroy things that he considered very important.

"This is it, stop the tank," I shouted into the ear of the tank operator. We had reached the necessary point. He nodded his head, understandingly. The tank stopped. I opened the hatch and looked around. We were surrounded by trees and rocks.

"What a beautiful place!"

Suddenly tank guns around us began to boom and we could hear the staccato fire of machine guns. I had to get back inside quickly. The firing stopped. We surveyed the region again, then went a little further and stopped.

"Look, what is that?" I said, pointing.

Not far off among the rocky crags was some kind of strange structure. A long, inclined metal girder resembling a trestle frame had one end placed in a deep rock quarry. The other end rose gradually above the cliff and protruded sharply over the high trees. Two parallel bands resembling narrow-gage rails from a distance could be seen clearly on the surface of this long girder. We headed toward it. Could this be the launcher for the V rocket? No, we were disappointed. I looked for a way down. Off to the side was a road that led toward the mysterious structure. Corpses, ruined vehicles, and discarded weapons lay on the ground around us. There were many craters.

"Let's go down there," I said to the commander.

"Fine."

The tank crawled slowly down the road leading into the quarry. We came out on a level concrete square. Not far away we saw the base of the inclined metal girder, and right next to it were several metal doors that tightly guarded the entrances to rooms cut into the sheer cliff. It was absolutely silent. Somewhere up on top firing was going on. I began looking over the site. Building materials and tools were all around. The site was still under construction.

"Well, it seems that that's it. There are no launch sites for V rockets here," I said to the tank soldier. "Let's go back up!"

For performance of the main part of my assignment, searching for the underground plants, the army command had given me a special, well-equipped armored personnel carrier with an outstanding, battle-experienced crew. The commander was M. Sgt Pavel Drobyshev. The APC had a crew of three combat engineer-sergeants. They were the ones with whom I had to carry out my search for the underground aviation plants around the Austrian capital.

We reached Vienna during the day of 12 April, at the very time when Soviet forces were cleaning up the remnants of the Nazi garrison. We entered the city from the west, from the side of the ancient park of the Schoenbrunn Palace. The trees around were in bloom. The square in front of the palace was ringed by high green walls formed of some kind of marvelous plant. It was comparatively quiet there. But the rest of the city was engulfed in smoke and fire.

Our vehicle drove through the city streets at high speed and reached the outskirts. We went on past places where many different industrial enterprises were located. We drove around a large area for several hours but were unable to detect any signs of underground installations. The fascists had hidden them quite well from outsiders.

"Let's drive over to that empty field over there," I said to the sergeants.

"Why do that? That's a dump, don't you see?" the crew members objected.

For a minute I began to doubt whether I was searching in the right place. I took out the map and plan prepared in advance and compared them to the terrain. I recalled that these were precisely the places I had seen earlier in aerial photographs. No, it was no mistake. We were in the exact quadrant where we were supposed to be.

"All the same, let's see what kind of dump it is and what kind of trash they have there."

We drove northeast, where we could see piles of some kind of material scattered in disorder over an enormous empty field. A miserable road full of potholes, a rarity in this area, led in that direction. Everything seemed neglected and abandoned. There were no residential or industrial structures nearby. No people could be seen either.

We drove closer to the empty field. There were many craters from large aerial bombs around. I recalled that this was where our long-range bombers had been sent. I looked around the area carefully and suddenly I saw low racks standing between piles of trash and various kinds of industrial waste. Arranged on the racks were many types of high-grade steel, iron, and nonferrous metals in billets of various lengths and thicknesses, circular and rectangular strips, angle and T-section strips, and more. The racks were covered by planking on which trash had been spread around.

"Quite some camouflage!" I said to the crew members.

"But what is hidden here?" they asked.

"Let's go see."

We walked up to a large pile of trash and looked it over. It turned out to be an enormous cylinder with shutters, carefully concealed by special camouflage.

"A ventilation unit?" the thought flashed in my mind.

We investigated carefully. There was a vent. Beneath us was what we were looking for, an underground plant. It was a large empty field. In the large empty field there were many similar piles of trash. They were all ventilation shafts. But where was the entrance to the underground area? How could we find it? We drove all over the field, but could not find any entrance. I pondered what to do next.



"Look over there, someone is coming down the road," the sergeant standing on the APC reported.

I looked in that direction. Walking along the road coming from the city I saw a man and a woman pulling a cart behind them. We drove up to them and exchanged greetings.

"Arbeiten?"

"Ja, ja."

I walked over and shook the Austrian worker's hand. He began to say something quickly, all the time pointing at the high-rise buildings of the worker community to which they were going. Mixing Russian and German words, I asked him if he knew where the underground plant here was located and how to enter it. Again they began to point to the buildings of the worker community. We understood that they were asking us to drive there and find out everything. We took them into the vehicle and drove to the city.

The Austrians were joyfully greeted by their relatives, among whom was a grey-haired man of about 50. After some brief mutual greetings and questions the young Austrian worker that we had brought in the APC and the grey-haired man stepped off to the side to talk, obviously about the subject in which we were interested.

After about 40 minutes our APC, with the young and old Austrian workers on board in addition to the crew, drove through the familiar empty field toward a small grove on its west edge. As soon as we entered it the old worker ordered us to stop the vehicle by an enormous pile of dry twigs and some kind of rubbish. He pointed in that direction, as if to say: here is what you are looking for. We got out of the APC and began carefully removing the twigs, empty boxes, and shavings. At the very bottom we found some sheets of iron. We moved them to the side and saw the enormous bifolding doors that concealed the entrance to the underground area.

"Finally," I could not help saying. "Here is what we need!"

The combat engineers got to work. They examined the outer entrance carefully. There were no signs of mines by the outer entrance. Neither were there any by the entrance leading into the underground area. We descended quietly on broad stone stairs. It was dark, with a smell of grease, gasoline, and engine oil. The powerful electric light hanging on my chest revealed a metal door in the darkness at the bottom. It was the entrance to the underground rooms.

"Comrade captain!" one of the sergeants said, turning to me. "Order everyone to go back up. I will open the lower door alone."

"Good."

The combat engineer moved toward the lower entrance to the underground area. But I remained standing on the top steps to light the sergeant's way with my light.

The enormous force of the explosion knocked me off my feet instantly. I lost consciousness when my head struck the stone steps. When I came to I was on top, in the APC. My head ached, my ears were ringing, and my body seemed foreign. My comrades were standing around me.

"Where is the sergeant?" I asked them quietly.

There was no answer. The remains of the dead sergeant were lying nearby covered by a cloak. We had hit a booby trap. It is true that combat engineers only make one mistake.

On that same day our group entered the underground aviation plant through a different door. Each shop in the plant resembled a metro station in dimensions and appearance. The only difference was that here there were machine tools along the walls. Alongside them were boxes and stacks of various semi-finished and finished parts for airplanes. Each underground room was connected with another by a tunnel with metal doors at both ends. We were struck by how many machine tools were driven by electricity. After inspecting all the shops we went to the rooms where the desks and other facilities for mechanical drawing and copying were found. It would be necessary to examine this site as carefully as possible, count all the machine tools, and determine what the plant produced.

Based on the many parts arranged alongside the lathes and the various models lying on the desks and in racks and boxes in the workrooms of the engineering-technical personnel, it was possible to determine that this large underground aviation plant produced parts and assemblies for fighter planes. Other underground plants that we inspected produced parts for aircraft engines.

Our group spent more than a day in this region and collected valuable information on several underground aviation plants where fascist aircraft were produced. The words Marshal of Aviation Vorozheykin had said to me in Balatonalmad a month earlier with respect to these facilities were confirmed in full.

In the evening of 13 April, after performing the assignment, our APC pulled up to the building of the just-established military provost's office in Vienna. I had taken no more than a few steps when the Willys driver and sergeants Yatsyna and Yakimenko, who had been waiting, ran up to me. We had a happy meeting, as if we had not seen each other for an eternity, even though we had parted just a few days earlier.

I thanked the crew of the APC warmly for the help they had given me in performing my assignment. Then I sent them back to their unit. I myself and my loyal friends set off for the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. We raced out of Vienna on the broad highway going south.

I reported the results of my inspection of underground plants in the Vienna region to Marshal Vorozheykin on the next day. He listened to the report carefully, asked about the things that interested him, and ordered that a written report be compiled which would give a thorough description of the facilities I had investigated, indicate the number of machine tools and

general character of the parts and assemblies produced, and more. I worked on this report for several hours. When it was done the marshal sent his report to the HqSHC. In addition to my information he reported that the air force of the 4th Ukrainian Front was ready to carry out the Morava-Ostrava offensive operation.

Moscow called him in the evening of 17 April. The Supreme High Commander demanded that the underground plants in the Vienna region be inspected again to confirm the information sent earlier about them.

The marshal called for me immediately and said, "Tomorrow morning we are flying to the 3rd Ukrainian. Give the command to the airplane crew."

At exactly 1000 the next morning the HqSHC representative's plane landed at Baden airport. From there we set out to see Marshal F. I. Tolbukhin, whose headquarters was located in one of the picturesque parts of the city. Fedor Ivanovich was glad to see Grigoriy Alekseyevich. The marshals were old friends. They had known each other before the Civil War and had fought together. They met many times during the peacetime years, and now here they were cleaning up the Nazi hordes on the southern flank of an enormous front. To their mutual satisfaction, military destiny often brought these two leaders together.

After settling all urgent matters with the front commander the HqSHC representative and a group of senior officers, which included specialists in aviation engineering, set off in several vehicles for the Vienna region to inspect the underground aviation plants. During the night before 19 April a confirmation of all the data on the installations that interested the supreme command was sent to the HqSHC.

Col-Gen Avn V. A. Sudets later took up the study of the underground aviation plants of fascist Germany in Austria. A whole group of representatives of the People's Commissariats of weapons and the aviation industry (unfortunately, I do not know the names of these comrades) were sent from Moscow to work with him. During their searches they found several more underground aviation plants with various kinds of equipment.

Fascist Germany had a rich industrial base in Austria. The underground aviation plants produced thousands of aircraft. But they did not save the rulers of the Third Reich from collapse. The Soviet army brought down these pretenders to world domination.

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## TANK UNIT FUEL CONSERVATION EFFORTS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 80 p 9

[Article by Maj S. Margin, regiment commander, and Warrant Officer V. Shurpin, company senior technician: "Good, Thrifty Management"]

[Text] The men of our tank regiment have successfully fulfilled their socialist pledges. This year we once again appealed to the men of the Soviet Armed Forces to become actively involved in the nationwide campaign for thrift and economy. Having amassed certain experience, we are endeavoring to consolidate achieved success and to make it the daily standard in our combat training.

Warrant officers and noncommissioned officers have played an important role in boosting the proficiency ratings of the men. They directly supervised the activities of specialists at field and tactical exercises and in servicing equipment. The entire regiment is familiar with the names of competition-leader warrant officers L. Yefimov, S. Sandratskiy, and V. Shurpin.

Excellent results were achieved by the tank crews led by Sr Sgt Ya. Voytekhevich, Sgt Yu. Talalayev, I. Ushupniyeks, V. Romanovskiy, and others. Sr Sgt N. Kushniruk rightly became an example for the truck drivers in achieving fuel savings.

Emulating the leaders, this regiment's tank and truck drivers frequently achieved very high results. Pvt R. Shmidt, for example, achieved savings of 500 liters of diesel fuel, Jr Sgt N. Ignat'kov -- 400 liters, and Pvt V. Gruzdev -- 400 liters of gasoline. When the results were totaled up each month, the "Thrifty Subunit" challenge banner was awarded with the greatest frequency to the men of officer G. Garafetdinov's company. The advanced know-how of the competition right-flankers was constantly studied and assimilated by all enlisted men, NCOs and officers. And this promoted to a considerable degree successful accomplishment of our assigned tasks.

Upon totaling up socialist competition results for the year it became known that the personnel of our regiment saved enough fuel and lubricants to hold several battalion tactical exercises. The liters of fuel saved by each crew during the days of combat training at the tank training area and at field exercises add up to tons.



The greatest success was achieved by the men of Sr Lt G. Garafetdinov's tank company. During the summer period of training alone Jr Sgts V. Sapunov and N. Fedin and Pvt V. Min'kov saved approximately 100 liters of diesel fuel each. The other driver-mechanics in the subunit also produced good results.

In this company specialist pledges were drawn up in the form of individual "For Thrift and Economy" cards. Each crew member kept one of these small cards. The number indicating planned savings for the current period of training was entered on the card. The actual economy figures would be entered each month in the appropriate column when results were totaled up. Therefore each driver-mechanic always knew whether or not he was behind the control figure, for the standard fuel consumption figure for 100 kilometers of mileage traveled is known in advance. And at the end of the workday, knowing his mileage, the driver can easily determine actual fuel consumption.

Introduction of these individual cards in other subunits made it possible to achieve greater publicity, concreteness, and comparability in the course of competition. The simplicity and clarity of recording increased the drivers' feeling of responsibility and injected a lively spirit of competition. It is not surprising that at the end of a tactical exercise or field drill activity Jr Sgt V. Sapunov, Pvt V. Min'kov and others would hasten to ask their superior officer whether the company as a whole had achieved fuel savings. As a rule the result was affirmative.

This is due first and foremost to a high degree of skill at driving combat vehicles. As an example, the subunit is executing a march in a column formation. It would seem that the route would be the same for all tanks. With the experienced drivers, however, engine operation corresponds to speed and road conditions, and the engine does not overheat. The men skillfully negotiate various obstacles in the higher gears. If the column halts, they immediately turn off the engine.

Jr Sgt V. Sapunov, one of the subunit's best drivers, drives his tank intelligently in all conditions. He also employs intelligent procedures during halts, especially in winter. Since the tank engine as a rule is not overheated, Sapunov immediately shuts it down. He then closes the engine compartment louvers and covers the radiator with an insulating blanket. This slows the process of cooling off of the engine. If the order comes to resume movement, little fuel will be required to bring the engine up to operating temperature. This means savings.

The younger men are a different thing altogether. Pvt N. Budnik, for example, was having a hard time mastering driving skills. During marches he would let the engine operating temperature get too high. He would drive in too low a gear, which required greater fuel expenditure to maintain the same speed. During stops he would be forced to expend fuel idling the engine, to drop the engine coolant temperature to the required level. As a result Budnik failed to achieve his pledge of saving 30 liters of fuel during the winter training period.

The conclusion was obvious -- it was necessary to improve the tankers' skill. During the summer training period all tankers in the majority of subunits improved their proficiency rating by one level. Less experienced men, such as Privts N. Budnik and Yu. Isayev, were helped by their comrades.

There is considerable reserve potential for savings in high-quality servicing and maintenance of tank systems and assemblies. Let us say, for example, that an air cleaner is dirty. Fuel is consumed as the tank moves, but the engine is just not pulling. Or take the routine servicing of fuel filters. Pvt M. Simonov, replacing the filter bowl after cleaning the primary filter, forgot to install the gasket. The result is a potential fuel leakage where the gasket is missing. This is why we devote particular attention to high-quality equipment servicing.

In winter it is important to make sure the heater is in proper working order, regularly to remove scale from the boiler and promptly to close the access cover, preventing dirt from getting in. All this increases fuel consumption efficiency and consequently leads to savings.

We also teach the men to service and maintain the equipment with care and intelligence. Special work stations are set up when winterizing and summerizing. Two diesel fuel baths are used when working with filters, for example: one for the initial cleaning and the other for the final cleaning. These measures also make it possible to consume fuel and lubricants economically.

A personnel technical conference was held in the unit with a high level of enthusiasm. Tankers discussed knowledgeably and with interest how and where fuel can be saved, optimal operating rpm and gear combinations, etc.

Matters of thrift and economy are frequently raised at Komsomol meetings. At these meetings the men exchange information, note their successes, analyze deficiencies, and specify ways to correct problems. A businesslike discussion is also conducted in wall newspapers and news bulletin sheets. Instances of negligence and carelessness are subjects for a satirical "Bannik" [Cleaning Rod].

Publicity has had a positive effect on improving the work performance of our specialists. It has given each and every man, as it were, an additional charge of energy, evoking an endeavor not only to improve one's own performance results but to achieve the results reached by the competition leaders.

Analyzing the results of this past year, one reaches the conclusion that diesel fuel savings are a result primarily of good occupational training of our tank drivers and a high sense of responsibility on the part of each individual for the success of the collective.

In the new training year we shall improve competition results and honor important days -- the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of Victory -- with new achievements in meeting adopted pledges and in increasing vigilance and combat readiness.

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## TANK EXERCISE IN CARPATHIAN MOUNTAINS DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 80 pp 10-11

[Article by master proficiency rating Warrant Officer M. Severenchuk, Red-Banner Carpathian Military District: "The March -- an Examination for Tankers")]

[Text] Our tank training subunit was executing a long march. The winter bad road conditions were making travel difficult, but the combat vehicles persistently negotiated kilometer after kilometer. The tankers were endeavoring to complete the entire route without breakdowns or cause for admonition. The subunit successfully accomplished the assigned mission, and all vehicles reached the destination area on schedule. En route, however, some of the crews were forced to stop because of equipment problems and to make necessary repairs either independently or with our assistance. Warrant Officer P. Filipishin and I were in the technical maintenance echelon.

While negotiating a hillslope, tank driver Pvt P. Shusherov threw his left track. This soldier was a comparative novice at driving a tank, and he had made a maneuvering error. When we reached the stalled tank, the crew was already preparing to unlink the track in order to thread it back onto the road wheels. Warrant Officer Filipishin quickly walked around the tank, making some mental calculations. He then stopped the tank crew and ordered them to put everything back the way it had been. He sat at the tank controls, shifted into low gear, and pushed the right control lever. Obedient to the touch of a master, the tank slowly began to move, centimeter by centimeter. Gradually the track threaded itself back onto the road wheels. The crew, thanking us for our assistance, set out to catch up with the column.

A few dozen kilometers further on we saw another stopped tank. A track had become unlinked while the tank was in movement, and the tank crew, led by Sr Sgt V. Zarutskiy, was placing it back on. Working together, we quickly determined the cause of the problem. The drive sprockets on this tank had been repaired before setting out on the march. In mounting the track following the repairs, one of the track link fasteners was secured incorrectly. The crew was able to correct the error without assistance.

Analyzing after a march the causes of breakdowns, one can see that they are divided basically into two groups. The first group includes mistakes made by personnel in readying equipment for the march, while the second group includes inadequate driving skills on the part of some of the younger men.

This march graphically demonstrated that primarily needed in order to operate and maintain a combat vehicle correctly is technical knowledge. This is why from the very first days of combat training we endeavor to create in the subunit an atmosphere of interest and to develop in the men a love of their equipment. Various forms are utilized for this. I, for example, operate in the company a technical study group for tank drivers. We thoroughly study the design and construction of tank components, assemblies and systems, servicing and maintenance rules and procedures, driving procedures, and other topics.

While preparing for the march our top specialists -- Maj V. Serov and Warrant Officers P. Filipishin and N. Kudymets -- addressed a training class to share their experience and know-how in driving vehicles under difficult conditions. They also gave recommendations on correcting various malfunctions and performing repairs in the field. The specialists emphasized that the main thing is not to ignore even a single minor item both when readying and operating equipment.

While readying for the march, I stressed to the drivers the importance of thorough servicing of tracks and suspension and performance of preventive maintenance. In addition to the prescribed operations, we checked attachment parts, such as track pins, master clutch control rod lock washers, and drive sprocket toothed ring securing bolts. We tightened up every threaded connection.

In addition, in view of the fact that various unexpected problems can arise en route, I drew the drivers' attention to the importance of the ability properly to utilize the spare gear and equipment, to know literally blindfolded what is located where. And this knowledge came in handy.

The tank driven by Pvt V. Loktionov suddenly stopped. The engine had died. It seems that the rod from the fuel feed regulator had worked loose. The driver, using his kit of tools and spare parts, quickly corrected the problem. The vehicle continued on its way.

In training young specialists, I devote considerable attention to an inspection of the tank at the first halt, since various equipment operation problems usually crop up precisely at the beginning of a march. There is little time available for vehicle inspection during a halt, and the driver must perform his duties quickly and skillfully.

Technical inspection lists help the men here. They contain a detailed list of all operations, specify distribution of tasks among the crew members and indicate the maximum allowable time allocated for each operation. Problems noted by crew members during the march are analyzed and corrected during the halt.

At the first halt Jr Sgt N. Bundak reported to me that the transmission oil pressure gauge was sometimes failing to show a reading. The crew members and I proceeded to look into the problem. We opened up the engine-transmission compartment. When we removed a valve unit, we discovered a piece of bakelite paint blocking the orifice. We flushed out the unit, replaced it, and road-tested the vehicle. It was now operating flawlessly.

When preparing for the march, all specialists devoted considerable attention to equipment operation at low ambient temperatures. Temperatures rose above freezing,



however, on the day of departure. The tanks also encountered rain en route. At this point it was discovered that the observation instrument hydropneumatic cleaning system on Pvt V. Vivchar's tank was not operating. He had forgotten to inspect it, and perhaps he was hoping that in winter it would not be necessary to switch the system on. It did not take long to reconnect the washing fluid line to the sprayer, which had worked loose. But at the next performance critique the company's tank drivers received a graphic example of the potential consequences of carelessness.

The snow concealed obstacles and created additional difficulties, but the men drove their tanks with confidence. And later the drivers had no need of assistance from the technical maintenance echelon. The equipment operated reliably.

The many-kilometers-long march demonstrated the fine field proficiency of the majority of our tankers and became for all personnel a genuine school of combat skill.

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## TANK EXERCISE IN MOUNTAINS DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 4, Apr 80 p 12-13

[Article by Col N. Yezhov: "Tank Gunnery"]

[Text] Jr Sgt Yu. Pankov and Pvt S. Lesnykh were able to hit only one target apiece when firing standard artillery rounds in mountain terrain. Nor did their comrades fire well. As a result the subunit received a low mark for the firing exercise.

On the previous day, on the same ground, and under the same weather conditions, the tankers of another subunit, in which Warrant Officer K. Loktev, Sgt N. Gasanov and B. Nikitenko serve, performing the same firing exercise, scored solid hits on both tank gun and machinegun targets. The conditions for conduct of the training drill, tank gunnery drills and for performing the exercise were practically identical for these subunits, but as we see, the results were different. What is the reason for success by one subunit and failure by another?

Firing the standard artillery round under difficult mountain terrain conditions should be preceded by special tank gunnery drills, at which the specific procedures of each crew member are practiced. In the subunit in which Junior Sergeant Pankov and Private Lesnykh serve, scheduled training classes and drills were conducted without taking account of specific features of mountain terrain. Little work was done on target reconnaissance under difficult conditions, and mistakes were made in determining target range. When a projectile fell just short of a target, crews would frequently have the false impression that they had scored a hit. As a result they would not utilize the time to prepare for firing the next round. Young gunners would press the electric firing button at the moment the tank would list, knocking off the gun's aim, and the projectile would land far from the target.

Errors were also made in correcting fire: the tankers would make corrections without changing the sight setting, which can be done only when firing at flat-trajectory range. Under the conditions of the exercise the targets were placed at close to maximum range of effective tank fire, and in case of a miss it was essential to figure in the amount of burst deviation from the target, as well as the change in distance from target to tank, and to apply the total correction to the sight setting.

Also noted at the post-firing critique was the tankers' inadequate proficiency in loading procedures. The standard round is heavy. It is no easy task to load it into the bore in a limited time with the tank subjected to considerable shaking on slopes and other mountainous terrain irregularities; considerable dexterity is

required. Many tankers lack the required skill. Such "trivial matters" were ignored at practice drills, and they did not concern themselves with readying the weapon in advance. They knew in theory that when firing the standard round in mountain terrain one must devote particular attention to adjustment of stabilizer parameters to standard figures, inspection and verification of antirecoil devices and all other gun components. In practice "they didn't lay a hand on it." As a result all unnecessary simplifications and relaxation of demands at practice drills as well as carelessness and negligence in servicing weapons led to unsatisfactory firing results.

The situation is different in Warrant Officer K. Loktev's subunit. They employ not only weapon training classes but also training on the tank for developing firm combat performance skills in crew members. They employ training drills involving driving tanks in the mountains in order to develop in loaders solid skills in rapid gun loading during tank movement across rough ground. Loaders are instructed to load the gun with dummy artillery rounds a specified number of times while the tank is in movement. Speed of loading gradually increases.

At each tank gunnery drill tank crews work on problems in target reconnaissance by observation and learn to observe firing results and correct fire under various conditions: when the target is situated on a facing slope, on flat ground, etc, practice determining the sense of burst and making corrections in initial settings....

Immediate preparation for firing the standard round begins in advance in this subunit: five or six days prior to the firing exercise, the senior commander holds a test drill with the tank crews, four or five days prior to the exercise the subunit commander sets up the firing schedule, and two or three days prior to the firing day the tanks and weapons are inspected and serviced, and the training devices are thoroughly readied. On the eve of the firing exercise instructor-methods classes are held with the instructors at the training stations (with platoon and tank commanders), a briefing session is held for firing exercise support personnel, and the training stations and moving target tank gunnery range area are readied. The tankers are issued ammunition, check sights, and zero the machine-guns.

Personnel knowledge of the equipment and weapons is checked at the check drills, as are the tankers' skills in target reconnaissance by observation and determination of range to targets in mountainous terrain conditions, as well as meeting of performance standards. Serious attention is focused on the men's ability to handle ammunition within the fighting compartment while the tank is swaying and shaking, and their ability to eliminate various delays occurring during firing.

One of the most important conditions for successful performance of a standard artillery round firing exercise in mountain terrain is thorough preparation of weapons for firing. The assigned tanks are brought out to the moving target gunnery range one day prior to the firing exercise. Tank gun antirecoil devices and stabilizer characteristics are checked without fail. Crews check the ball and socket sights on a distant point, machineguns are zeroed on a 100-meter sighting target and are tested by firing at actual range. During this firing they check to make sure that the electrical circuits and stabilizer are in good working order while the tank is moving across mountainous terrain. After this the weapons are once again inspected, firing pin protrusion is gauge-checked, and play is adjusted in the mechanism.

At the instructor-methods session the subunit commander draws the tank commanders' attention to the important matter of target reconnaissance ability and ability to determine range to targets in mountain terrain. The fact is that in the mountains apparent distance differs greatly from actual distance: during downward observation mountains make distances look shorter, with the situation reversed when gazing upward.

Tankers should also possess thorough knowledge of the locations of weapons in the enemy's dispositions under mountain conditions and their telltale signs. For example, the subunit commander reminds his men that machineguns are usually positioned on hill spurs (but not on the hilltop itself) and on projecting cliffs, from which the machinegunner can put fire into ravines, gullies, and gorges. In the mountains antitank rocket launchers and grenade launchers, in contrast to machineguns, are usually positioned close to mountain roads, passes, and ravines where armored equipment movement is possible. Antitank guns and antitank missiles are also deployed on tank-threat axes in the foothills, in ravines, in trees and brush along mountain roads....

On the day of the gunnery exercise, not later than 30 minutes before its commencement, the subunit commander assembles his men and checks to determine that they are familiar with the conditions of the exercise and safety procedures to follow during gunnery in the mountains. He then assigns the mission to his subunit, specifies the sequence of alternation at training stations, indicates the direction of tank movement during firing, sectors of observation and fire (without disclosing the target locations), main and alternate axes of arc of fire, tank turning sequence and procedure on the cease-fire line and their return to the initial position. After this the tank crews proceed to perform the exercise.

The crews begin to move on the command "Advance!" (if any tank has not begun moving out within 20 seconds after the command is given, its crew is prohibited from firing, since the vehicle may lag behind its neighbors by more than 100 meters, thus violating safety rules). The gun is loaded immediately after a tank crosses the open-fire line. If firing is being conducted under conditions where observation of firing results is made difficult (dust in the direction of travel), after the first round is fired the directing officer communicates to the crew the position of the burst relative to the target, without indicating the amount of error. It sometimes happens that when firing under difficult conditions certain gunners wait to be given a correction, while they themselves do not determine in a prompt manner the sense and amount of impact error. It has been proven by experience, however, that smoke (dust) from the shot dissipates more rapidly than the shellburst cloud, and with adequate practice one can almost always determine the sense and amount of the burst error or spot the projectile impact point. Therefore the gunner should continue observation, without taking his eye from the gunsight eyepiece, and endeavor to determine the sense of burst himself.

It is best to locate the targets with a 3 and 5-power magnification, while it is expedient to change the sight to 7-power magnification for the actual firing and determination of burst sense. This of course demands highly precise actions on the part of the gunner and verification by the tank commander. The proficiency of the crew members and the degree of smooth coordination in their actions are also important here. They are excellent in Warrant Officer Loktev's subunit.



During firing on the move, when range to target has been determined with a high degree of accuracy, tank commanders always figure in the amount of change in range from their tank to the target when specifying the initial sight setting. If the target is situated at a distance slightly exceeding the range of a direct fire shot, they commence firing with a sight setting corresponding to the range of direct fire, aiming at the center of the target. It is true that the probability of a short increases somewhat with this, but firing is simplified, since it is conducted with a fixed sight setting. Nor do they forget to introduce a lateral correction when the tank is firing on a slope (the tank is listing right or left). Here the tankers are helped by excellent knowledge of firing rules and procedures.

Every loader in the subunit knows that the gunnery result is also dependent on the precision of his actions. Before loading he must inspect the bore, and after loading he disengages the gun interlocking. He then reports ready. The gun fires, and the loader has already determined the amount of recoil....

An excellent level of proficiency, an understanding by each tanker of the importance of his job, smoothness of performance and mutual interchangeability help a subunit perform a difficult exercise with a high mark.

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## ROLE OF SERGEANT IN FORMULATING BATTLEFIELD STRATEGY DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 80 p 7

[Article by Col N. Yershov: "The Sergeant's Initiative in Battle"]

[Text] Initiative in battle is not an end in itself but one of the means of achieving victory. It manifests itself in the striving to find the best method of carrying out a mission and in the ability to make a bold decision quickly and to put it into play unremittingly.

This is precisely how Sr Sgt V. Sychev acted during the tactical exercise. His platoon, together with other company units had broken through the "enemy's" FEBA and, after a brief engagement, seized hill 135.0 (diagram 1). His flank unit on the right lagged behind, however. He was being held back by antitank weapons on hill 132.5. As can be seen from the diagram, they were located in the distance and off to the right of the direction of advance of the 1st Tank Platoon. The "enemy" threatened this very flank unit with a counterattack from Figurnaya grove. Just one more push, one more rush and, it seemed, the counterattacks would succeed. At that moment, however, when motorized infantry with three tanks came out onto hill 132.5, fresh forces pounced on them. These were the tanks of Sr Sgt Sychev. Owing to the initiative displayed by the platoon commander and the decisive action of his personnel, the "enemy's" counterattack was foiled.

The advance continued. The platoon received a new mission--operate in the advance party. Traveling along a predetermined route, the tank crews could not allow a sudden "enemy" attack on the column of main forces. They had to capture the bridge across the Klenovka river and seize hill 112.5 by 11:30. Here they had to protect the deployment of the main forces of the advance guard. At Redkiy copse (diagram 2) the platoon met fire from antitank weapons and from a tank in the region of the yellow knolls and was forced to deploy. Tank commander Sgt K. Kashin, situated on the platoon's left flank, noticed that the hollow to the left of the copse was almost not covered by fire. A bold solution ripened in his mind: go around the knolls by way of the hollow and pounce on the "enemy" with a flank attack. The sergeant reported his solution to the platoon commander by radio. The commander approved this wise initiative, since he knew that the sudden appearance of just one tank at the "enemy's" rear would bring about the kind of result that a platoon advancing from the front would not be able to achieve.

Diagram 1




Diagram 2





Diagram 3

1 - Knolls; 2 - Redkiy copse; 3 - Figurnaya grove; 4 - Yarkovo; 5 - Nizkiy undergrowth; 6 - Pribrezhnaya; 7 - Klenovka river; 8 - Vol'noye.

Indeed, the appearance of Sgt Kashin's tank at the rear of the defended post was all that was needed for the "enemy's" resistance to weaken noticeably at the front. The remaining platoon crews were promptly employed and the attack was completed successfully.

When the tank crews drew up to the Klenovka river, the "enemy's" resistance stiffened. At 10:40 the advance party commander found out that six "enemy" tanks from Yarkovo were advancing on hill 128.0. Sr Sgt Sychev halted the platoon on the southern edge of the Nizkiy undergrowth and gave the order to open fire at the tanks from their position. The tanks, however, suddenly turned and began to outflank the platoon. Sychev was not taken aback at this and gave the command to de-

part for the north-east slopes of hill 122.0, from where the advance party blocked the path of the counterattacking tanks with fire. Suffering losses, the "enemy" began retreating to hill 118.0.

The tank crews turned to all-out pursuit. The "enemy", however, managed to reach the river's north shore by bridge and at 11:00 blew it up. At this moment, the advance party reached hill 115.6 (diagram 3). The platoon commander reported his situation to the senior commander and received from him the order to search for locations which would be convenient for making a forced river crossing. Having found them, he was to cross the river and secure a defensive position on the shore.

Sychev began to reconnoiter the river and its flood lands. At 11:00 tank commander Sgt Dudarev reported that three APC's and several other "enemy" vehicles were moving from Vol'noye toward the river. "There must be a ford there," thought the commander. Indeed, the "enemy" soon began to cross the ford.

The solution matured with lightning speed: seize the ford on top of the "enemy" and, having crossed it, secure a defensive position on hill 110.8.

He ordered tank commander Sgt Kashin to open fire on the "enemy" troops occupying a defensive position on hill 122.5. He took his own tank and the third tank under cover of a smoke-screen to the ford, crossed it quickly and reached hill 110.8 by 11:20.

Gaining a foothold on the bank, Sychev reported his situation to the senior commander. The senior commander approved Sychev's actions and ordered him to hold onto the hill firmly.

The operational experience of the platoon's tank crews was instructive. It graphically indicated how significant the commander's creativity and initiative had been. We saw how Sgt Kashin, having discovered a weak spot in the "enemy's" defenses, immediately undertook a flanking maneuver with the platoon commander's approval. It is quite clear that both of them saw the danger in the decision they had made. The danger was associated with crossing an almost impassable section of terrain, but they proceeded with a known degree of risk. This justified the sergeants' actions.

Initiative and resourcefulness had also brought success during the forced crossing of the Klenovka river. If the platoon commander had looked for a solution to the problem in the area of the blown-up bridge, the "enemy" probably would have set up a defensive position on the opposite river bank and would not have allowed the advancing troops to cross the river so quickly.

In his critique, the senior commander highly praised the actions of Sr Sgt Sychev. He noted in particular Sychev's initiative and the tank crews' ability to successfully conduct modern combat.

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## GROUND FORCES: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

### Artillery Observation Exercise

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 80 pp 8-9


[Text] Observation is one of the basic methods in the platoon and squad for conducting reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain. It is conducted continuously in all situations by the subunit commander personally and by the observer designated by him, because the main thing in battle is to forestall the enemy, i.e., be the first to spot, the first to make a decision, and the first to open fire. "To forestall is to defeat the enemy." Front-line soldiers said this and this expression is still correct today.

The complicated conditions of modern battle make increased demands not only on the organization of reconnaissance in the subunit but also on the training of each soldier and NCO. It is precisely because of this that the instruction of personnel in the skill of carrying out observation in battle, and accurately determining distances to targets is one of the most important tasks of combat training.

The ability of each soldier to perform observation and reconnaissance work acquires especially important significance during operations in a mountainous terrain. An extremely rugged terrain, the presence of a great number of concealed approaches, and a limited field of vision both along the front and into the depth significantly hamper the observation and detection of targets, and the monotonous outlines of slopes, ridges, and other heights limit the selection of landmarks. In clear weather the sharp shadows and the abundance of relief folds conceal the actual distance to targets while frequent and sudden fogs, snowfalls, and snowstorms significantly lessen the visibility and complicate the use of optical instruments.

Reconnaissance and observation problems have become a compulsory part of each weapons exercise in the platoon commanded by Warrant Officer (praporshchik) B. Sergeyev and the skills obtained are being strengthened and improved at combat training and leading exercises which also assist in increasing the firing training of personnel and improving the subunit's combat teamwork.

We will see the methods used by Warrant Officer Sergeyev in giving observation training to his subordinates at weapons training exercises. Preparing for the next exercise on the topic "Firing on Appearing Targets from Place," for which three hours were allotted, the platoon commander outlined in a n hour an elaboration of



# Key:

1. Targets
2. Landmarks
3. Squads
4. Mound
5. Barn

two lessons on observation(see the chart). At the training site specified by the company commander--a section of an electrified tactical training area--the warrant officer selected landmarks, determined the location of the targets, the time of their display, and the order of simulation. Then he made up a table for himself of the mistakes committed in determining distances while working on the preliminary exercise (see table).

In the independent training hours on the day before the exercise, Warrant Officer Sergeyev studied with his subordinates the ways to locate and recognize targets by their identification features, and he recalled the organization and tactical actions of a probable enemy because this helps in more rapidly determining the possible locations of enemy weapons.

Taking into account that the accuracy of determining the distance to a target depends largely on firing accuracy(correct sight selection, point of aim, introduction of necessary wind and target movement corrections), the warrant officer explained that distances to landmarks, terrain features, and the angles between them must be determined by the "thousandth" formula  $U = V \times D / 1000$ , and the distances to the targets with the help of the sighting equipment of the small-arms(sights of the gun and grenade launcher).

Then the warrant officer reminded his subordinates of the importance of the covering range of the front sight and the back sight notch. As seen in figure 1, for an automatic weapon at a distance of 100 meters, they are equal to 30 and 60 cm respectively, and the two openings produced on each side are equal to 15 cm each. By increasing the distance to 200, 300, 400, 500 meters, etc. the specified range grows respectively by 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. times. For example, at a distance of 400 meters the covering range for the front sight is  $30 \text{ cm} \times 4 = 120 \text{ cm}$ , and the groove of the back sight is  $60 \text{ cm} \times 4 = 240 \text{ cm}$ . It is not difficult to determine these values for any other distance in the same way. Having detected the target and knowing its dimensions, one can quickly and accurately determine the distance to it, using only the weapon's sighting equipment.

Table 1.

Target Number	Distance (in meters)	Mistakes Made in Calculating (in meters)			Time of Display (in seconds)
		Outstanding	Very Good	Satisfactory	
5--spotter	230	23	34	46	30 and 40
6--grenade launcher	280	28	42	56	20 and 30
7--messenger	350	35	52	70	30
8--PTURS(anti-tank guided missile)	620	62	93	124	50
9--gun	540	54	81	108	40
10--helicopter	830	83	124	166	50

Take, for example, a running figure(target number 8--50 cm wide, figure 2). As seen in the picture, the target is fully covered by the front sight's covering range. The distance to it is determined in the following way: the width of the target(50) divided by 30(the value of the covering range of the front sight at a distance of 100 meters) and the number obtained multiplied by 100(50 divided by 30 x 100 = 170 meters), or more simply 5 divided by 3 = 1.7 x 100. The distance to the target in our example is 170 meters.

Here is another example. In picture 3 there is an artillery piece in an emplacement(target number 19a--180 cm wide). The target rests on its base in the back sight groove. The following must be done: 180 divided by 60 x 100 = 300 meters. The distance to the target is 300 meters.

Having satisfied himself through questions that his subordinates had mastered these calculations, Warrant Officer Sergeyev orders them to independently solve a firing problem: the target is a machine gun(target number 10a), it covers the front sight and one side opening(figure 4), the wind is moderate at 4-5 meters per second, blowing from the left at a 90 degree angle. Determine the distance to the target, the sighting, and the wind correction.

Sergeant Bragin was the first to report a solution. He, like many of the other soldiers, correctly calculated the distance to the target as 220 meters(distance = 100 divided by 45 x 100), the sighting 3, under the target, a half-figure allowance to the left. The sergeant determined the wind correction in accordance with a field rule learned at the previous exercise: "the allowance is equal(in centimeters) to the sighting of the distance to the target multiplied by this sighting and the constant number 5," i.e., 2 x 2 x 5 = 20 cm, or a half-figure(figure--50 cm). These data are close to the standard and ensure accurate firing.



Figure 1.  
Value of the covering  
range of the front  
sight and back sight  
groove of a subma-  
chine gun at 100 meters



Figure 3.  
An artillery piece  
in an emplacement;  
the distance to the  
target is 300 meters



Figure 2.  
A running figure  
(target number 8);  
the distance to the  
target is 170 meters



Figure 4.  
A machinegun(target  
number 10a); the  
distance to the  
target is 220 meters

Then three additional firing problems were solved at this same exercise. Such a method of training soldiers and NCO's increases the quality of their weapons training, assists in developing firm skills in the rapid determination of distances to targets, and the correct use of firing rules under field conditions. The experience of running such exercises shows that the trainees better master and remember numerical values expressed in linear values (centimeters, meters) than in angular ones (degrees, thousandths). It is also necessary to use visual aids at lessons--diagrams, drawings, posters.

The platoon arrived at the tactical training area at the established time. The warrant officer announced the topic, targets, and the exercise training problems. After this he oriented the subordinates to the terrain and showed them the tactical problem, indicating that all of them would operate in the role of observer and conduct observations in the following zones: on the right--a barn, landmark 2; on the left--a mound, projection of a forest.

In starting to work on the first training problem, the platoon commander recalled that when studying the terrain they must examine it along lines going from themselves to the enemy, from right to left. The close one (up to 400 meters) is studied first, then the middle one (up to 600 meters), and then the more distant one (above 600 meters). Prominent terrain features as well as landmarks should be noted on a diagram--this makes target designation easier in battle.

The squads occupied the training site on the command of the warrant officer. The soldiers and NX's, arrayed 3-5 meters apart in a trench started the site's observation equipment and then proceeded to study the terrain. The squad command-ers helped the subordinates to correctly determine distances to landmarks and terrain features along the lines with the assistance of binoculars and a telescopic sight, and also visually according to the "thousandths" formula, and taught the subordinates to draw the simplest diagram of the terrain and to report spotting results at the appearance of the targets (numbers 1 and 2).

Warrant Officer Sergeyev followed the activities of the trainees. Noticing that mistakes were being made in the reports on determining the nature of the target and its position relative to the landmarks, he explained the causes of the mistakes to the subordinates, demanded that they repeat the solution of the task which had been set, and he achieved correct and concise reports.



The platoon commander signaled for the consecutive display of targets 1-4 in order to teach the reconnaissance of targets and the determination of distances to his troops. After their display, the operator switched on the simulation: commands, sounds of firing from automatic weapons and guns, the noise of a running motor. The squad commanders heard in turn the reports of the subordinates on the observation results. With the aid of an orthoscope they checked the ability of the soldiers to correctly sight the target detected by them and to accurately determine which part of it was covered by the front sight so as to calculate and establish the distance to the target.

Having made sure that the soldiers and NOD's had learned to use the value of the sighting equipment covering ranges to determine distances, Warrant Officer Sergeyev ordered his people to fill out spotting lists; blank ones had been distributed beforehand.

Having received reports from the NOD's on the readiness to carry out the preliminary exercise, Sergeyev gave the command "Casualty," and then "Begin Spotting" and he switched on his stopwatch. Some 15 minutes were allotted for the exercise. Targets 5-10 appeared on his signal at an interval of 1.5-2 minutes. Simultaneously with the display, the operator switched on the sound simulation.

The exercise was considered fulfilled in an outstanding way if the trainee detected all targets and determined the distances to four of them with a rating of outstanding; in a very good way if five targets were detected and the distances to four of them were determined with a rating of no lower than very good; and in a satisfactory way if four targets were detected and if the distances to them were correctly determined.

The platoon commander required his subordinates to strictly execute the rules of camouflage and independently conduct all calculations on determining the distances to targets.

Having completed the preliminary exercise, the warrant officer formed up the platoon, collected the spotting lists and made a short critique of the exercise, and announced the rating of each trainee. The set training goal--to teach the soldiers to carry out reconnaissance of targets and determine the distances to them--was fulfilled.

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#### Artillery Exercise Described

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 80 p 5

[Text] The artillery howitzer detachment commanded by Sergeant Ye. Makhov went, as part of a battery, on a tactical exercise on the subject "Activities of a Gun on the Offensive." The detachment commander had to teach his subordinates to occupy a direct fire position, prepare the gun and ammunition for firing, and fire, by direct sighting, on stationary and moving targets. During the multi-theme exercise, they intended to cross the gun over the Glubokaya River on assault water-crossing equipment. Concealing the gun, the detachment went to the northwestern edge of the small Zelenaya Woods. Here the sergeant gave the following task to the trainees: "We are in small underbrush at the northwestern edge of the Zelenaya Woods. North is to the right. The Glubokaya River is in front of us."

"There are the following landmarks: the first--an individual tree directly in front of us beyond the river, sight setting 10; the second--a heap of rocks on the Samenistaya Hill, sight setting 14; the third--a house with a green roof on the southern outskirts of Primost'ye, sight setting 13; the fourth--a yellow hillock on the northern slopes of the Truglaya Height, sight setting 16; the fifth--a crossroads to the left and beyond the Samenistaya Heights, sight setting 18.

The enemy is in defensive positions along the northern bank of the Glubokaya River. In the forward area are the following: target number 1--a tank in a trench, the first landmark, to the right 40; target number 2--a gun in an emplacement, the first landmark, to the left 30.

The first motorized rifle company will force the river and begin advancing toward Primost'ye.

The task of the gun crew: with an artillery strike, by direct sighting, to destroy the tank and the gun in the emplacement. Later on to be ready to fire in the main firing area: to the right--landmark 2, to the left--landmark 3. The fire position is in the shrubbery, 100 meters in front. The gun tractor site is 200 meters behind. Occupy the position with the start of the artillery strike."

The gun detachment commander, having checked the detachment members' knowledge of the landmarks and distances to them, trained the subordinates to determine distances to the targets. Then he indicated that the distance to target number 1 was 1,200 meters, sight setting 12. The wind was blowing from the right at a speed of 10 meters per second. Therefore, the direction correction must be to the right--0-30. The air temperature is a +6 degrees, the distance correction is a +50 meters. Thus, for the first firing on target number 1, sight setting is 13, by high-explosive fragmentation scale, and the deflection is 30-01.

The gun detachment commander ordered the crew to technically prepare the howitzer and ammunition for firing. The artillerymen began their work. The sighter, PFC V. Sytnov, accurately took the panoramic sight readings along the muzzle face of the barrel and compared the reading with the figure written on the gun plate. The remaining detachment members also worked in an organized way. Only the number 2 gunner, Private B. Sagatov, displayed some sluggishness, which led to a decrease in the over-all tempo of the crew's operational efficiency.

Sergeant Maklay trained Private Sagatov in loading the gun and, once convinced that the trainee had found the necessary military groove, he continued the exercise.

The gun moves out swiftly to the fire position on the sergeant's command.

"Target one. Aim at the center. Fire!"

Meanwhile the motorized rifle company started to force the river. Its firepower destroyed target number 2--the gun in the emplacement.

Sergeant Maklay ordered the trainees to observe in the sectors assigned to each one.

"Landmark 4, left 40, on the Truglaya Height a PTURB [anti-tank guided missile] installation," the number 2 gunner, Private Sagatov, reported.

The sighter, PFC Ryshov, quickly aimed the gun at the target and reported: "Seen"--and after several seconds: "sight setting 15."

"The PTUR installation, with high-explosive fragmentation, high-explosive fuse, full charge, sight setting 15, to the right 0-2, aim at the center, one shell... fire!"--the sergeant commanded and after aiming the gun, he checked the accuracy of the work of the trainees. In the rated time required for the motorized rifle troops to force the river, the gun detachment commander issued various commands for firing on the targets, checking on how the soldiers were fulfilling the combat norms. However, they received a scenario from the senior chief stating that the company had overcome the river line and was successfully advancing toward the populated point Primost'ye.

The gun crew quickly abandoned the firing position and began to move toward the assault crossing. In 30 minutes the artillerymen had been trained to mount howitzers on an amphibious carrier(a gun tractor--on a trailer to the carrier).

After the crossing and with the break-out into the firing position area, Sergeant Makhov set the following task for the crew:

"The enemy is preparing a counter-attack from the Tenny Forest. The first motorized rifle company went to the line 500 meters in front of us. It is being trained to repulse tanks and other armored targets from the Tenny Forest."

Using the prepared ground area, the gun detachment commander pointed out the landmarks, the arc of fire, organized the spotting for the enemy, and ordered the tracing of the gun pit.

The artillerymen quickly brought the system to a firing position. The sighter set up the telescopic sight, the number 2 prepared the howitzer for firing from the auxiliary barrel. Sergeant Makhov gave the commands: "Tanks to the right," "Action," and others.

The gun detachment commander issued ammunition(rounds for the auxiliary barrel) to the loader and indicated to the sighter on which target to open fire.

"Seen," PFC Ryshov reported.

"Tank, with a hollow-charge shell, sight setting 8, left 0-02, aim at the center... fire!," the sergeant commanded.

The fire task was carried out on simulation devices at first by the gunner and then, for the purpose of developing interchangeability, by the remaining crew members.

At the conclusion of the firing on the simulators, Sergeant Makhov set the task:

"The enemy counter-attack has been repulsed. The first motorized rifle company is proceeding to consolidate a favorable line. Our gun has been ordered to report to the battery firing position--the northern outskirts of Primost'ye, and to continue to carry out the task as part of that unit."

The tactical exercise concluded with the working out of this scenario. The gun detachment commander made a detailed critique of the course of the exercise, announced the rating for each trainee, noted the shortcomings and set the tasks for their elimination.

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### Artillery Night Exercise

Moscow ZNAMENSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 80 pp 6-7

[Text] The complexity of night firing training is caused by difficulties in orientation, target detection, and determination of the distances to targets. Keenness of sight sharply decreases at night, lighted and bright objects seem to be closer than they really are, and small and camouflaged articles are poorly distinguished. Therefore it is important to teach the soldiers and NCO's to determine the nature and location of targets by sound, light, and other identification signs.

However, detecting and determining the nature of a target at night is only a part of the firing task. Firm skills and proficiency in the actions of the firer, and the ability to fire accurately on targets which are revealed by muzzle flashes and illuminated by artificial and natural sources of light are required to hit a target within a relatively short period of time and on the first round.

The platoon commander Warrant Officer (praporshchik) V. Naumov, at first during the daylight hours, trains his subordinates to correctly install self-luminous caps on the sighting gear and to aim the weapon, load magazines and belts by touch, load and unload the weapon, place the change-over switch in the single round or automatic fire position and on the safety according to the clicks, and adjust the sighting.

The warrant officer begins the night training by teaching his subordinates to fire on illuminated targets and their silhouettes. At the next stage Naumov teaches the sub-machine gunners to fire, under limited visibility and in total darkness, on targets which reveal themselves by muzzle bursts.

He will examine the organization and techniques of the exercise carried out by Warrant Officer Naumov on the topic "Firing on Appearing and Moving Targets at Night." On the day before the exercise, the platoon commander instructed the NCO's, explained to them the sequence for working on training problems, the target display order, and terrain illumination. The personnel were shown a film strip on the peculiarities of night firing.

The platoon was moved out to the firing area at such a time so that the first 30 minutes of the exercise took place in daylight. After announcing to the personnel the topic which had to be worked on, the warrant officer pointed out the landmarks (consult the diagram) on the terrain and set the tactical mission: "an enemy offensive is expected in 30-40 minutes toward Protovo and Dolgovo. The platoon is defending this position: on the right--a separate building, to the left--a road junction. The arc of fire: on the right--a separate building, the second landmark; on the left--a road junction, the third landmark."



Then he announced that all of the soldiers would operate as spotters, and explained to his subordinates that with the coming of darkness spotting is intensified and supplemented by listening, because under favorable conditions one can hear firing from a small-arms at a distance up to 2 km, the movement of tanks and combat vehicles up to 2-4 km, motor vehicles up to 1 km, and the movement of infantry up to 400-600 meters.

The platoon commander reminded the trainees of the conditions for fulfilling the preliminary exercise on the reconnaissance of targets and told them that if they were unsuccessful in accurately determining the location of a target during the time when the terrain was lighted, then they should remember in what direction it was located and try to establish its peculiarities and the distance to it by identification features.

After this, on the order of the warrant officer, the squads occupied the training areas specified for them, and the soldiers got ready for battle and began to study the terrain in the platoon's arc of fire. On the command "begin spotting," targets 1 and 2 were shown for 40 seconds, and in three minutes targets 3 and 5 were shown for 60 seconds. Each group of targets was lit by one rocket and in the last 15-20 seconds of the display, the operator switched on the firing simulator for each of them.

The squad commanders, after hearing the reports of their subordinates, reviewed the conduct of the preliminary exercise. They considered it fulfilled if three targets were located, including the machine gun and grenade launcher. Such training is conducted in the platoon at each night exercise and this helps to develop firm skills in reconnoitering targets--one of the major conditions for training a marksman.

Before working on the first training problem, the platoon commander reminded the trainees that the sudden illumination of the terrain causes temporary blindness in the firer. Therefore, it is recommended that they not look at the source of the light--rockets, fires, campfires, etc. The most favorable moment for opening fire on detected targets is at the start of their illumination. Moreover it is important to accurately execute the rules of sighting with the help of a cam: the luminous point on the front sight must be higher and touch with its lower part the luminous point on the back sight, forming a figure 8.

After this, on the command of the NCO's, the motorized riflemen worked out ready position movements and ways to fire from various positions from place (lying on the hand, standing in a trench, and kneeling behind a concealment). The platoon commander signaled for the successive display of targets (numbers 1, 1a, and 1b) and for the illumination of the terrain, and he directed the NCO's in training their subordinates.

The ready position movements for firing at night do not differ from the daylight ones. The squad commanders had shown and explained to their subordinates at previous day exercises the method for rapidly loading the gun by touch. Now, at night, the squad commanders taught the soldiers to adjust the change-over switch and set the sighting from the beginning at a slow tempo and, by steps, to achieve clear and rapid ready firing stances from various positions.

Having noted that many of the trainees were delaying the opening of fire because of the tardy detection of a target, the warrant officer gathered the platoon at the second squad's training area. He briefly analyzed the mistakes that were committed and recommended the following method. After getting ready for battle, they should do their spotting by slightly raising their heads above the rifle butts. As soon as the target is located, they should quickly pull their heads down, sight the weapon, and capture the most illuminated part of the target in the front sight protector. Then they should take the correct aim for elevation (figure 8), and open fire.

Firing at moving targets at night is the most complicated thing. Here it is necessary to teach the firer to make a correct allowance, i.e., to sight not on the target itself but at a hypothetical point in front of the target.

They use field firing rules in the platoon to determine the allowance range. They are close to the calculated ones--simple and easily remembered by the troops. For a figure running at a speed of 3 meters per second at a 90 degree angle to the firer's position, the allowance (in figures--from the center of the target) is equal to the sighting number of the distance to the target. At 100 meters--1, 200 meters--2, 300 meters--3 figures (picture 1). If the lateral movement is at an angle of less than 45 degrees--the allowance is cut in half.

After checking the knowledge of firing regulations, studied at daylight exercises, warrant Officer Naumov began instructing his subordinates in firing on moving targets through a tracking method. At night it is more complicated to use the expectancy method because of the difficulty in selecting landmarks for sighting on the movement of the target.


The platoon commander paid primary attention to the ability of the sub-machine gunners to evenly fire the weapon, maintaining the taken allowance, and at the same time smoothly executing the trigger release so that the shot occurs while the gun is moving. In this case the size of the allowance taken is preserved.

The warrant officer recommended the following method to the trainees to achieve the best firing results. When the target is moving from right to left, without changing the position of the elbows, move the body slightly to the right--the weapon is moved to the left. The muscle power of the hands will lead the weapon to the right and, after taking the necessary allowance, relax the muscles. In this case it is more comfortable to smoothly and evenly fire to the left, i.e., toward the target movement. If it moves from left to right, all actions are done in reverse order.

A preliminary exercise was worked on as the final stage of the exercise. The target was a RPTN/anti-tank rocket launcher or grenade launcher at a distance of 100-150 meters. It was shown three times, for 30 seconds each time, with 10 second intervals. The ammunition was three shells with tracer bullets. Hitting the target on the first display was outstanding, on the second was very good, and on the third was satisfactory.

Before working on this exercise, the platoon commander once again reminded the trainees that in sighting targets which reveal themselves by firing bursts, it is best to keep your eyes open (slightly screwed up); and one eye must be aiming. One must capture the observed bursts of fire in the center of the protective front sight, make a correct figure 8 (figure 2) and, holding the weapon firmly, by movement of the body (after taking a deep breath), raise the weapon and place the upper part of the figure 8 under the burst.

## Lay-Out of Training Targets



### Key:

1. Targets
2. Landmarks
3. Squads
4. Enemy
5. Krotovo
6. Rocks
7. Dolgovo
8. Individual building

## Training Questions and Time

Reviewing the exercise--10 minutes

2. Firing on moving targets (numbers 4 and 5), illuminated by artificial sources of light and rockets--30 minutes;
- Conducting a preliminary exercise (targets 2 and 3)--20 minutes.
1. Firing on appearing targets:
- training in firing at targets (numbers 1, 1a, 1b, 2, 3) lit by rockets--20 minutes;
- training in firing at target silhouettes (numbers 1, 3a, 4) seen against a background of fires and illuminated terrain objects--20 minutes;
- training in firing on targets (numbers 1a, 2, 3), simulating bursts of fire--30 minutes.

An introductory part--conducting a preliminary exercise on the reconnaissance of targets at night and determining distances to them (targets 1, 2, 3, 5)--20 minutes



Figure 1. Two-Figure Allowance  
(distance--200 meters)




Figure 2. The Target--A Grenade  
Launcher(distance--100  
meters)

After this explanation, the warrant officer, appointing in turn two trainees to a shift, checked the ready position and knowledge of firing regulations of each subordinate. Then, under his control, the sub-machine gunners by turns fired single rounds from place. The squad commanders continued to train the free soldiers during this time. Such a training method has allowed Warrant Officer Naumov to achieve very good results in firing on appearing and moving targets at night.

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## **BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT CONFERENCE**

### **Participants**

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 inside front cover, p 13

[Article: "Increasing the Field Proficiency of Small Subunits"]

[Text] The Red-Banner Belorussian Military District is known throughout the Armed Forces for its high level and quality of combat and political training, firm military discipline, skilled organization of competition, firm observance of procedure laid down by regulations in the subunits and units, and the ideological and physical conditioning of personnel. This is promoted by effective activities by commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, as well as good training facilities and advanced training and indoctrination methods which are adopted into the practical activities of all commanders.

Convincing evidence of this is the district scientific-practical warrant officers and noncommissioned officers conference on the subject "The Role of Advanced Methods in the Field Training of Small Subunits."

Leading warrant officer and noncommissioned officer command personnel from all garrisons gathered at the conference, which was held at the training center.

Participants in the conference included Col Gen Tank Trps M. M. Zaytsev, Commander of the Red-Banner Russian Military District, district first deputy commander Lt Gen Tank Trps A. I. Semirenko, district deputy commander for combat training Lt Gen Tank Trps P. S. Pecherskiy, officers and general officers representing the district headquarters political directorate, directorates and departments.

Col Gen Tank Trps Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaytsev, Commander of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District, opened the conference with a brief welcoming address.

"Pursuant to a decision by the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces," he stated, "our district's military council, jointly with the staff of the Ministry of Defense journal ZNAMENOSETS, is holding a warrant officers and noncommissioned officers scientific-practical conference on the subject "Role of Advanced Methods in the Field Training of Small Subunits."

The conference is an important event for the troops of this district. It will unquestionably help warrant officers and noncommissioned officers improve the quality of training of their subordinates.

"We must teach our units and subunits," the commander emphasized, "to gain victory by means of the art of warfare, the ability to wage combat against a powerful, aggressive adversary, to achieve fire superiority over him, and to hit the target on the first round and first missile."

The commander then yielded the floor to Lt Gen Tank Trps P. S. Pecherskiy, Belorussian Military District Deputy Commander for Combat Training, who presented a report entitled "The Role of Advanced Methods in Field Training of Small Subunits."

\* \* \*

The editors of the journal ZNAMENOSETS would like to express their thanks to Col Gen Tank Trps M. Zaytsev, Commander of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District; Lt Gen Tank Trps A. Semirenko, First Deputy Commander of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District; Lt Gen Tank Trps B. Pecherskiy, Deputy Commander of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District for Combat Training; Maj Gen V. Nechayev, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District; Maj Gen Tank Trps P. Zaytsev, Deputy Chief of the Combat Training Directorate of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District; Col S. Baulin; Col A. Kryukov; Lt Col A. Rochev; and Lt Col V. Gudyalis for their joint efforts on behalf of preparing for and holding this conference.

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#### Tactical Problems

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 2-3

[From report by Lt Gen Tank Trps P. Pecherskiy, Red-Banner Belorussian Military District deputy commander for combat training: "Accomplish Tactical Tasks in a Comprehensive Manner"]

[Text] "As a result of persistent labor by military collectives and improvement in the work style of commanders, political agencies, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations," the speaker stated, "the majority of subunits and units have fulfilled their ambitious socialist pledges.

"Some of the credit for this goes to the warrant officers and noncommissioned officers, the largest detachment of commanders, the immediate instructors and indoctrinators of the enlisted personnel. The absolute majority of these work with fervor and enthusiasm. They skillfully teach and indoctrinate their subordinates on the basis of profound theoretical knowledge and methods skills. The top methods specialists and Competition Winners include deputy platoon commander Sgt V. Nenya, deputy platoon commander Sr Sgt N. Tarasevich, squad leader Sgt A. Burlakov, deputy platoon commander Sr Sgt M. Karachun, squad leader Jr Sgt V. Yas'ko, tank commander Sr Sgt V. Tumday, platoon commanders Warrant Officers L. Sushko, A. Vol'skiy and others.

"Combat training is conducted in an organized and purposeful manner in this district's units and subunits," Lt Gen Tank Trps Pecherskiy continued. "Personnel are learning with enthusiasm and political high spirits evoked by celebration of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, the 35th anniversary of Victory, and preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress."

The deputy commander for combat training then discussed in detail the specific features of the current training year and the combat training programs, which specify that tactical training is the foundation of field proficiency, for it most fully ensures comprehensive mastery of skilled, smoothly-coordinated actions under conditions maximally approximating actual combat. This obliges noncommissioned officers and warrant officers to work constantly to improve their theoretical knowledge, thoroughly to study field manuals and regulations, and requires good practical skills in organizing for combat in the field under various conditions, both day and night.

"In the majority of this district's units and subunits," Lt Gen Tank Trps Pecherskiy continued, "considerable importance is attached to solving tactical problems in combination with other training subjects, as well as working during tactical drills on performance standards in the area of weapon and engineer training, protection against mass destruction weapons, and other training categories.

"Such drills and exercises intensify the training process, help reinforce the skills of the enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, and make training activities more instructive.

"We frequently see, however, that when conducting training activities, some noncommissioned officers and warrant officers become carried away with merely solving tactical problems and ignore other items, although they are specified in the training schedules.

"Practical experience has convinced us that combining different training subjects with tactical training, both day and night, has made it possible to avoid duplication of many items and to reduce expenditures of training time and motor vehicle mileage on special disciplines, while tactical training has essentially become the leading training subject, unifying all other disciplines into an integral whole.

"A significant role in tactical training of small subunits is played by the 24-hour tactical exercise," the speaker stated. "It is for the purpose of smoothing and coordinating platoon performance in combat, for improving commander skills in organization for combat in the field, in subunit and fire control in combat, and continuous work on training topics, day and night, in strict sequence and in a uniform tactical situation.

"Experience indicates that 24-hour tactical exercises with platoons are as a rule organized and conducted on tactical training grounds, and sometimes in a field area providing high-quality work on designated training items, with utilization of the equipment of tactical complexes, targets, dummies and various pieces of basic combat equipment for designating the 'adversary,' as well as means of simulation and illumination. Such drills are conducted in a high-quality and effective manner wherever instructors thoroughly prepare for them in advance.

"Why do I say in advance? Because 24-hour tactical exercises should be preceded by a number of measures without the accomplishment of which high-quality exercise execution is inconceivable. First of all, it is necessary to prepare in advance and well the platoon commanders and sergeants in the area of theory, thoroughly studying with them the provisions of the field manual and regulations and to conduct group practice sessions and brief exercises on organization for combat, subunits and fire control.

"Secondly, it is necessary to work with platoon personnel on exercise topics in the area of technical, weapon, and engineer training, driving combat vehicles, protecting troops against mass destruction weapons, and other training topics.

"Third, it is necessary to conduct in a high-quality manner tactical drills with the platoon, both during daylight hours and in hours of darkness, on the corresponding topics.

"Essentially these measures are practiced in the majority of subunits. Sometimes, however, they are done hastily, superficially, and only partially.

"An important component part of field training," emphasized the deputy commander, "is weapon training. High quality is secured by methodological consistency in training. Wherever it is conducted in a planned and consistent manner, results are excellent. This is convincingly attested by the experience of the subunits in which officers A. Shoyenko, Yu. Makarov, Ye. Nazarov and others serve. The following has become a firm rule in these and other subunits: hit the target on the first round, burst, and missile at maximum range, day or night, and hold no fewer than three marksmanship (tank gunnery) practices a week, including one at night.

"A smooth rhythm in the holding of tank gunnery and marksmanship practices has been established in this district's units. Commanders of all echelons realize that without holding such activities on a regular basis it is impossible to achieve success and a high degree of weapons proficiency.

"Many NCOs and warrant officers are continuing a constant search for new ways to improve the quality and effectiveness of marksmanship (tank gunnery) exercises. They have found one such way in elaboration of increased-complexity preparatory drills (increase in the number of targets displayed, reduction of target display time, higher grading requirements in performance of preparatory drills). Solving problems of determining range to targets with various methods, preparation of data for firing at a moving target under various conditions, and issuing target designations and commands to open fire, which is widely practiced at tactical drills, when driving combat vehicles, during conduct of tank gunnery drills, and even during travel to exercise sites serves this same end.

"An important role in training subunits for the conduct of combat operations under present-day conditions is played by training in driving combat vehicles and increasing troop march training. In the majority of subunits leading commanders, when assigning tactical, fire and other types of training missions to crews, specify driving tasks, and when totaling up exercise results they determine a grade for each driver-mechanic. This improves the quality of work on tasks pertaining to tactical, fire and other disciplines, as well as the skill of the tank drivers. In the company under the command of Capt Yu. Makarov, for example, organization of training stations and logistical support are thoroughly provided for when preparing for drills and exercises. The company commander himself prepares the warrant officers and NCOs and skillfully relies on them in the course of training activities.

"Successful accomplishment of tactical training plans is promoted by technical conferences, technical study groups, and military-technical quiz games, the topics of which are closely coordinated with the combat training program.



"These matters are handled in the best manner in the subunits of the motorized rifle regiment under the command of Lt Col L. Kovalev, initiator of socialist competition in the Ground Forces. In this regiment the technical warrant officers and NCOs are distinguished by a highly activist approach."

Discussing in detail problems of technical training, Lt Gen Tank Troops Pecherskiy continued: "You well know that personnel training is directly dependent on the availability, condition and technical level of training facilities and simulator devices. At the present time this district's troops have at their disposal modern field and classroom training facilities, providing intensive personnel training. All our training facilities will be shown in action in training activities with subunits."

NCOs and warrant officers take active part in efficiency innovation and invention activity directed toward improving training facilities. Weapons platoon commander Warrant Officer A. Lazarev, for example, has submitted 15 efficiency innovation suggestions in three years, nine of which have been adopted into training practice.

"An effective means of mobilizing personnel for high-quality performance of troop field training tasks is well organized socialist competition. The experience of leading units indicates that creation of a spirit of healthy competition at every training activity makes it possible more rapidly to achieve high results in combat training and troop field proficiency, and this will depend first and foremost on you NCOs and warrant officers."

Lieutenant General Tank Troops Pecherskiy discussed in detail shortcomings and deficiencies.

He then proceeded to problems of occupational and methods training of warrant officers and NCOs.

"In this district's troops," stated the lieutenant general, "commander training of warrant officers and noncommissioned officers is organized and conducted on the basis of corresponding programs. We devote principal attention to tactical training, during which a special role is assigned to teaching warrant officers and NCOs organization for combat right in the field, skilled control of the subunits and subunit fire control in battle, and development in commanders of volitional qualities in independent performance of missions in a complex, rapidly changing situation, especially during shift from day (night) to night (day) actions.

"In addition to short commander training courses and two-day exercises, we conduct with NCOs and warrant officers each month group exercises in the field, tests on knowledge of field manuals, gunnery and driving training manuals, as well as graded exercises in firing, driving combat vehicles, technical, drill and physical training, and meeting performance standards in protection against mass destruction weapons. Independent training of noncommissioned officers and warrant officers has improved."

There is a sufficient quantity of good literature, methods manuals and recommendations published by the Ground Forces Main Directorate for Combat Training and the district Combat Training Directorate.

Upon completion of the report, the conferees went out into the field, where for a period of two days they studied, with demonstration classes, methods of combat training of small subunits in various training subjects.

The warrant officers and noncommissioned officers also became acquainted with modern training facilities equipment in the district and exchanged information and know-how.

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### Platoon Training

Moscow ZNAMENSETS in Russian No 6, Jan. 80 pp. 3-5

[Article by platoon commander Lt. G. Elimenkov: "Twenty-Four Hours of Combat"]

[Text] In the unanimous opinion of the conferees, the combined tactical drill on the topic "Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Attack" was quite comparable to a tactical exercise in dynamic nature and intensity.

The instructor, Sr Lt G. Tyganov, assigned the NCOs and enlisted personnel three main training objectives: 1. To achieve a high degree of platoon performance smoothness and coordination; 2. To improve the skills of the platoon commander and squad leaders in organizing for combat while in the field, and in direct control of subunits and fire control in combat both during the day and at night, under conditions approximating actual combat; 3. To work on the topic training items with a high degree of quality, in strict sequence and in a uniform tactical situation, forming excellent psychological qualities in personnel.

In order to achieve high-quality elaboration of training items, the platoon exercise was conducted in a tactical training area with utilization of its equipment, as well as on unfamiliar terrain. Movement into the field was preceded by study of the theoretical points of the Field manual and regulations, conduct of group drills with officers and NCOs in organizing for combat, practice in fire control, and working on training topics of weapon and technical training, driving infantry combat vehicles, and protection of troops against mass destruction weapons. Day and night platoon tactical drills on the corresponding topics were conducted in a quality manner.

The instructor designated 10 training items. We shall mention only a few of these: 1. Occupying an assembly area, performance of field fortification and camouflage activities. Preparation of equipment and weapons for combat; 2. Organization for combat in the field; 3. Moving up to the final coordination line and deployment into battle formation; 4. Crossing obstacles; 5. Assault on the main line of resistance; 6. Combat duty in the "enemy's" defense.

Motorized rifle platoon actions in an assembly area were instructive. Personnel combat equipment and weapons were thoroughly readied for the forthcoming attack. Sr Sgt D. Dvoryatov's squad, assisted by the company technician, inspected the infantry combat vehicle and topped off fuel and engine oil. The second squad (squad leader Sgt L. Karmov), together with the battalion artillery technician, loaded ammunition into the vehicle and checked the fighting compartment. The third squad (squad leader Sr Sgt A. Matkarimov), under the supervision of the platoon commander, checked the combat vehicle's gunights against a reference target. The squads spent

one hour and thirty minutes at each station. In addition, the motorized riflemen performed field fortification and camouflage.

When the platoon leader left to conduct personal reconnaissance together with the company commander, the sergeants alternated in performing his duties -- responded to a warning signal, checked communications gear, and organized patrols. Thus the requirement to teach commanders at all levels the ability to perform duties one step up was met in a practical manner.

At the designated time the instructor was communicated the platoon leader's decision, listened to him issue the operation order and organize coordination, and checked to determine how the mission was communicated to personnel by the sergeants. The actions of Senior Sergeant Davletov were distinguished by particular precision and skill. The sequence and content of the work procedures of this noncommissioned officer, as of the other sergeants, are presented in Diagram 1.



Diagram 1.

Key:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Combat mission briefing</li> <li>2. Briefing: 1. where the enemy is, what he is doing, location of weapons. 2. Platoon and squad mission, sequence and timetable of mission execution</li> <li>3. Assigns missions to subordinates</li> <li>4. Requires personnel, weapons and infantry fighting vehicle for combat</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Specifies: 1. Location of enemy weapons. 2. Mission of platoon, squad and adjacent units. 3. Mission: gunner-operator, machinegunner, rocket launcher crewman, driver-mechanic, other squad members. 4. Procedure of delivery of fire from squad weapons at low-flying air targets. 5. Time to be ready for action. 6. Designates second in command.</li> </ol> |
|--|---|

Due to the limited time available, the conferees were able to observe work on only two training items: "Assault on the 'Enemy's' Main Line of Resistance" and "Combat Deep in the Defense."

At the instructor's signal, the motorized rifle platoon, proceeding in coordination with tanks, swiftly deployed into an extended line of vehicles and advanced swiftly

toward the "aggressor." Intense combat training was in progress among the infantry fighting vehicle crews. The platoon leader taught his men to maintain continuous observation of the "enemy" and to report results, while he taught the sergeants to control squad fire to kill "enemy" weapons and personnel. Broadcasting reports, instructions and commands over a public address system made it possible to achieve maximum instructiveness for the companies. The platoon dismounted without halting the vehicles. Therefore some of the men were somewhat timid and slow, in order to economize on vehicle use, the instructor did not return the platoon to the dismount line but limited himself to specific comments. And in our opinion this was entirely warranted.

Those present at the exercise voiced deserved praise for the ability of the infantry fighting vehicle commanders to control fire and the men's ability to execute fire missions swiftly and efficiently. Within seconds after a rocket launcher appeared (Diagram 2) (Diagram omitted), Senior Sergeant Davletov gave the command to knock it out. This was followed immediately by performance of a new and more complex mission: two infantry combat vehicles proceeded to deliver concentrated fire on an antitank missile launcher, the third ICV began firing at a heavy machine-gun, after which the gunner-operators of the first and second squads shifted fire to an emplaced tank, while the gunner-operator of the third squad, Private Novikov, shifted fire to a recoilless gun on the south slope of Dlinnaya Hill. Skillfully issuing appropriate scenario changes and building up the situation intensity, the instructor taught the platoon commander and squad leaders to make intelligent, bold decisions.

"The 'aggressor' in the trig point area is resisting heavily. The first squad is taking casualties. What do you propose to do?" the officer queried the leader of the 3d Squad, Sr Sgt A. Matkarimov, and the leader of the 2d Squad, Sgt I. Kurmaz.

"I have decided to shift fire to the 'aggressor' defending in the trig point area."

"I have decided to utilize terrain cover and squad fire to advance to the east slope of Dlinnaya Hill and to hit the flank of the defending force in the trig point area," the sergeants radioed back their reports.

The first decision was wrong. The second was right, but incomplete.

"Adjacent unit on the left is successfully advancing deep into the defense. The tank working in coordination with the platoon has crossed the minefields and is approaching the south slope of the hill," the officer stated, amplifying the scenario detail.

"I have decided," came the new confident voice of Senior Sergeant Davletov, "exploiting the success of the adjacent unit on the right and the tank's advance, and utilizing terrain cover, to move toward reference point 4 and, working in coordination with the 3d Squad, to destroy the 'aggressor' in the vicinity of the trig point with a combined assault from the rear and flank."

The decision was a correct one. Sergeant Kurmaz also refined his report, adding that important omitted element pertaining to the matter of coordination with the 3d Squad.



Proper methods technique was employed by the instructor, correcting the mistakes made by the NCOs, by refining situation detail, with information about adjacent units, and with brief comments. The officer did not display haste or suggest (impose) a ready-made decision. Precisely this method at a tactical exercise helps promote development of independence and initiative in the junior commander trainee and teaches him to act intelligently, resolutely and boldly rather than following stock, unoriginal solutions.

Naturally certain shortcomings and deficiencies cropped up in the course of the exercise. In these cases the experienced methods specialists corrected the wrong actions in such a manner that the trainee independently realized the mistakes he had made, understood the causes of these mistakes and acted in conformity with the prevailing situation.

While crossing the minefields when the motorized riflemen were advancing along a cleared lane on the heels of their infantry fighting vehicle, suddenly a signal flare shot skyward from one of the mine markers. A soldier, attempting to cut a corner and save time, had encroached the minefield. Acting with foresight, on the previous day the instructor had run thin strings along the left and right side of the minefield lane and had set trip flares on both sides.... It was necessary to turn the platoon back, sternly reprimand the soldier, and then repeat minefield crossing procedures.

The "aggressor," having been defeated, was withdrawing to the north, attempting to dig in and establish an intermediate position on the south slope of Hill 131.5. The platoon shifted to pursuit, with the mission of preventing the "aggressor" from digging in. Senior Lieutenant Tsygankov deployed his men into a column and, continuing the advance, gave a signal summoning the infantry combat vehicles. The vehicles, advancing at maximum speed, surged past their squads and slowed. The motorized riflemen quickly mounted the vehicles and, under the watchful eye of the sergeants, prepared to deliver fire. Incidentally, in all units and subunits in this district dismounting from and mounting infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers) are also practiced with the vehicles in movement.

As the head of the platoon column reached the brush, the instructor gave the signal to simulate digging-in actions by the "aggressor" on Hill 131.5.

The platoon leader decided to pin down the defending force with accurate fire and, utilizing a small ravine to the right and a knoll to the left, to finish off the "aggressor" with an assault from the front and flanks. The sergeants fully understood the platoon leader's plan. But the unexpected occurred in the 3d Squad. Infantry combat vehicle driver Pvt A. Shavrov, failing to appreciate the hazard of a water-filled shellhole in his path, decided that he could drive right across it. He miscalculated. The vehicle bogged down, becoming an easy target for the "aggressor." One round disabled a track, and a second knocked out the engine.

Squad leader Senior Sergeant Matkarimov acted with decision and initiative in this situation. As soon as the infantry fighting vehicle became stuck, he ordered his men to dismount and advance on foot up the ravine. Gunner-operator Private Novikov continued delivering fire from the disabled vehicle. The 2d Squad, skillfully maneuvering, reached the west slope of Hill 131.5. The simultaneous assault from the front and flanks failed to materialize, however. The instructor brought the

platoon back and repeated the assault. This time the motorized riflemen performed with better coordination and decisiveness. The fire position and personnel deployed on the hill were wiped out. Some of the weapons, however, survived in half-demolished buildings. The motorized riflemen boldly engaged the "aggressor" troops positioned in the building in hand-to-hand combat.

This ended the demonstration for the conferees. The battle continued, however, for the platoon's motorized riflemen.

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### Raising Level of Training

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 5-6

[From address by Sr Sgt L. Stankevich, commander of excellent-rated squad: "Based on an Individual Approach"]

[Text] The motorized rifle squad I presently lead is excellent-rated. It is tops not only in the company but in the regiment as well on the basis of combat training marks and socialist competition results. But with your permission, comrades, I shall first relate to you how I made the squad one of the worst in the company. (Stir among the audience). For one also learns from one's mistakes. Upon arriving to my duty assignment from the training subunit, I enthusiastically proceeded with training my subordinates, conscientiously transmitting to them my knowledge and skills, hoping that they would be the best in our unit. You can imagine my disappointment when the final training and socialist competition results showed that my squad was in last place!

I was disconsolate. After examining my teaching method, the platoon commander pointed out serious errors. The main shortcoming was the fact that I taught all men identically, without an individual approach to each, and failed promptly to note their errors and mistakes, which would carry over from one class to the next.

For example, I failed to take timely note of the fact that at practice sessions driver-mechanic Private Makeyenko was not operating the control levers with confidence and would become confused by complicated scenario instructions. When we took to the field for a tactical drill exercise and the subunit swiftly initiated an assault, our infantry fighting vehicle lagged behind, was late in crossing a minefield, and in the final analysis was "disabled."

As we know, military training is distinguished by a special practical thrust and orientation. At every training class and drill I endeavor to hone a soldier's every action to automatism. Not everyone would succeed immediately. For some it was enough merely to demonstrate a move -- they would immediately grasp the idea and execute with precision. In my squad gunner-operator Pfc Malenkov was such a person. With others one must spend a great deal of time. Machinegunner Private Nepran caused me a good deal of problems. During firing he would become confused, become excessively anxious and in his haste send bullets everywhere but into the target. This was particularly noticeable during movement into the assault and when shifting positions, that is, those times when it is required that a machinegunner instantly carry out a fire mission without prompting. He was not thoroughly familiar with firing drill procedures, which impeded his actions. It was necessary to take

all this into account and to work up individual practice sessions for him. After a certain period of time Private Neprian was able to perform all drills successfully, and now he produces stable results in all training subjects.

On the platoon leader's recommendation, I devote considerable attention to instilling a high degree of aggressiveness by the men in combat. Take the assault phase, for example. We know that promptly locating and destroying the enemy is a guarantee of victory. Taking account of this fact, at every firing practice and at tactical training drills I devote particular attention to developing in my men skills in target reconnaissance under difficult conditions. The men learn to observe the battlefield, to detect targets, to determine range to targets, and to give target designations from foxholes, shelters, when moving dismounted and when on board infantry combat vehicles. We employ smoke to hinder battlefield surveillance. Important during such drills is not only detection of the "enemy" but also correct selection of target, weapon, type and distribution of fire. There were some problems at one time in this area, for example, with Pfc R. Ismatov. With normal intensity of target illumination he would perform confidently and hit targets with accuracy. But as soon as visibility was reduced, he would lose his bearings and provision of combat performance. I proceeded to work with this soldier on target reconnaissance for the most part with smoke screening and noise distractions, as well as at night. His performance improved substantially.

In order to test the men's individual level of proficiency, I give them observation cards, on which they record a detected target, range, target designation, as well as specifying initial firing data. Such drills increase the men's powers of observation on the battlefield and improve their level of weapon training. But this is insufficient for successful accomplishment of complex combat missions. A soldier should know how to move correctly on the battlefield and adapt quickly to the terrain. I devote principal attention to this, especially at tactical drills, where each action can be worked on element by element, correcting errors, and then the entire move can be executed. Here again an individual approach is essential. It is important that the sergeant see everybody simultaneously and each individual separately. During bounds, crawls, crossing minefields, destroying the "enemy" at a strong point and deep in the defense, and when repulsing counterattacks the men are acting separated from one another, at specified intervals, which naturally makes it difficult to observe them.

I proceed as follows, for example. I break the squad up into reduced intervals, two or three paces, not more. What benefit does this bring? First of all, I can see everybody well and can monitor each individual and the entire squad as a whole. Secondly, when I make a critical remark to any one individual, the entire squad can hear it, and this means that each individual learns from the mistakes of his comrades and will not repeat them.

In training drills I always endeavor to teach the men to act with decisiveness, with the element of surprise, to paralyze the adversary's will to resist, to diminish his combat efficiency and to create favorable conditions for victory over him. How do I achieve this? Before each training session begins, I specify the conditions of competition -- who will sneak up on an "enemy" sentry or an objective, who will swiftly and boldly invade an enemy trench, and who will more skillfully conduct hand-to-hand combat. I use the element of surprise in giving scenario changes for working on combat performance standards.

Once I employed the following methodological device at a training session: I removed all those who failed to meet the performance standard or employed incorrect procedures. This forced the men to have a more serious attitude toward their actions. Comrade sergeants, try this methodological device on your subordinates, vehicle and weapon crews, and you will see that your men will increase their combat activeness.

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#### Antichemical Training

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 6

[Article by Sr Lt A. Kolychev, antichemical platoon commander: "At an Antichemical Training Facility"]

[Text] The conferees saw and heard many interesting and useful things at the antichemical training facility. Viewing demonstrations by the chemical defense platoon under the command of Sr Lt A. Kolychev, they were shown how better and more effectively to utilize training devices, to conduct training drills in a methodologically correct manner, and what role sergeants play in these activities.

Training was conducted by Sgt V. Yermakov at one of the stations. He and his squad were to study chemical spray truck equipment and the procedure of deploying and operating it. Up until quite recently, a special vehicle would be brought from the depot for this purpose. Tach hours would be run up, fuel and lubricants consumed, and equipment service life shortened. Considerable time was spent on driving the vehicle to the training site and on servicing it.

Maj M. Daychik suggested that a simulator be made of equipment retired from service, providing the capability to practice and drill on all those procedures and operations which normally required the regular spray truck. This idea inspired Sr Lt N. Malyshev. They installed an economical electric motor on the simulator in place of the gasoline motor. Now the CW troops no longer waste training time but utilize it for practice and drills, as it should be. The simulator has proven to be highly effective and quite simple: efficiency innovators in any unit can build one.

Sgt V. Yermakov set up the training session in precise conformity with the demands of methodology. Having determined by questioning that privates Rubetavichus, Latkevich and others had mastered the sprayer truck equipment, which had been previously studied, he described and then demonstrated how the vehicle is deployed and readied for operation. The sergeant proceeded slowly and performed the procedures element by element in order that the men better understand and remember the content and sequence of operations. He then ordered his men to do the same. After determining that all were doing it right, the squad leader proceeded to the main part of the exercise -- a sprayer truck crew drill. The skilled methods specialist patiently and calmly explained to those who made mistakes the reason for their error, once again demonstrated how it should be done correctly, and resumed the drill. When the men had learned to function as a team, correctly although slowly, the sergeant increased the pace of the drill and began gradually reducing the time for performing procedures.



Particular interest on the part of the conferees was aroused by the practice drill performed by the men of Sr Lt A. Kolychev's CW platoon, which was performed on a special tactical CW reconnaissance scout simulator, on which CW troops master, by repeated solving of various scenario problems, to perform skillfully and dexterously under conditions of modern combat.

A man would begin the simulator drill with the platoon leader giving a verbal order to conduct radiological and chemical reconnaissance. The procedure of reporting and transmitting reconnaissance data was detailed. The sergeants prepared radio signals, terrain diagrams, and reported ready to execute the mission. When he had determined that the sergeants were ready for action, the platoon commander ordered them to proceed with reconnaissance, while he employed a control console to indicate to his men radiation levels, degree and character of terrain contamination with toxic chemical agents. The squad leaders responded rapidly to situation changes on the reconnaissance route and reported their decisions. Following each report, Senior Lieutenant Kolychev would give a brief critique, grade the sergeants' performance, pointing out deficiencies, would explain the reasons for errors and order them to continue reconnaissance taking the critical comments into account.

We should emphasize that the drill was conducted with employment of calculated formulas for estimating the radiation situation, and special code tables making it possible to conduct radio communications maintaining secrecy.

Skilled utilization of the simulator's capabilities enabled the instructor to set up a complex and dynamic situation characteristic of modern combat and to place the trainees in conditions requiring of the NCOs and enlisted personnel considerable knowledge, initiative, ingenuity, and the will to win.

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#### Tank Training Simulators

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 7

[From address by Warrant Officer V. Fedorov, tank platoon commander: "Training Facilities Assist"]

[Text] Practical experience and know-how indicate that it is extremely difficult to master operation of complex combat vehicles and weapons systems in a short period of time without extensive employment of trainers, simulators, working models, display stands and other auxiliary devices. Therefore the most serious attention is devoted in our unit to improvement of training facilities.

Each submit has at its disposal interesting training devices. These include, for example, a standardized gunner's training stimulator, designed to develop and reinforce the firing skills of several crews simultaneously. It gives information on effectiveness of fire delivery, that is, records the number of rounds fired, the number of hits, and in case of a miss -- by how much. It also signals a trainee's errors in switching on the stabilizer. Firing from the tank gun and machinegun is simulated with light and sound effects, with shell and bullet trajectories and points of impact indicated. Not only the trainees observe the course of firing, but the instructor as well, who can intervene at any time in the process of readying the gun for firing and can correct the gunner's actions at every stage of the drill.

One can readily judge the effectiveness of simulator practice from the results of field firing exercises and by the rate at which the specialists' skill improves. Today more and more crews are hitting the target on the first round. The same applies to improvement in the men's skill. Now one fourth to one fifth the time is spent on training specialists 2d class, for example, as in the past. These figures speak for themselves.

It would be erroneous to assume, however, that after honing their performance on training devices the men can consider themselves full-fledged specialists. No matter how sophisticated a simulator may be, it cannot fully simulate the operation of an actual piece of equipment or combat vehicle. Some conditionality also remains in the actions of the specialists, which must be taken into account. The first test at an actual station will reveal everything a soldier has not mastered or has not mastered sufficiently well.

I shall cite an example which will evidently be found in every subunit. While still a novice driver-mechanic, Jr Sgt V. Opanasets seemed to have acquired fairly good driving skills on the training simulator -- he performed with precision, speed and confidence. At the controls of a real tank, however, he would most frequently make the same mistake -- he would not "get into" the turn. I was well familiar with this "ailment" of recent recruits -- an inability to manipulate controls.

I could have ignored this shortcoming. Ten runs or so and it would unquestionably be corrected. But I proceeded differently -- I put V. Opanasets into the training simulator and made him practice until his turn manipulations became second nature. The results exceeded my expectations -- this driver's mistake was never repeated again.

I know that many instructors give preference to this training method, and they are correct. When practice sessions on the simulator are intelligently combined with work on the actual equipment, they reinforce and supplement one another, as it were, and maximum effect is achieved.

There is one more plus in using training simulators. In some specialists skills form more slowly than in the majority of personnel. In this case the instructor does not have to personally conduct additional practice sessions with the slower learners. He can turn them over to experienced specialist NCOs. The expediency of this approach has been tested time and again. I remember that for a long time Pvts A. Zhakupov and B. Tarasevich were unable to learn to switch on the stabilizer correctly, although they theoretically knew how it was done. Instructing Jr Sgt A. Baranovskiy to drill these soldiers, I soon saw that they had totally mastered the procedure of performing this operation.

I mentioned the advantages of utilizing only certain simulators. But unquestionably more rapid training of personnel is promoted by all facilities, including working models, equipment assemblies, display stands, posters, etc, with which training classrooms, offices, and training simulator buildings are equipped. And the more frequently an instructor resorts to using this equipment in the conduct of training classes, the better the results of personnel combat training will be, the faster and better they will be able to perform their assigned tasks.

The new training equipment makes it possible to save on fuel, electricity, ammunition, combat vehicle engine mileage, and at the same time to improve the quality

of training. A training simulator, for example, brings the instructor closer to the trainee, creating conditions for fuller implementation of the principle of the individual approach in training subordinates.

Good training facilities constitute the correct way to achieve success in mastering the science of defense of the homeland.

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### Tank Driving

Review ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 7-8

[Description of infantry combat vehicle driving class under the direction of Capt V. Bereznitskiy: "At the Tank Training Area"]

[Text] The infantry combat vehicle lurched into motion and, rapidly accelerating, charged down the course. Ahead lay an antitank ditch. Lightly applying the brakes, the infantry combat vehicle nosed down slightly, and a second or two later, its engine roaring, once again surged along smooth ground. The driver reported back to the instructor, Capt V. Bereznitskiy: first obstacle negotiated.

The entire obstacle course was clearly visible from the instructor's tower. The infantry combat vehicle was maneuvering across an area containing obstacles and narrow lanes, was leaving behind the uphill and downhill grades, and was proceeding at high speed toward a track bridge. The vehicle also crossed this obstacle without delay. The infantry combat vehicle was being driven by Pfc A. Amochkin, Specialist 1st Class.

The next vehicle was at the starting line. Pvt V. Vartanyan, Pfc Amochkin's constant socialist competition rival, was ready to run the course. He has not yet become a specialist 1st class, but he handles his infantry combat vehicle well and at high speed. The command was given, and his vehicle swiftly set out on the course. A stopwatch was clicking off the seconds...

"The objective of this practical exercise," officer V. Bukhval'd told the conferees, "is to teach the men to drive combat vehicles at maximum possible speeds. A course has been set up in the tank training area for driving infantry combat vehicles under difficult terrain conditions, that is, with alternation of those obstacles which are most frequently encountered on combat routes. Drivers must not only skillfully negotiate obstacles but also maintain a high average speed. In today's combat high speed is a decisive factor in success."

The tank training area meets the requirements of the combat vehicle driving course, and its equipment and facilities permit employment of advanced personnel training methods. In order to utilize each and every minute with maximum effectiveness, three stations have been set up: practical vehicle driving, working on technical training performance standards, and practice in negotiating the most difficult obstacles. The men spend 5-6 hours of the allocated time sequentially at each of these stations. Organization of trainee activities has been planned right down to the last detail. The practical vehicle driving station, for example, contains three training points. Driving practice is performed at the

first, while at the two other points the men who are not engaged in driving prepare for it. When a subunit arrives for a training class, it is broken down into three groups, which then alternate with one another.

The second training point is a classroom with three identical simulators. The work station of each is an exact copy of the driving compartment of an infantry combat vehicle. Taking his place in the simulator, the trainee must "drive" the vehicle along a complex loop route which he sees through a viewing device on a special screen. A timer automatically records the beginning and end of "movement." The instructor's console receives detailed information on the performance of each driver and records his mistakes, such as incorrect gear choice, excessive speed while negotiating certain obstacles, etc. Subsequently the instructor can work with the trainee and emphasize correction of mistakes typical of that trainee. At the third training point the instructor (as a rule the company senior technician) tests the drivers' technical training knowledge. To intensify the questioning, specially developed tests are used, each of which encompasses a specific range of theoretical points, vehicle operating rules and procedures, procedure of servicing vehicle components and assemblies, etc.

This classroom contains, in addition to diagrams, posters, excerpts from the operating manual and other technical requirements, display stands with a visual display of operation of infantry combat vehicle systems, cutaway parts and assemblies and other learning aids. Drivers have the opportunity quickly to review the specific operating features of a given system, typical malfunctions and methods of correcting them.

But of course the specialists' proficiency can be graded only by actual driving. The subunit commander is the instructor at the first training point. He personally observes how the men drive their infantry combat vehicle on the course, recording in a special log the time each driver takes to complete the course. Also entered into the log are data on mistakes made while negotiating obstacles, obtained by the instructor from the technical monitoring devices, and wherever no such devices are installed -- from observers specially assigned to this task. Subsequently the instructor sums up all the data he has and grades each driver and the subunit as a whole on exercise performance.

...The combat vehicles set out onto the course, one after the other. Encouraged by the success of Pfc A. Amochkin and Pvts V. Vartanyan and M. Polvanov, who substantially surpassed the performance standards for a grade of excellent, the other men were also producing a high average speed. Specialists 2d Class Pvts I. Khomichuk and A. Vaysbekker successfully fulfilled their pledges. They closely approached the first-class drivers in average speed. Pvts N. Vorob'yev and M. Millers met second-class infantry combat vehicle driving performance standards. And none of them received negative comments for their technique of negotiating obstacles.

The specially equipped stations also played a role. The site where personnel practice estimating distance by eye and hone skills in operating night vision devices, for example, was given universal recognition. The rail transport classroom, which contained an actual rail flatcar, was very helpful, for it is a well known fact that rapid loading and off-loading is one of the indicators of driver expertise.



The following training method also proved effective: practicing the men on obstacles built following close tolerances. For example, a lane breaching an antitank ditch may be from 4 to 4.5 meters in width. In this subunit the men learn from the very outset to breach a ditch with a lane 4 meters wide. All this of course requires additional effort on the part of both instructors and trainees. But the cost is repaid a hundredfold.

Practical infantry combat vehicle driving presented the conferees with a convincing example of skilled utilization of advanced method techniques and facilities for achieving a high degree of effectiveness and quality of training activities.

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#### Antiaircraft Defense

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 8-9

[From the address of Warrant Officer N. Davydov: "At Low-Flying Targets"]

[Text] During recent field firing at low-flying targets, many of our warrant officers and noncommissioned officers achieved excellent results. Sgt V. Chervonik did a particularly fine job. What is the secret of his success? What helped him accomplish the assigned missions better than all the others? Thanks to a high degree of proficiency, Sergeant Chervonik was able quickly to spot and identify the target, to aim quickly and flawlessly, and to open fire without delay. He performed calmly, confidently, in strict conformity with the demands of the training manual.

Success did not come immediately, but after persistent, systematic practice and drills, for which we possess excellent training facilities: a classroom in the training building, modern-equipped stations at the air defense gunnery training facility, requisite training simulators, and objective monitoring instruments.

Just as his fellow soldiers, Sergeant Chervonik, utilizing display stands, posters, and albums, thoroughly studied the performance characteristics of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and their weapons, as well as jamming equipment. Daily training sessions on air target models at the air defense training site also played a positive role.

After Sergeant Chervonik learned accurately to determine air targets, they proceeded to work on meeting performance standards dealing with aircraft identification within seconds. Here literally each second was taken strictly into account and affected the grade.

Simulation devices were extensively utilized to designate air targets. They were set up at various points in the area, which corresponded to conditions of simulation of suddenly appearing targets.

Just as the other specialists, Sergeant Chervonik worked on firing at a stationary target with the simulator equipment, and when he had acquired the requisite skills he began practicing firing at a moving target. He practiced long and hard, and therefore at each session he was spending less time on these operations and began surpassing performance standards for high marks.

As we know, in order successfully to engage hostile aircraft an antiaircraft gunner needs not only thorough knowledge of theory and solid practical skills. Equally important are moral-fighting qualities.

It is not merely by chance that I described in detail how Sergeant Chervonik trained, how he became an expert at delivering accurate fire on air targets. Taking his experience into account, I drew certain conclusions for myself as well. The principal conclusion is as follows: one cannot count on success without thorough knowledge of one's weapon and equipment and the ability to ready them for combat correctly and quickly. All crewmen must thoroughly master firing procedures and rules, safety regulations, and must be unwaveringly guided by them in performing combat missions. We devote the most serious attention to developing in personnel excellent moral-fighting qualities, especially such qualities as staunchness, boldness, initiative, confidence in one's ability and in the reliability and excellent combat capabilities of one's weapons.

I constantly draw attention precisely to these items when training and indoctrinating personnel. Only after I have achieved fulfillment of the above demands from my men do I proceed with further improvement of their combat proficiency and endeavor to raise to an even higher level their moral-psychological conditioning. I adhere strictly to the following principles in my methodology: teach that which is necessary in modern combat; proceed from the simple to the complex; reinforce acquired knowledge with regular practice and drill.

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#### Tank-Antitank Missiles

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 9

[From address by tank platoon commander Warrant Officer P. Vavilov: "Tank Against Antitank Missile"]

[Text] ...A hitch occurred in the tank platoon's swift assault. Lightning flashed ahead of the left-flank tank, an explosion sounded, and the combat vehicle, hit by an antitank missile, stopped dead. All this happened so unexpectedly that I, the platoon commander, did not even have time to blink, as they say.

Halting briefly, we knocked out the launcher with concentrated platoon fire, and successfully completed the assault. But I could not get over my feeling of annoyance at the sergeant's sluggish performance, for I had told the tank commanders time and again that during an attack it is necessary skillfully to utilize terrain irregularities and brush in order when moving forward to avoid giving the enemy the opportunity to deliver aimed antitank missile fire. Up to this time the sergeants as a rule had performed in strict conformity with the requirements stated in the field manual, but this time one of them had let me down.

I began my address with this incident in order to emphasize a fundamental point: even the most advanced method will not produce positive results if the commander fails to be highly demanding on himself and his men. Not one single mistake by his subordinates should escape his gaze, for in actual combat this will cost dearly. I consider commander demandingness to be the most important element of effectiveness of training method and high quality of each and every training session. I utilize

every opportunity to instill in the NCOs and enlisted men faith in the power and might of our equipment.

I remember that at a training session Private Litvin expressed doubt over successful combat by a tank with an antitank missile.

I decided to have a talk with the men. I titled the discussion as follows: "Can a tank defeat an antitank missile in combat?"

I asked the tank crewmen to list the advantages of an antitank missile over a tank. The men mentioned substantial range, high accuracy (1-2 missiles per tank), and considerable armor piercing capability throughout the entire range of guided flight, as well as other plus points.

I saw that the men possessed considerable knowledge. I asked a second question: "What vulnerable points does an antitank missile have?" The men listed these points one after the other:

A large blind spot, which forces missile crews to change position in combat often, giving their position away.

A long duration of missile flight to the target (10-20 seconds), which reduces a launcher's rate of fire, makes it possible to observe the missile and determine the point from where it was fired.

Limited visibility, rain, snow, fog, smoke and haze are a great hindrance to missiles.

"Thus," I summarized, "a well trained tank crew can come out victorious in combat with an antitank missile even when the missile has already been fired."

The men exchanged glances and proceeded to whisper among themselves. I saw that they were rather doubtful. Well, in such instances methodology recommends using visual aids, persuasive examples. I proceeded to do so.

"Let us solve a problem," I suggested to my men, and quickly drew a diagram. "Let us assume that an antitank missile has been fired at an advancing tank from a range of 2,000 meters. As the missile's average rate of speed of 130 meters per second, it will take between 15 and 16 seconds to reach the target. What can the tank crew do in this time? First of all, they can spot the launcher position from the flash and can fire one or two aimed rounds at it. Secondly, the tank can hide behind intervening terrain or in brush. Third, it can sharply change course. The result is victory for the tank crew."

I hold such discussions with new recruits, because I believe that a tanker's faith in the power of his weapons, in the outstanding performance capabilities of his combat equipment, and the ability to exploit the weak points of the enemy's weapons and equipment constitute a reliable factor for achieving victory in combat.

We also thoroughly developed a method of teaching tankers to conduct battlefield reconnaissance. At our gunnery range we have set up 36 different pop-up and moving targets. When training tank crews in target reconnaissance, I always rely on the main principle of my methodology -- proceed from the simple to the complex.

Initially I raise one or two targets. When the tankers acquire certain skills in target reconnaissance, I make the situation more complicated and raise a group of targets simultaneously, including one representing an antitank missile, at different ranges. I seek to have my tank commanders give the command to open fire at the missile launcher on a priority basis. Sgts Roman Yablonskiy and Aleksandr Chernobay handle this task in excellent fashion. They also perform with intelligence and initiative at live-fire exercises.

As I have already stated, advanced methodology requires extensive use of training facility equipment and devices in training personnel. Our efficiency innovators have developed a device which simulates the flash of an antitank missile booster in the fire position. With the aid of this device we train personnel not only quickly to spot a dangerous target but also to open fire immediately.

We know that beyond the tank gun's effective range probability of hitting an antitank missile launcher on the first round drops off. Therefore we teach tankers to fire from position in such situations, since this increases rate of fire and probability of scoring a hit on the first round. We require that in one-on-one firing the gunner be able independently to make corrections for the second shot.

At medium and long ranges we as a rule teach personnel to deliver concentrated platoon fire, and at short range to utilize the antitank missile's blind spot and the tank's advantages.

Relying on modern training facilities and experience-proven methodological devices, I also teach my tankers to employ passive forms of combat with antitank missiles on the battlefield: I develop the ability effectively to employ the protective properties of the terrain, to maneuver with cover and concealment (between hills, through gullies, ravines, clumps and stands of trees, brush, etc), and to perform competently in rain, fog, and at night.

The ability effectively to combat antitank missiles is a most important combat skill of tankers. It is developed in the process of each and every training activity, each and every field exercise.

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#### Physical Training

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 10-11

[Description of obstacle course exercise: "Test of Courage"]

[Text] This well equipped obstacle course on the flank of a tactical training area (see diagram) includes a number of artificial obstacles and structures for developing in trainees physical stamina, boldness, resoluteness and ingenuity, skills in moving across difficult ground, methods and techniques of negotiating various obstacles and attacking the enemy. Such a course can be used to test both the individual proficiency of each man and the level of training of a squad or platoon as a whole.




# Diagram

## Key:

1. Board fence
2. Wall with breach
3. Semi-demolished buildings
4. Stone wall
5. Building facade
6. Communication trench
7. Vertical wall
8. Brick wall and water-filled ditch
9. Abatis
10. Communication line
11. Barbed wire entanglements
12. Trench
13. Barbed wire entanglement
14. Lever lines
15. Taking out a sentry
16. Water-filled ditch
17. Inclined ladder
18. Start
19. Finish

A reconnaissance subunit, which was well prepared in studying techniques of negotiating all obstacles, in practical grenade throwing, and in techniques and methods of attack and self-defense, went out to the facility for a scheduled demonstration exercise. All scheduled practice drills involving execution of individual elements, as well as negotiating groups of obstacles and performance of the test exercise as a whole were performed with excellent results.

The method of competition between individual scouts, pairs of soldiers and squads for speed and quality of negotiating obstacles, accuracy in grenade throwing and correctness of execution of attack and self-defense procedures was employed at training activities. The excellent squad led by Sgt S. Shchurok was unfailingly successful. And now the participants in the district scientific-practical conference were able to evaluate the performance of the competition winners.



The exercise began with vigorous platoon calisthenics. The scouts proceeded in a column of twos along the obstacle course. Sergeant Shchurok's squad did the course alongside their competition rivals, Sgt A. Bugaychuk's squad, and this very circumstance impelled the men to perform aggressively and to endeavor to better their neighbors. The warmup sequence also included fast walking with thrusts, running with high kneelift, and bounding combined with crossing several obstacles. This is done in order to avoid pulling muscles and straining tendons during subsequent performance of an exercise which requires considerable physical output, that is, to prepare the organism for substantial stresses.

Upon completing the warmup sequence, all trainees took their weapons, gas mask, three grenades apiece, and other gear. The men's gear was the same employed in an actual combat situation.

The training area suddenly resounded with shellbursts, the chatter of assault rifle and machinegun bursts, the roaring of tanks, the clanking of vehicle tracks, the scream of diving bombers and fighters, and the sinister hissing of antitank missiles.... High-powered speakers boomed out the sound effects of a dynamic modern engagement recorded on tape. Visual effects were also added: there were explosions out ahead, to the side, and to the rear. A trailing black smoke screen obscured a group of obstacles, and a machinegun burst sent bright cherry-red tracers out from behind a twisted, uprooted stump.... At the officer's command, two reconnaissance platoons moved swiftly forward on a parallel course. The first obstacle was a board fence. Sergeants Shchurok and Bugaychuk, competing with each other, clambered over simultaneously. Within another second both leaders were over a brick wall. Sergeant Shchurok glanced back for a second. Pvt V. Bulatkin, a nimble scout with good reactions, was running right behind him. There was a time when he could not quite handle this brick wall. Bulatkin had become accustomed to leaping over it by first stepping up onto rubble along the side, which was not actually prohibited by the rules. Sergeant Shchurok, however, endeavoring to assess everything by the measure of combat, advised his subordinate to take the obstacle through the breach, since this technique was safer than when a soldier, crossing over the obstacle, for a certain time presents a target to the enemy. Private Bulatkin was willing to practice the new way, but the habit he had developed still sometimes affected him, and the scout would be somewhat slow in taking the obstacle. This time he had no problem....

The path was blocked by a building facade with broken windows, an intact stairway, and a collapsed second-story floor. Before entering the building, Sergeant Shchurok threw a hand grenade. As he was winding up to throw it, somewhere behind him he heard a shrill whistle, followed by the burst of a heavy shell. He was deafened by the piercing howl of a jet aircraft pulling out of a dive. But his hand did not shake, as had once been the case. He had become mentally tough. The grenade, describing an arc, sailed cleanly into a window. A second later the grenade thrown by Sergeant Bugaychuk reached its target. During these minutes both NCOs were influencing the actions of their subordinates only by their own personal example, and this was understandable. They had worked long and hard with their men, honing and polishing each and every technique, each and every action. Pvt V. Kuryankulov, for example, was having trouble throwing his grenade accurately. Sergeant Shchurok fairly quickly taught him to throw grenades accurately, working half an hour with him every day on the obstacle course. Pvt V. Bakumenko had a different problem -- he was timid about getting past the building facade. The thoughtful squad leader

realized what the problem was. In climbing from one window opening to another and when descending down the interior half-collapsed beams and stairway, he simply was unable to find a solid support and was afraid of heights. Sergeant Shchurok explained to him in detail and demonstrated how to choose a firm support, to ensure a safe grip and to move boldly along the facade in any direction. This produced positive results.

Private Bakumenko took one obstacle after another easily, confidently, and boldly. Behind him now were a brick wall, the top of which was strewn with broken glass, a barbed-wire entanglement, and a deep, water-filled ditch. The soldier reached the wire communication line at a run, nimbly climbed up the slippery pole with the aid of materials at hand, tapped into the wire and recorded the message traffic. A high degree of proficiency could be sensed in his actions. Within the blink of an eye he lifted up a manhole cover, took concealment in a sewer pipe, crawled several dozen meters, and reappeared from another manhole. The skilled scout now noiselessly lifted off the cast-iron cover and silently crept up on a sentry....

The competing squads negotiated the final obstacle. The scouts had not made a single error. But Sergeant Shchurok's men had the best time, and his squad was declared the winner.

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#### Night Exercise

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 11

[From address by platoon commander Warrant Officer N. Gil': "We Prepare for Night Combat"]

[Text] Since the development of night vision devices, both the attack and defense under night conditions have become normal kinds of combat actions. This requires of tank crews a high degree of combat proficiency, smoothness of performance, and flawless individual proficiency by each and every specialist, including firm skills in handling night vision devices.

Our combat vehicles are so well furnished with modern equipment that every crew member has a night vision device. The tank commander has a TKN, the gunner a TPN, and the driver a TVN. And coordinated employment of all types of instruments is essential in order more fully to organize night battlefield or route surveillance.

Exercises in our company have shown that the crews as a rule employ these devices well. There have been incidents, however. For example, during night driving activities drivers Pvts A. Kachenya and I. Dubritskiy drove off the route several times, confused landmarks, and did a poor job on negotiating some obstacles. The other tankers also made mistakes. At the critique the company commander emphasized that some of the men were not yet adequately prepared for night activities.

It was determined, however, that not only the drivers were to blame. An incorrect practice was followed in the company, where only certain individuals readied instruments for a forthcoming exercise. For example, Pfc V. Rogach, company senior technician and one of the best drivers, checked the TVN instruments. The platoon commanders themselves readied the TKN and TPN instruments, not entrusting performance of these operations to subordinates.

Gaps in the tankers' knowledge also began to become evident at field exercises. Driver Pvt A. Ivanchikov, for example, lost his bearings en route, wandered off the route and pulled two other vehicles after him. This error was due to the fact that viewing through the TVN had worsened, and therefore he confused landmarks. As it turned out, the real reason was the fact that the driver had not checked the TVN headlamps in advance.

At special training sessions with tank commanders, gunners and drivers, we studied in detail the construction of these instruments and clarified the procedure of readying them for operation. The tankers also added to their knowledge of the rules and procedures of night terrain orientation.

As a platoon commander I began more frequently testing my men's ability correctly to operate these instruments and would check to see how they were preparing for the next driving session. I endeavored to drill and practice them more. We know, for example, that night vision devices "conceal" distance, which makes orientation more difficult. Therefore both at exercises and at tank gunnery drills I taught my men when observing local features to compare apparent with actual distance to them.

The training drills were also assisted by a specially-equipped site where we placed various silhouettes on movable bases: a tree, a rock, a machinegun, etc, and separately set up a TVN instrument at the edge of the site. Moving silhouettes to various distances from the instrument (the instructor can see these distances with an accuracy down to centimeters!), it is easy to develop tankers' visual estimating ability. From our own experience, these drills produce considerable results.

Preparing for our next exercise, we also utilized transfer of know-how to increase the men's knowledge. Leading tank commanders, gunners, and drivers related to their comrades how best to identify objects through night vision devices in various situations. They went over with the young tankers the procedures of switching on the infrared searchlight, concealing the devices, and methods of combating return illumination. All this came in handy in the field.

Night actions differed little from daylight actions as regards maneuverability, dynamism and effectiveness of employment of combat equipment. The platoon received a high mark for conduct of combat.

An important role is also assigned to night vision devices in defensive combat, for one of the decisive conditions for success in night defense is constant readiness to repulse a surprise enemy attack. And this requires around-the-clock surveillance of the adversary and reconnaissance of his battlefield dispositions. During hours of darkness it is primarily night vision devices which help successfully accomplish this mission.

Defense imposes its own demands on employment of these instruments. The most important is careful concealment and camouflage. If this is not observed, it is easy for the adversary to determine the location of night vision equipment, that is, he can virtually determine practically the entire fire plan. This is why at training exercises where the men are working on platoon night defense actions, I teach my men to conduct reconnaissance, skillfully combining utilization of instruments with means of illumination.



Our experience in training tankers indicates that only systematically increasing their knowledge of theory in combination with intensive drills and practical exercises in the field has the result that the men acquire firm skills in handling and operating night vision devices.

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### Tank Weaponry

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 12

[Tank gunnery exercise in company under the command of Capt A. Protsenko: "School of Gunnery Experts"]

[Text] From the experience of the excellent-rated company under the command of Capt A. Protsenko, the conferees became convinced that tank gunnery practices are very useful if they are set up in conformity with the high demands of modern combat, on the basis of advanced methodology, employing good facilities.


The gunnery range where practice is held is a model facility in the district. It is correctly considered a forge producing tank sharpshooters. Automated, electrified, and equipped with electronic simulators, it enables the instructor to conduct training sessions day and night, with maximum effectiveness. Also at the disposal of the tank crews are TOPT [expansion unknown], mounted on rocking frames, and a complex target range nicely fitting into the terrain, which is activated by a special program developed by efficiency innovators. The conditions encountered at practice sessions do not differ at all from those which tank crews encounter at a conventional firing range. Therefore quite diverse variants of organization of tank firing drills can be organized.

The tank gunnery drill was very instructive in the sense that it eliminated purposeless expenditure of time on excessive explanations, on assigning missions, on frequent station changes, on crews mounting and dismounting from tanks and TOPT, and extensive critiques.

Initially the crews worked at three stations, working on improving the quality of performance of tank weapon utilization procedures, observation of pop-up and moving targets, and performing fire missions with utilization of objective monitoring devices. Then all the company's tank crews simultaneously performed one of the preparatory range practice drills. Two platoons would fire from tanks mounted on rocking frames, while the third platoon and the company commander's crew would fire from TOPT from rocking frames. The final 30 minutes of the practice was scheduled for a company fire control drill (directed by the battalion commander).

...Informing the crew about the successes of their competition rivals in performing the drills and achieving combat performance standards, tank commander Sgt M. Nozdrin proceeded with the drill. Pfc K. Mironets served as gunner. With practiced hand movements he sequentially activated the stabilizer switches, hooked up to the tank intercom system, and reported ready. This was immediately followed by a command by Sergeant Nozdrin: "Proceed to trace target-envelope!"

Some of those present were quite surprised that the tank commander did not spend any time on mounting the special strut for the target-envelope and the strut for the pantograph-piercing pin screen. Soldiers handy with tools had fabricated a number of simple devices which make it possible to ready this station for training activities with a minimum time expenditure. Diagram 1 shows one such device. Diagrams 2 and 3 show another innovation -- mounting a pantograph-piercing pin on the tank hull. In addition to the fact that this makes the crew's work easier, it increases accuracy of monitoring of the trainee's actions by the station instructor. With the aid of a pantograph-piercing pin one can successfully train gunners in the conduct of target reconnaissance, in determining range to targets, and in "cold" firing at them....



Diagrams

Key:

- |                       |                         |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Front view         | 6. Gun barrel           |
| 2. Side view          | 7. Screen               |
| 3. Piercing pin mount | 8. Strut                |
| 4. Piercing pin       | 9. Strut mounting bolts |
| 5. Counterweight      | 10. Tank hull nose      |

"Armor piercing, landmark 3, left 0-10, tank 1800. Fire without halt... fire!" commanded Sergeant Nozdrin.

The gunner located the target out on the range, correctly determined range to target, performed a calculation, and then specified initial data for the first round (sight setting, aiming mark, point of aim), and aimed the gun, naturally endeavoring to hit the target with the first round.

This target had been designated in advance by the number 6 on the pantograph-piercing pin screen. The tank commander checks to see where on the screen the piercing pin point mark is positioned at the moment the trainee pushes the electric firing button.

"Round fired!" announced Pfc Mironets. The piercing pin clicked.

"Over!" reported Sergeant Nozdrin over the tank intercom system.

The gunner thought for a minute. Everything had seemed right, but....

"You failed to consider," the sergeant explained, "that the lower part of the target is concealed by grass, and therefore the actual angle of sight decreased, and this means that range increased...."

The trainee once again proceeded to solve the fire problem and corrected the error.

The final segment of the tank firing drill was reminiscent of an episode from a tactical exercise with live fire: the platoons, and then the entire company performed the fire control drills.

The gunnery drill came to an end. The commander totaled up results and designated the socialist competition winners. He then enabled the crews right on the spot to acquaint themselves with the experience and know-how of the top specialists, who had demonstrated a high degree of proficiency at the exercise.

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#### Concluding Remarks

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 80 p 13

[From the concluding address by Col Gen Tank Trps M. Zaytsev, Commander, Red-Banner Belorussian Military District: "Persistently Adopt Advanced Know-How"]

[Text] "In view of the complexity of the present world military-political situation," the commander stated, "we must increase vigilance, combat readiness, and the level of combat and political training. We must seek to ensure that elements of tactics stand out at every weapon, technical and special training exercise, and we must seek to ensure that every special exercise is of a combined-arms nature. The purpose of our conference was to demonstrate for you advanced techniques and methods of tactical, weapon, technical and special training as well as other subjects, to exchange experience and know-how, to synthesize elements of the new and progressive in methodology of improving the field proficiency of subunits in light of modern requirements on it and to draft practical recommendations on further improving methods of training small subunits. This goal has been achieved."

Further discussing the specific features of the combat training program for motorized rifle and tank subunits, Colonel General Tank Troops Zaytsev emphasized that the level of training of subunits and units depends in large measure on the degree of proficiency of small subunits which are commanded by warrant officers and NCOs. In the course of the conference the participants shared their work experience and know-how and discussed the most effective techniques and methods of training and indoctrinating personnel.

Platoon sergeant Sgt Leonid Cheslavovich Stankevich, for example, related how painstaking labor, a constant search for new methodological techniques, and an individual approach to training subordinates have helped him bring his squad up from laggards to leaders.

Warrant Officer Vasilii Alekseyevich Fedorov presented in a clear and lucid manner the effectiveness of utilization of training facilities in the training process.

Infantry combat vehicle commander Sgt Leonid Petrovich Zubovich spoke on the difficulties of commander development and demonstrated how the personal preparedness of an NCO affects the quality of training subordinates.

The role of socialist competition in intensification of the training process and development of expert marksmen and proficiency-rated specialists was discussed in a lucid manner by tank commander Sgt Vladimir Nikolayevich Kudrov.

An interesting presentation was given by Lt Col L. Kovalev, commander of the motorized rifle regiment which initiated competition in the Ground Forces, by tank platoon commander Warrant Officer V. Aleshin, and others.

"You have seen in the field a 24-hour platoon tactical exercise, during which methods of preparing personnel and equipment for combat were demonstrated, as well as the platoon commander's work pertaining to organizing for combat on the terrain, as well as the conduct of platoon combat actions to penetrate a defense and attack a strong point deep in the enemy's defense.

"You have also become acquainted with methods of training the individual soldier, squad, as well as the conduct of test drills to check the level of the soldiers' individual training and performance smoothness of the squad. Please devote particular attention to these matters.

"At battle drill exercises we sought to demonstrate training methods to you, that is, the methods techniques employed by the squad and platoon leader in organizing training.

"You yourselves have seen, comrades warrant officers and NCOs, how a squad leader taught his men how to move in combat when operating dismounted, and destroying the enemy with grenade fire while advancing and in hand-to-hand fighting. If each and every commander will train his subordinates in this manner and will fully carry out the program, the results will naturally be considerable. Your critical comments about the squad leader who failed to demand that his subordinate precisely carry out the specified techniques and actions very clearly attest to the fact that in the process of training it is essential to work individually with each man, to point out deficiencies, and to work to correct them, followed by achieving correct and dexterous actions.



"Drill, physical, and weapon training activities were instructive, as were section classes. Air defense specialists became acquainted with methodology of conducting training classes in special simulator complexes for developing smooth, coordinated performance by equipment crews. In the course of a battle drill exercise you saw that utilization of gunnery training facilities makes it possible to simulate a large percentage of tactical problems which can arise in actual combat. The trainees fire from sub-caliber barrels. The method employed in this training exercise should be extensively utilized in training.

"Missile forces and artillery warrant officers and NCOs learned many interesting points.

"You were given the opportunity to see advanced methods of training small subunits, to see in the course of training activities the most modern simulator equipment, various classrooms, field base facilities and ways of utilizing them effectively in the training process. In addition, display stands from the units of this district were exhibited at the conference. You have become acquainted with the advanced training and indoctrination methods of the finest commanders. One must approach all this innovatively and adopt all the best items in a practical manner.

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## TRAINEES LEARN TO COMBAT ARMORED VEHICLES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Outstanding Unit Commander, Sgt N. Bogatov]

[Text] Competing for the sake of the noteworthy 26th CPSU Congress, the motor riflemen of our company strive for marks of "excellent" in carrying out all their combat-training missions. It is not without reason that the unit has been getting high results in training and in service over the course of the last few years. Particularly visible is the success the soldiers have had in field training. They staunchly bear the burdens of modern combat, display self-control, courage and endurance in the most critical situations and act coolly, calculatingly and on their own initiative, making full use of the capabilities of the weapons entrusted to them. This has become possible because the sergeants of our unit attach primary importance to the psychological conditioning of the motor riflemen during exercises in all their training subjects.

I would like to communicate to you the experience we have accumulated in teaching psychological stability to the soldiers of our unit while instructing them in the various methods of combating tanks.

Before going out into the field for scheduled training, I urged the trainees to learn well the characteristics of the tanks, infantry combat vehicles and APC's of the armies of a probable enemy and to master their weak and strong points, particularly their vulnerable spots. We studied the equipment, its principle of operation and the methods and principles of throwing and firing hand (and rocket) anti-tank grenades. I also urged them to master the use of antitank mines in combat. During the physical training exercises I tried to get each soldier to become skilled in throwing the grenades accurately over a distance. In their engineering training, I tried to get them to set up the antitank mines rapidly and correctly, whether burying them or throwing them.

The antitank training exercises took place on a section of a military firing range of dimensions 200x400 m (see diagram). In order of priority, I took the unit up to a tank in front of which stood driver-mechanic first-class Pfc A. Pershin. In a few minutes he would have to test the courage and psychological stability of the motor riflemen. In addition, he would have to present each soldier with a favorable opportunity to learn how to emerge the victor in single combat with a tank in any situation. The trainees took their places in the combat vehicle and saw for themselves that, no matter how menacing the machine might be, it did have vulnerable spots and a "blind spot" when conducting fire and surveillance.

This is very important in the psychological plan.

"If you cover the vision devices," I explained while familiarizing them with the tank, "with a rain-cape, smear them with dirt or oil or cover them with a smoke-screen, the crew will become 'blind.'"

Further along, on the rail-mounted tank mock-up, I showed the trainees the proper way to throw grenades at a moving armored vehicle from various directions, how to select an aiming point and how to choose a safe position. The first after me to occupy the trench set between the rails of the moving tank mock-up was an outstanding trainee, Pvt Chichkov. I consider this teaching method indispensable. Indeed, when the sharp dividing line between the sergeant's model demonstration and the trainee's actions is no longer felt, within the soldier's consciousness arise the first assurances that he can manage like his comrade. The productivity of the exercise increases greatly due to the good frame of mind. A reasonable question: when is the weakest trainee checked? There is no simple answer. Here a differentiated approach is necessary. If, let us say, we develop a method or action of greater than normal complexity, the weak soldier must be checked last. Up until that moment, he observes the training of his comrades, considers their experience and manages to prepare mentally for the exercise. One cannot, however, always leave the "last word" for the least experienced trainee. He will feel that he is being treated as a weak trainee. This will depress him mentally and will mean that the process of mastering the material will be hampered. If you feel that some method is not complicated and that the slow soldier can carry it out successfully, grant him the possibility to excel; that is, the possibility to be among the very first to excel.

The exercise proceeded according to the principle of simple-to-complex. The unit moved to the next training area for the direct roll-over. First, the trainees crawled after me underneath a tank with the motor off as well as with the motor running. I noticed some inhibition in the actions of a young soldier, Kh. Gimadeyev. I found some kindly, gentle words for him and broke the tension with a joke.


"You did just fine," I said, patting Pvt Gimadeyev lightly on the shoulder. "It was your first time and you were not even afraid."

It was enough for the soldier. He was completely transformed.

On the officer's command I brought my unit onto course number one. The trainees occupied the trench. Pvt Chichkov, who had been through the roll-over many times, was shoulder to shoulder with Pvt Gimadeyev. The tank appeared up ahead. As the tank approached, the unit opened fire with all regular weapons. The machine-gunner and the men with automatic weapons tried to put the vision devices out of commission. When the combat vehicle was 18-20 meters away, I gave the command: "Grenades at the tank--commence fire!"

All the trainees threw antitank grenades. I observed the accuracy of the throws and made notes in my pad. The "enemy" tank was over the trench. The ground shook and clods of dirt spilled down the sides of the trench. The vehicle's steel belly was over Chichkov's head. Pvt Gimadeyev was three steps away. His tense stare was not fixed on the tank but on the experienced soldier, Chichkov. Letting the

vehicle pass over him, Chichkov threw a second grenade right at the transmission, then jumped easily from the trench and ran to the individual foxholes located along course number two. Following the example of his comrade, the young soldier assured himself that there was nothing to be afraid of and that the main thing was to show restraint and calm.



On the second course the unit learned how to blow up an armored vehicle with the help of an antitank mine attached to the end of a long slender cord and pulled under the track. In addition, the students repeated the same actions they had performed on the first course, undergoing roll-over a second time. This time Gimadeyev was situated about one meter from the place in the trench where the tank laid down its tracks. From all indications, one could tell that the soldier was not afraid. Now you could put him with confidence in the middle of the trench, which I did on the next course. On the way to this trail the detachment overcame various obstacles: fences, barbed-wire and barriers of bundled logs. Without a bit of fear, the young soldier jumped into the bottom of the trench and prepared to meet the tank. The engagement was successful. Gimadeyev fired with precision at the vision devices on the combat vehicle, threw his grenade accurately under the turret itself and, allowing the tank to pass over his head, threw his second grenade into the transmission.



The trainees' burden grew. Having overcome the water-filled moat and the bridge across it, the motor riflemen reached the fifth course at a run. Here the detachment had to undergo roll-over without the trench. It was necessary to lie between the track ruts, let the tank pass overhead and, rising quickly, throw a grenade at it. This demanded restraint, coolness, courage and resoluteness from each trainee. In order to develop such qualities without a psychological breakdown, on the advice of the commander all trainees followed me and crawled underneath a tank standing still with the engine idling. While my subordinates were performing this action, I directed their attention to how the depth of the clearance and the width between the tracks insured the soldier's complete safety, if only on solid ground. I also pointed out to them that, when under the tank, they had to be wary, prepared to move to one side or the other to avoid being caught under the tracks.

During the roll-over, Pvt V. Klenkov "distinguished" himself in the unit. Instead of pressing flat to the ground when the vehicle advanced, he, showing everyone that he was too daring, contrived to crawl while underneath the tank, touching it with his back. I gave everyone a strict warning, saying that such menacing equipment is not to be trifled with. I explained what serious consequences such bravado could lead to: when the tank settles, the trainee could be injured.

On the sixth and seventh courses the motor riflemen learned to hurl grenades at the tank from a foxhole, from the balconies of a burning house (combat in the city) and from alongside the road (combat in the forest). They learned how to jump from a height onto the rear of a tank in order to blind the crew with a rain-cape and to put the gun and vision devices out of commission. Here a certain systematic sequence was strictly observed. The jumps onto the tank from windows, house balconies and trees were at first carried out on a stationary vehicle, then onto a vehicle moving at minimum speed. Only then was the armored vehicle's speed brought up to combat speed. Pvt Chichkov and Pvt Fedyanichev performed particularly nimbly as a pair. Calculating the exact moment, they simultaneously leaped onto the rear of the tank. One of them instantly smeared the driver-mechanic's vision devices with wet clay and covered the vehicle commander's devices with a rain-cape. The other used a small entrenching tool to put the observation devices out of commission. The rest of the soldiers continued to acquire skill in throwing hand grenades accurately over distances. They developed methods of blowing up "enemy" tanks and armored combat vehicles with the aid of antitank weapons.

At the end of the exercises, practice in jumping onto tanks was arranged for the personnel [course eight]. The motor riflemen learned how to quickly occupy positions on the rear of a combat vehicle--first at low speeds, then at high. They learned to dismount at full speed, to make a concerted attack on a defended post in cooperation with a tank and to throw grenades at "enemy" infantry taking shelter in a trench.

The exercises took place with great intensity. The trainees received a good physical and psychological work-out and acquired valuable skills in combating infantry armored vehicles. These skills were soon after consolidated in a tactical exercise.

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